Administrative Law Commons^™

Can He Legally Do That? Does The President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, Robert V. Percival

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Chevron Without The Courts? The Supreme Court's Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through An Immigration Lens, Shruti Rana

Faculty Scholarship

The limits of administrative law are undergoing a seismic shift in the immigration arena. Chevron divides interpretive and decision-making authority between the federal courts and agencies in each of two steps. The Supreme Court may now be transforming this division in largely unrecognized ways. These shifts, currently playing out in the immigration context, may threaten to reshape deference jurisprudence by handing more power to the immigration agency just when the agency may be least able to handle that power effectively.

An unprecedented surge in immigration cases—now approximately 90% of the federal administrative docket—has arrived just as the Court is whittling …

Marginalizing Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

A major focus of finance is reducing risk on investments, a goal commonly achieved by dispersing the risk among numerous investors. Sometimes, however, risk dispersion can cause investors to underestimate and under-protect against risk. Risk can even be so widely dispersed that rational investors individually lack the incentive to monitor it. This Article examines the market failures resulting from risk dispersion and analyzes when government regulation may be necessary or appropriate to limit these market failures. The Article also examines how such regulation should be designed,including the extent to which it should limit risk dispersion in the first instance.

Understanding Regulatory Capture: An Academic Perspective From The United States, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Although it sometimes seems that financial regulatory agencies have been entirely captured by the larger players in the industry they regulate, a closer examination reveals that a variety of factors contribute to policy outcomes in this arena. Agencies have different agendas and stakeholders, and banks often perform quasi-governmental roles that blur the line between the captors and the captured. The real danger is that public policy can be distorted as a result of excessive influence by one set of interests at the expense of others. This danger is best thwarted or at least mitigated through the application of a range …

Accountability In Patenting Of Federally Funded Research, Arti K. Rai, Bhaven N. Sampat

Faculty Scholarship

Bayh-Dole allows academic grantees to patent federally-funded research for purposes of promoting the commercialization of this research. To ensure commercialization goals are achieved, the Act requires grantees to report to funding agencies not only the existence of federally-funded patents but also utilization efforts they and their licensees/assignees are making.

Although reporting is a cornerstone of accountability under Bayh-Dole, information about grantee compliance with reporting requirements is incomplete and dated. In fact, the last significant study of the question dates back to the late 1990s and analyzes only 633 patents. Since that time, concerns have emerged that federally-funded university patents are …

Regulatory Techniques And Liability Regimes For Asset Managers, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Benefits Of Capture, Dorit Rubinstein Reiss

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulating The Workplace: Three Models Of Labor And Employment Law In The United States, Reuel E. Schiller

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Political Turn In American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, And Reasons, Jodi L. Short

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Paranoid Style In Regulatory Reform, Jodi L. Short

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Embracing Administrative Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

This Foreword begins with the descriptive claim that much of administrative law is really administrative common law: doctrines and requirements that are largely judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, the President, or individual agencies. Although governing statutes exert some constraining force on judicial creativity, the primary basis of these judge-fashioned doctrines lies in judicial conceptions of appropriate institutional roles, along with pragmatic and normative concerns, that are frequently constitutionally infused and developed incrementally through precedent. Yet the judicially created character of administrative law is rarely acknowledged and often condemned by courts.

Turning from descriptive to more normative, …

Serial Litigation In Administrative Law: What Can Repeat Cases Tell Us About Judicial Review, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

In Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, Emily Meazell takes up the topic of serial administrative law litigation. These repeated rounds of challenges and remands, which Meazell finds are particularly prevalent in contexts of risk regulation, provide a new lens on court-agency relationships. Meazell closely reviews several instances of such litigation, spanning topics as diverse as endangered species, potential workplace carcinogens, and financial qualifications of nuclear plant operators. She argues that such close examination reveals a process of dialogue, with agencies ultimately (if not immediately) responding to judicial concerns and courts in turn acknowledging administrative responses.

The Case For Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, Rena I. Steinzor

Faculty Scholarship

A series of catastrophic regulatory failures have focused attention on theweakened condition of regulatory agencies assigned to protect public health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment. The destructive convergence of funding shortfalls, political attacks, and outmoded legal authority have set the stage for ineffective enforcement, unsupervised industry self-regulation, and a slew of devastating and preventable catastrophes. From the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico to the worst mining disaster in forty years at the Big Branch mine in West Virginia, the signs of regulatory dysfunction abound. Many stakeholders expected that President Barack Obama would recognize and ameliorate …

The End Game Of Deregulation: Myopic Risk Management And The Next Catastrophe, Thomas O. Mcgarity, Rena I. Steinzor

Faculty Scholarship

On December 22, 2008, the contents of an enormous impoundment containing coal-ash slurry from the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant poured into the Emory River. The proximate cause of the spill was the bursting of a poorly reinforced dike holding back a pit of sludge that towered 80 feet above the river and 40 feet above an adjacent road. The volume and force of the spill were so large that 1.1 billion gallons of the inky mess flowed across the river, inundating 300 acres of land in a layer four to five feet deep, uprooting trees, destroying …

When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach To The Biggest Sticks In An Agency's Arsenal, Brigham Daniels

Faculty Scholarship

A regulatory agency’s arsenal often contains multiple weapons. Occasionally, however, an agency has the power to completely obliterate its regulatory targets or to make major waves in society by using a “regulatory nuke.” A regulatory nuke is a tool with two primary characteristics. First, it packs power sufficient to profoundly impact individual regulatory targets or significantly affect important aspects of society or the economy. Second, from the perspective of the regulatory agency, it is politically unavailable in all but the most extreme situations. They are found in many corners of the federal bureaucracy. This Article illustrates that even when individual …

Capture Nuances In The Contest For Financial Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Applying capture analysis in the hotly contested arena of financial regulation is difficult. Numerous regulators with widely differing missions and widely diverse stakeholders are involved. Regulators operate under widely differing authorizing legislation. They even function at different levels of government. Agencies are often at odds with each other when it comes to determining optimal public policy. Unlike policy disputes in many other areas of regulation, which can be settled by reference to scientific data, public policy in financial regulation rests profoundly on essentially contested economic ideologies. This makes financial policy doubly difficult: one the one hand, it requires deep expertise—and …

"Deference" Is Too Confusing – Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" And "Skidmore Weight", Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay suggests an underappreciated, appropriate, and conceptually coherent structure to the Chevron relationship of courts to agencies, grounded in the concept of "allocation." Because the term "deference" muddles rather than clarifies the structure's operation, this Essay avoids speaking of "Chevron deference" and "Skidmore deference." Rather, it argues, one could more profitably think in terms of "Chevron space" and "Skidmore weight." "Chevron space" denotes the area within which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints – that is, its allocated authority. "Skidmore weight" …

A Current Assessment Of Some Extraterritorial Impacts Of The Dodd-Frank Act With Special Focus On The Volcker Rule And Derivatives Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

As the world struggles to emerge from the Global Financial Crisis the vision of a harmonious framework of global financial regulation seems as distant as ever. Important progress made by international committees such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board notwithstanding, there seem to be increasing signs of unilateral, extraterritorial action by major jurisdictions, including the United States. This paper reviews the framework created by the US financial reforms, in particular anti money laundering provisions, the Volcker Rule and the proposed OTC derivatives margin requirements, and considers some of the dilemmas presented by modern global …

Energy Policy: Past Or Prologue?, Michael J. Graetz

Faculty Scholarship

The United States was remarkably complacent about energy policy until the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Since then, we have relied on unnecessarily costly regulations and poorly designed subsidies to mandate or encourage particular forms of energy production and use. Our presidents have quested after an elusive technological “silver bullet.” Congress has elevated parochial interests and short-term political advantages over national needs. Despite the thousands of pages of energy legislation enacted over the past four decades, Congress has never demanded that Americans pay a price that reflects the full costs of the energy they consume. Given our nation’s economic fragility, …

Exhausted, Giovanna Shay

Faculty Scholarship

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) contains an administrative exhaustion provision that was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Woodford v. Ngo in 2006 to impose a procedural default component. This piece argues that we should take seriously Justice Breyer’s Woodford concurrence, in which he noted that administrative law doctrine contains well-established exceptions to exhaustion. Although this point might at first seem inconsistent with other Supreme Court cases interpreting the PLRA, this Article argues that Justice Breyer’s concurrence can be reconciled with those opinions. PLRA exhaustion invokes regular administrative law exhaustion doctrine so long as it is not inconsistent with …

Justice Stevens And The Chevron Puzzle, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Justice Stevens's most famous decision – Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC – has come to stand for an institutional choice approach to agency interpretation. But there is no evidence that Justice Stevens shared this understanding. Instead, he followed an equilibrium-preserving approach, which sought to nudge agencies to reconsider decisions the Justice regarded as unreasonable. Although the equilibrium-preserving approach is consistent with what a common law judge would embrace, the institutional choice perspective is probably more consistent with the needs of the modem administrative state, and it appears the Court as a whole is gradually adopting that perspective.

Beyond The Private Attorney General: Equality Directives In American Law, Olatunde C.A. Johnson

Faculty Scholarship

American civil rights regulation is generally understood as relying on private enforcement in courts rather than imposing positive duties on state actors to further equity goals. This Article argues that this dominant conception of American civil rights regulation is incomplete. American civil rights regulation also contains a set of "equality directives," whose emergence and reach in recent years have gone unrecognized in the commentary. These federal-level equality directives use administrative tools of conditioned spending, policymaking, and oversight powerfully to promote substantive inclusion with regard to race, ethnicity, language, and disability. These directives move beyond the constraints of the standard private …

Accountability And The Bureau Of Consumer Financial Protection, Susan Block-Lieb

Faculty Scholarship

Some industry and political actors oppose the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) on the grounds that its institutional design ensures its lack of accountability. Specifically, opponents point to the CFPB’s regulatory and financial independence and to the fact that a single director heads the Bureau rather than a bipartisan panel of commissioners. But to focus on the Bureau’s financial independence and single director misses the distinctive political deal struck when Congress created the CFPB. The CFPB has been uniquely and intentionally structured to insulate it not only from interest group influence and executive interference, but also from congressional control, while …

To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Two very different visions of the national government underpin the ongoing battle over the Affordable Care Act (ACA). President Obama and supporters of the ACA believe in the power of government to protect individuals through regulation and collective action. By contrast, the ACA's Republican and Tea Party opponents see expanded government as a fundamental threat to individual liberty and view the requirement that individuals purchase minimum health insurance (the so-called "individual mandate") as the conscription of the healthy to subsidize the sick. This conflict over the federal government's proper role is, of course, not new; it has played out repeatedly …

Envisioning The Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy, And Institutional Experimentation In The 2010 Financial Reform And Oil Spill Statutes, K. Sabeel Rahman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Brand New Law! The Need To Market Health Care Reform, William M. Sage

Faculty Scholarship

The most serious problem with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is not its contents but its packaging. Because it requires significant departures from business as usual in health insurance, health care delivery, and health behavior, the ACA is unlikely to succeed unless Americans feel a shared stake in its success. Unfortunately, the new law has been branded only by its opponents. Neither the Obama administration nor its congressional allies have effectively communicated the law’s key elements to the public. Most surprisingly, the groundbreaking program of near-universal health coverage the ACA creates does not even have a name. …

Capture In Financial Regulation: Can We Redirect It Toward The Common Good?, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

“Regulatory capture” is central to regulatory analysis yet is a troublesome concept. It is difficult to prove and sometimes seems refuted by outcomes unfavorable to powerful interests. Nevertheless, the process of bank regulation and supervision fosters a closeness between regulator and regulated that would seem to be conducive to “capture” or at least to fostering undue sympathy by regulators for the companies they oversee. The influence of very large financial institutions has also become so great that financial regulation appears to have become excessively distorted in favor of these entities and to the detriment of many other legitimate interests, including …

Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies Across The Atlantic: The Office Of Information And Regulatory Affairs In The Us And The Impact Assessment Board In The Eu, Jonathan B. Wiener, Alberto Alemanno

Faculty Scholarship

‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ asked the Roman poet Juvenal – ‘who will watch the watchers, who will guard the guardians?’ As legislative and regulatory processes around the globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, we ask: who oversees the regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and beneficial, it can also impose its own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embracing, regulatory oversight--frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evaluation. We are especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new set of institutional actors, the …

Adaptive Regulation In The Amoral Bazaar, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Twelfth Oliver Schreiner Memorial Lecture,delivered on 20 October 2010 at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Many gradual changes in science, law and society are crystallizing to shape a significant transformation in administrative law. The doctrinal framework within which Justice Schreiner himself attempted to modernize how law should regulate government and private economic activity seems from our vantage point to be quite antiquated. In explaining why, my examples will come from the world of financial services, but they could easily be found anywhere in the area of law and regulation. First I will outline the …

State Enforcement Of Federal Law, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

Federal law is enforced through a combination of public and private efforts. Virtually all federal civil statutes vest enforcement authority in a federal agency; some also create private rights of action that permit private parties to sue to enforce federal law. Decades of commentary on the choice between public and private enforcement have generated a remarkably stable set of arguments about the strengths and weaknesses of each type. But the conventional wisdom tells only part of the story, as it ignores variations within the category of public enforcement. In fact, there are two distinct types of public enforcement. Many federal …