Accounting Law Commons^™

Addressing The Auditor Independence Puzzle: Regulatory Models And Proposal For Reform, Martin Gelter, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Auditors play a major role in corporate governance and capital markets. Ex ante, auditors facilitate firms’ access to finance by fostering trust among public investors. Ex post, auditors can prevent misbehavior and financial fraud by corporate insiders. In order to fulfill these goals, however, in addition to having the adequate knowledge and expertise, auditors must perform their functions in an independent manner. Unfortunately, auditors are subject to conflicts of interest by, for example, providing non-audit services or the mere fact of being hired and paid by the audited company. Therefore, even if auditors act independently, investors have reason to think …

The Auditor's Responsibilities For Fraud Detection And Disclosure: Do The Auditing Standards Provide A Safe Harbor?, James L. Costello

Maine Law Review

Eighty-seven percent of managers recently surveyed were willing to commit financial statement fraud. More than half were willing to overstate assets, forty-eight percent were willing to understate loss reserves and thirty-eight percent would "pad" a government contract. These disturbing results are underscored by the financial miseries still brewing in the savings and loan industry, as well as by other corporate and banking financial debacles of the past decade, including Lincoln Savings & Loan, Wedtech, and the Delorean sports car venture scandal. Amidst these financial ruins we find the chronic element of management fraud. Unfortunately for investors and depositors a troublesome …

From Legally Confidential To Financially Confident: Resolving The Tension Between Lawyers And Auditors Over Contingent Liability Disclosure, Samantha Nicole Kunz

CMC Senior Theses

Auditors review documented financial figures to test for their accuracy and materiality. Lawyers analyze evidential facts and records to build sound legal arguments. These parties work toward a mutual purpose: to present their clients as legitimate and compliant businesses. But what happens when the concrete facts upon which lawyers and auditors base their work are obscured by their inability to see into the future? In other words, how can these professions conjunctively handle potential future obligations brought about by contingent liabilities?

This study will attempt to resolve the tensions that emerge between lawyers and auditors when tasked with estimating the …

What's Good For The Goose Is Not Good For The Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, Lumen N. Mulligan

Michigan Law Review

In this Article, I contend that the Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired nonprofit reforms currently being put forward in seven states, particularly the costly disclosure requirements, will be of little value in the effort to improve ethical nonprofit board governance. After providing a primer on the oversight of nonprofit organizations and highlighting the unique difficulties facing the nonprofit sector the Article reviews the recent Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms introduced in seven states. It then contends that the disclosure- focused reforms that form the bulwark of these initiatives will not foster improved ethical nonprofit board governance. It also argues that this failure stems from the inappropriate …

Who's The Boss? Controlling Auditor Incentives Through Random Selection, David B. Kahn, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

It took the promise of knowledge to get Eve to yield to temptation. For people outside the Garden of Eden, money often does the job nicely. The U.S. capital markets are the locus of an enormous amount of money-and therefore of an enormous temptation for people who provide financial information to those markets to skew the reporting process to promote their own interests. The risk and potential consequences of skewed financial reporting are matters of grave concern.

Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too quickly when they prod the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based system. Priorities respecting reform of corporate reporting in the US need to be ordered more carefully. Incentive problems impairing audit performance should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect, the US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned …

Observations On The Role Of Commodification, Indpendence, And Governance In The Accounting Industry, Jonathan Macey, Hillary A. Sale

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Uncertain Litigation Cost And Seller Behavior: Evidence From An Auditing Game, Ping Zhang, Bryan K. Church, Lucy Ackert

Faculty Articles

Investigates difficulties that arise in estimating expected litigation costs in an auditing game in the United States. Effect of effort level on certain and uncertain costs of performing the engagement; Frequency of observed fee offers below the total expected cost of an engagement; Institutional arrangements and damage-sharing regimes; Theoretical and behavioral predictions.

Guarding The Guardians: Expanding Auditor Negligence Liability To Third-Party Users Of Financial Information, James W. Zisa

Campbell Law Review

The nature of today's financial information is changing faster than the public user can respond. The public is beginning to rely more heavily on the auditors of this information, imposing upon the professional a level of social responsibility unparalleled by that of prior years. This increasing reliance on the accounting profession is the focus of this Article. This paper will raise and discuss two interrelated issues. First, to whom, if anyone, should an auditor be held liable for negligence in the performance of his professional duties? Second, accepting the current system of legal responsibilities, what is the profession doing to …

Auditor Changes And Opinion Shopping- A Proposed Solution, Dale R. Rietberg

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that the existing regulatory mechanism has failed to address adequately the problem of opinion shopping, and that better means of ensuring the reliability of financial statements are needed. Part I describes the nature and extent of the opinion-shopping problem, including a discussion of its larger, macroeconomic impact. Part II argues that the underlying causes of the problem are systemic and that present safeguards against opinion shopping are inadequate. Finally, Part III examines some alternative solutions and proposes a system of Accounting Issue Inquiry Centers under the direction and auspices of the SEC. These Centers would be designed …

Current Problems Of Accountants' Responsibilities To Third Parties, T. J. Fiflis

Publications

No abstract provided.

Over-Accountable Accountants? A Proposal For Clarification Of The Legal Responsibilities Stemming From The Audit Function, Geoffrey T. Chalmers

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

How To Handle A Federal Income Tax Audit, Mortimer Caplin

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.