Administrative Law Commons^™

Symposium On Commercial Speech And Public Health, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

Does the constitutional protection of commercial speech impair the government's ability to protect and promote public health? Or does the commercial speech doctrine itself enhance consumer education and harness market competition to advance public health? Do First Amendment limitations on regulation of commercial messages unduly retard governmental efforts to safeguard consumers? Or do they properly constrain illiberal paternalism? If the Court has been over-protective of health-related commercial speech, is there a principled place to redraw the line? And how should those governmental agencies entrusted with the power to protect public health and welfare respond to these constitutional constraints?

The editors …

Mending Holes In The Rule Of (Administrative) Law, Evan J. Criddle

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

"Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control Of Administrative Power, David S. Rubenstein

William & Mary Law Review

Administrative agencies wield a necessary but dangerous power. Some control of that power is constitutionally required and normatively justified. Yet widely discordant views persist concerning the appropriate means of control. Scholars have proposed competing administrative control models that variably place the judiciary, the President, and Congress at the helm. Although these models offer critical insights into the institutional competencies of the respective branches, they tend to understate the limitations of those branches to check administrative power and ultimately marginalize the public interest costs occasioned by second-guessing administrative choice. The “relative checks” paradigm introduced here seeks to improve upon existing models …

Don't Take The Bait: Why Usda Organic Certification Is Wrong For Salmon, Jessica Hass

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.

Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation In Agency Rulemaking, Evan J. Criddle

Faculty Publications

Do administrative agencies undermine popular sovereignty when they make federal law? Over the last several decades, some scholars have argued that rulemaking by unelected agency officials imperils popular sovereignty and that federal law should resolve the apparent tension between regulatory practice and democratic principle by allowing the President to serve as a proxy for the "will of the people" in the administrative state. According to this view, placing federal rulemaking power firmly within the President's managerial control would advance popular preferences throughout the federal system.

This conventional wisdom is misguided. As political scientists have long recognized, the electorate's relative disengagement …

New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, And The Blurring Of Boundaries In Regulatory Theory And Practice, Jason M. Solomon

Faculty Publications

In the literature on "new governance" forms of regulation, the blurring of traditional boundaries is a pervasive but largely implicit theme. This Article makes this theme explicit, and argues that the capacity to blur boundaries is one of new governance's signature strengths. New governance regulation frequently blurs the roles of regulatory actors, the stages of regulation, the modes of regulation, the functions of a regulatory regime; and the structure of the regulatory regime. The Article applies this lens to a series of case studies, and demonstrates how industry attempts at preemptive self-regulation have created opportunities where new governance forms of …

Who Should Regulate? Federalism And Conflict In Regulation Of Green Buildings, Shari Shapiro

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.

The Devolution Of Nepa: How The Apa Transformed The Nation's Environmental Policy, Sam Kalen

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.

The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, And Statutory Silences, Jonathan H. Adler, Nathan Alexander Sales

Faculty Publications

Should agencies receive Chevron deference when interpreting the reach of their own jurisdiction? This Article argues that, in general, they should not. The authors begin by identifying and detailing the various different types of “jurisdictional questions” that may arise in statutory interpretation. The Article then surveys how courts have analyzed these different aspects of the jurisdiction problem, with a particular attention directed to statutory silences. The Court’s Chevron jurisprudence strongly suggests that deference to agency determinations of their own jurisdiction should be disfavored, particularly where a statute is silent (and not merely ambiguous) about the existence of agency jurisdiction. In …

Chevron's Consensus, Evan J. Criddle

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Administrative Judges' Role In Developing Social Policy, Charles H. Koch Jr.

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Doing More Or Doing Less For The Environment: Shedding Light On Epa's "Stealth" Method Of Environmental Enforcement, Ronald H. Rosenberg

Faculty Publications

Since the 1970s, environmental protection goals have gone from general statements of political desire to highly articulated systems of environmental regulation implemented by federal, state, and local governments. Environmental statutes have been enacted giving administrative agencies such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the responsibility for translating broad policy goals into specific regulatory requirements. Through its enforcement program, EPA seeks to assure that these general goals are achieved by individual actors. This Article examines a recent trend in EPA's practices, increased reliance on internal agency methods of enforcement. The study analyzes EPA's administrative enforcement system with particular emphasis on …

Hothouse Flowers: The Vices And Virtues Of Climate Federalism, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

Although economic theory would predict that states would lag behind federal efforts to control environmentally harmful emissions, there has been far more action on climate change in state capitols than in Washington, D.C. Without federal action, states have stepped in to fill the policy void on climate change. State-level action on climate change is unlikely, in itself, to have much impact on atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases or projected rates of future warming. Nonetheless, the level of state activity is significant.

The aggressiveness of state climate policy initiatives, and potential conflict between federal and state regulatory measures, provides an opportunity …

Money Or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences Of Uncompensated Land Use Controls, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

The conventional wisdom holds that requiring compensation for environmental land use controls would severely limit environmental protection efforts. There are increasing reasons to question this assumption. Both economic theory and recent empirical research--focused primarily on the Endangered Species Act but potentially applicable to other environmental regulations that create similar incentives--demonstrate that failing to compensate private landowners for the costs of regulation discourages voluntary conservation efforts and can encourage the destruction of environmental resources. The lack of a compensation requirement also means that land use regulation is "underpriced" as compared to other environmental protection measures for which government agencies must pay. …

Not-So-Independent Agencies: Party Polarization And The Limits Of Institutional Design, Neal Devins, David E. Lewis

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Primer For U.S. Lawyers On European Union Government And Law, Charles H. Koch Jr.

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Law And Governance In The 21st Century Regulatory State, Jason M. Solomon

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Reforming Our Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policy, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

Federal hazardous waste regulation and cleanup programs suffer from poor prioritization, insufficient flexibility, high costs, and questionable benefits. Many of these problems are a result of excessive regulatory centralization. The federal government has assumed primary responsibility for hazardous waste policy, placing states in a secondary role, even though the environmental threats posed by hazardous waste are generally quite localized. Hazardous waste itself is not a form of pollution, but rather a “precursor to pollution.” It only becomes an environmental problem when mismanaged, and allowed to contaminate land or water. Properly managed, however, hazardous waste is not a particularly pressing environmental …

Abbott Labs V. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Administrative Decisionmaking By Judges In The United States' Environmental Protection Agency Administrator's Civil Penalty Assessment Process: Whatever Happened To The Law?, Richard R. Wagner

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.

Warming Up To Climate Change Litigation, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

There was never any doubt that Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (“Mass. v. EPA”) would be a closely watched and hotly contested case. The surprise in Mass. v. EPA is the facility and ease with which the Court dispatched opposing arguments and redefined prior precedents. Not content to widen doctrines on the margins, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion blazed a new path through the law of standing and unearthed newfound regulatory authority for the EPA.

Now that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases, regulatory controls on motor vehicles (as well as on other sources of greenhouse gases, including …

The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, James E. Moliterno

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

When Is Two A Crowd? The Impact Of Federal Action On State Environmental Regulation, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

Despite the extensive scholarly literature assessing the proper role of federalism in environmental law, there has been relatively little analysis of why states adopt given environmental policies. There is even less consideration of how federal regulatory choices influence state environmental policy, and how a change in federal policy could influence states' willingness to adopt more environmental protections of their own. This Article seeks to address this gap by describing some of the factors that are likely to influence state environmental policy decisions and delineating how federal environmental policies can affect state policy choices. Specifically, this Article seeks to further the …

Democratizing The Administrative State, Richard J. Pierce Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state. By 1980, a majority of Supreme Court Justices seemed poised to hold that large portions of the administrative state are unconstitutional. In 1984, the Court retreated from that abyss and took a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the administrative state. It instructed lower courts to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute, basing this doctrine of deference on the superior political accountability of agencies. Henceforth, politically unaccountable judges were prohibited from substituting their policy preferences for those of politically accountable agencies. The …

"Standard" And "Alternative" Environmental Protection: The Changing Role Of Environmental Agencies, George B. Wyeth

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.

Fcc V. Wncn Listeners Guild: An Old-Fashioned Remedy For What Ails Current Judicial Review Law, Charles H. Koch Jr.

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Fiduciary Foundations Of Administrative Law, Evan J. Criddle

Faculty Publications

An enduring challenge for administrative law is the tension between the ideal of democratic policymaking and the ubiquity of bureaucratic discretion. This Article seeks to reframe the problem of agency discretion by outlining an interpretivist model of administrative law based on the concept of fiduciary obligation in private legal relations such as agency, trust, and corporation. Administrative law, like private fiduciary law, increasingly relies upon a tripartite framework of entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duty to demarcate a domain of bounded agency discretion. To minimize the risk that agencies will abuse their entrusted discretion through opportunism or carelessness, administrative law …

Plan B For The Fda: A Need For A Third Class Of Drug Regulation In The United States Involving A "Pharmacist-Only" Class Of Drugs, Matthew J. Seamon

William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice

No abstract provided.

What Do Snowmobiles, Mercury Emissions, Greenhouse Gases, And Runoff Have In Common?: The Controversy Over "Junk Science", Linda A. Malone

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, James E. Moliterno

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.