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Articles 1 - 30 of 80
Full-Text Articles in Law
We Need A New Glass-Steagall Act To End The Toxic Symbiosis Between Universal Banks And Shadow Banks, Which Professor Corrigan Has More Fully Revealed, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
We Need A New Glass-Steagall Act To End The Toxic Symbiosis Between Universal Banks And Shadow Banks, Which Professor Corrigan Has More Fully Revealed, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Patrick Corrigan’s recent article highlights the abuses of securitization by universal banks during the subprime lending boom that led to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC). Professor Corrigan’s article focuses on what Zoltan Pozsar and other researchers have called “internal” shadow banking—namely, the origination and securitization of hazardous loans by universal banks through nonbank affiliates, including broker-dealer subsidiaries and off-balance- sheet securitization vehicles. I agree with Professor Corrigan that the enormous credit risks generated by universal banks and their “internal” shadow banking affiliates played a major role in precipitating the GFC.
Professor Corrigan’s article gives less attention to what …
Racism As A Threat To Financial Stability, Cary Martin Shelby
Racism As A Threat To Financial Stability, Cary Martin Shelby
Northwestern University Law Review
This Article draws from several theoretical frameworks such as critical race theory, law and economics, and rule of law conceptions to argue that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) should formally recognize racism as a threat to financial stability due to its interconnectedness with recent and projected systemic disruptions. This Article begins by first introducing a novel model created by the author through which to dissect this claim. This “Systemic Disruption Model” provides a theoretical depiction of how racism drives every phase along the life-cycle continuum of a systemic disruption.
First, with respect to the Model’s “Introduction” phase, this Article …
We Must Protect Investors And Our Banking System From The Crypto Industry, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
We Must Protect Investors And Our Banking System From The Crypto Industry, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The crypto boom and crash of 2020-22 demonstrated that (i) cryptocurrencies with fluctuating values are extremely risky and highly volatile assets, and (ii) cryptocurrencies known as “stablecoins” are vulnerable to systemic runs whenever there are serious doubts about the adequacy of reserves backing those stablecoins. Crypto firms amplified the crypto boom with aggressive and deceptive marketing campaigns that targeted unsophisticated retail investors. Scandalous failures of prominent crypto firms accelerated the crypto crash by inflicting devastating losses on investors and undermining public confidence in crypto-assets.
Federal and state regulators have allowed banks to become significantly involved in crypto-related activities. Several FDIC-insured …
Systemic Stewardship, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Systemic Stewardship, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
This Article frames a normative theory of stewardship engagement by large institutional investors and asset managers that is congruent with their theory of investment management — “Modern Portfolio Theory” — which describes investors as attentive to both systematic risk as well as expected returns. Because investors want to maximize risk-adjusted returns, it will serve their interests for asset managers to support and sometimes advance shareholder initiatives that will reduce systematic risk. “Systematic stewardship” provides an approach to “ESG” matters that serves both investor welfare and social welfare and fits the business model of large, diversified funds, especially index funds. The …
Climate Change As Systemic Risk, Barnali Choudhury
Climate Change As Systemic Risk, Barnali Choudhury
Articles & Book Chapters
Hindsight tells us that COVID-19, thought by former President Trump and others to have come out of nowhere, is more aptly labelled a “gray rhino” event, one that was highly probable and preventable. Indeed, despite considerable evidence of the impending threats of pandemics, for the most part, governments failed to prepare for the pandemic, resulting in wide-scale social and economic losses.
The lessons from COVID-19, however, should remind us of the perils of ignoring gray rhino risks. Nowhere is this more apparent than with climate change, a highly probable, high impact threat that has largely been ignored to date. Despite …
Wirecard And Greensill Scandals Confirm Dangers Of Mixing Banking And Commerce, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
Wirecard And Greensill Scandals Confirm Dangers Of Mixing Banking And Commerce, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The pandemic crisis has accelerated the entry of financial technology (“fintech”) firms into the banking industry. Some of the new fintech banks are owned or controlled by commercial enterprises. Affiliations between commercial firms and fintech banks raise fresh concerns about the dangers of mixing banking and commerce. Recent scandals surrounding the failures of Wirecard and Greensill Capital (Greensill) reveal the potential magnitude of those perils.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) have encouraged commercial enterprises to acquire fintech banks. The FDIC has authorized commercial firms to acquire FDIC-insured industrial banks …
Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …
The Occ's And Fdic's Attempts To Confer Banking Privileges On Nonbanks And Commercial Firms Violate Federal Laws And Are Contrary To Public Policy, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
The Occ's And Fdic's Attempts To Confer Banking Privileges On Nonbanks And Commercial Firms Violate Federal Laws And Are Contrary To Public Policy, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) have adopted several recent measures that attempt to confer benefits and privileges of banks on nonbank providers of financial services and commercial firms. The OCC’s and FDIC’s initiatives are unlawful and dangerous because they would allow nonbanks and commercial firms to subvert fundamental public policies embodied in federal laws governing banks and bank holding companies.
In 2018, the OCC announced that it would approve national bank charters for “fintech” firms that provide lending and payment services but do not accept deposits. The New York …
The Fdic Should Not Allow Commercial Firms To Acquire Industrial Banks, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
The Fdic Should Not Allow Commercial Firms To Acquire Industrial Banks, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
On March 17, 2020, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) published a proposed rule (the “Proposed ILC Rule”), which would govern applications for deposit insurance, changes in control, and mergers involving FDIC-insured industrial banks and industrial loan companies (“ILCs”). If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would open the door to widespread acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms engaged in industrial, retail, information technology, and other types of nonfinancial activities. In addition, on March 18, 2020, the FDIC approved deposit insurance applications filed by ILCs owned by two commercial firms – Square and Nelnet.
The FDIC’s issuance of the Proposed ILC …
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
At year-end 2005, almost all of the total assets of Iceland’s banking system were concentrated in just three banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki). These banks were criticized by certain financial analysts in early 2006 for being overly dependent on wholesale funding, much of it short-term, that could easily disappear if creditors’ confidence in these banks faltered for any reason. Landsbanki, followed later by Kaupthing and then Glitnir, responded to this criticism and replaced part of their wholesale funding by using online accounts to gather deposits from individuals across Europe. In Landsbanki’s case, these new deposits were marketed under the name …
Open Banking: Regulatory Challenges For A New Form Of Financial Intermediation In A Data-Driven World, Nydia Remolina
Open Banking: Regulatory Challenges For A New Form Of Financial Intermediation In A Data-Driven World, Nydia Remolina
Centre for AI & Data Governance
Data has taken immense importance in the last years. Consider the amount of data that is being collected worldwide every day, industries are reshaping their activities into a data-driven business. The digital transformation of all industries, portent of the fourth industrial revolution, is creating a new kind of economy based on the datafication of almost any aspect of human social, political and economic activity as a result of the information generated by the numerous daily routines of digitally connected individuals and technology. The financial services industry is part of this trend. Embracing the digital revolution and creating the right foundations …
The ‘Security Pacific Letter’: Estimating The Causal Effect Of Securitization On Banks’ Systemic Exposure, Paul-Angelo Dell'isola
The ‘Security Pacific Letter’: Estimating The Causal Effect Of Securitization On Banks’ Systemic Exposure, Paul-Angelo Dell'isola
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs
This paper aims to test the hypothesis of the ‘Safe Asset narrative’
which states that banks became manufacturers of pseudo safe assets to meet
a global shortage of safe assets in the pre-crisis period. In this narrative,
securitization is the mechanism which enables banks to become underwriters
of safe assets. This paper takes this hypothesis to the data and attempts to
estimate the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. In
particular, this paper exploits a regulatory change that occurred in 1987 when
the OCC expanded the scope of assets US national banks could securitize. By
using state-chartered banks …
Digital Market Perfection, Rory Van Loo
Digital Market Perfection, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
Google’s, Apple’s, and other companies’ automated assistants are increasingly serving as personal shoppers. These digital intermediaries will save us time by purchasing grocery items, transferring bank accounts, and subscribing to cable. The literature has only begun to hint at the paradigm shift needed to navigate the legal risks and rewards of this coming era of automated commerce. This Article begins to fill that gap first by surveying legal battles related to contract exit, data access, and deception that will determine the extent to which automated assistants are able to help consumers to search and switch, potentially bringing tremendous societal benefits. …
The European Aspects Of Global Financial Developments, Virag Ilona Blazsek
The European Aspects Of Global Financial Developments, Virag Ilona Blazsek
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
What is the position of Europe—and specifically the European Union (EU)—on the world map of global finances in 2017? This comment seeks to answer this question by focusing on three key issues. First, it analyzes Europe’s post-2008 bank bailouts, its sector-wide rescue packages, and its consequential sovereign-debt crisis. Second, it considers the role of the international credit rating agencies and asks why Europe does not have a large rating agency of its own. Third, it assesses the EU’s major recent regulatory developments related to the financial sector. There is no doubt that Europe is in a sustained economic and political …
Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case Of Fintech, Rory Van Loo
Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case Of Fintech, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
Finance startups are offering automated advice, touchless payments, and other products that could bring great societal benefits, including lower prices and expanded access to credit. Yet unlike in other digital arenas in which American companies were global leaders, such as search engines and ride hailing, the U.S. has lagged in consumer finance. This Article posits that the current competition framework is holding back consumer financial innovation. It then identifies a contributor that has yet to be articulated: the organizational design of administrative agencies. Competition authority—including antitrust and the extension of business licenses—is spread across at least five regulators. Each is …
Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, Yesha Yadav
Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
To build resilience within the financial system, post-Crisis regulation relies heavily on banks to fund themselves more fully by issuing equity. This reserve of value should buttress failing banks by providing a mechanism to pay off creditors and depositors and preserve the health of financial markets. In the process, shareholders are wiped out. Scholars and policymakers, however, have neglected to examine which equity investors, in fact, are purchasing bank equity and taking on the default risk of U.S. banks. This Article addresses this question. First, it shows that five asset managers - BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street Global Advisors, Fidelity and …
Taxing Systemic Risk, Eric D. Chason
Taxing Systemic Risk, Eric D. Chason
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
A tax on the harmful elements of finance—a tax on systemic risk—would raise revenue and also lower the likelihood of future crisis. Financial institutions, which pay the tax, would try to minimize its cost by lowering their systemic risk. In theory, a tax on systemic risk is perfect policy. In practice, however, this perfect policy is unattainable. Tax laws need clear definitions to be administrable. Our current understanding of systemic risk is too abstract and too metaphorical to serve as a target for taxation.
Despite the absence of a clear definition of systemic risk, academics and policy makers continue to …
Bank Governance And Systemic Stability: The "Golden Share" Approach, Saule T. Omarova
Bank Governance And Systemic Stability: The "Golden Share" Approach, Saule T. Omarova
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has sharply reframed the debate on the role of bank corporate governance as a mechanism of systemic crisis prevention. Among other things, it revealed how often the incentives of bank managers and shareholders to maximize short-term private gains are perfectly aligned as a matter of internal governance, but work directly against the broader public interest in preserving long-term financial stability. This Article accepts the existence of that built-in potential conflict as the critical starting point for answering the central question of post-crisis bank governance: How do we ensure that the board of directors of …
Luck, Justice And Systemic Financial Risk, John Linarelli
Luck, Justice And Systemic Financial Risk, John Linarelli
Scholarly Works
Systemic financial risk is one of the most significant collective action problems facing societies. The Great Recession brought attention to a tragedy of the commons in capital markets, in which market participants, from first-time homebuyers to Wall Street financiers, acted in ways beneficial to themselves individually, but which together caused substantial collective harm. Two kinds of risk are at play in complex chains of transactions in financial markets: ordinary market risk and systemic risk. Two moral questions are relevant in such cases. First, from the standpoint of interactional morality, does a person have a moral duty to avoid risk of …
Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, Kathryn Judge
Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
Financial regulations often encourage or require market participants to hold particular types of financial assets. One unintended consequence of this form of regulation is that it can spur innovation to increase the effective supply of favored assets. This Article examines when and how changes in the law prompt the spread of “investor-driven financial innovations.” Weaving together theory, recent empirical findings, and illustrations, this Article provides an overview of why investors prefer certain types of financial assets to others, how markets respond, and how the spread of investor-driven innovations can transform the structure of the financial system. This examination suggests that …
The Regulatory State In The Information Age, Julie E. Cohen
The Regulatory State In The Information Age, Julie E. Cohen
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Article examines the regulatory state through the lens of evolving political economy, arguing that a significant reconstruction is now underway. The ongoing shift from an industrial mode of development to an informational one has created existential challenges for regulatory models and constructs developed in the context of the industrial economy. Contemporary contests over the substance of regulatory mandates and the shape of regulatory institutions are most usefully understood as moves within a larger struggle to chart a new direction for the regulatory state in the era of informational capitalism. A regulatory state optimized for the information economy must develop …
In Praise Of Ex Ante Regulation, Brian Galle
In Praise Of Ex Ante Regulation, Brian Galle
Vanderbilt Law Review
The plaintiffs' daughter was four years old when they brought her in to the local medical clinic. Clinic staff gave the girl a sedative to keep her calm while they examined her, but they miscalculated the dose, and she later died.' Tort liability, or the specter of it, is supposed to discourage these kinds of preventable tragedies. The clinic's owner, fearing a potential crippling award to bereaved families, should have trained his staff more carefully. As it happens, the owner instead had carefully scooped all the assets out of the firm. When the girl's parents won a $34.6 million award …
How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency In Capital Markets, Yesha Yadav
How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency In Capital Markets, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article argues that the rise of algorithmic trading undermines efficient capital allocation in securities markets. It is a bedrock assumption in theory that securities prices reveal how effectively public companies utilize capital. This conventional wisdom rests on the straightforward premise that prices reflect available information about a security and that investors look to prices to decide where to invest and whether their capital is being productively used. Unsurprisingly, regulation relies pervasively on prices as a proxy for the allocative efficiency of investor capital.
Algorithmic trading weakens the ability of prices to function as a window into allocative efficiency. This …
Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Kenneth Ayotte
The usual reaction if one mentions bankruptcy as a mechanism for addressing a financial institution’s default is incredulity. Those who favor the rescue of troubled financial institutions, and even those who prefer that their assets be promptly sold to a healthier institution, treat bankruptcy as anathema. Everyone seems to agree that nothing good can come from bankruptcy. Indeed, the Chapter 11 filing by Lehman Brothers has been singled out by many the primary cause of the severe economic and financial contraction that followed, and proof that bankruptcy is disorderly and ineffective. As a result, ad-hoc rescue lending to avoid bankruptcy …
Investing And Pretending, Anita Krug
Investing And Pretending, Anita Krug
All Faculty Scholarship
One of the more prominent components of Dodd–Frank’s regulatory changes was Title VII, providing for the regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives known as “swaps.” A swap is a financial instrument whose value is based on an asset—the “reference asset”—that is wholly unrelated to the swap itself. Although there was much ado about swap regulation immediately after Dodd–Frank’s enactment, the same cannot be said of the many rules that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has subsequently adopted pursuant to its authority under Title VII. This Article critically evaluates the CFTC’s “swap rules” and identifies the regulatory vision that they reflect. …
International Financial Law: The Case Against Close-Out Netting, Vincent R. Johnson
International Financial Law: The Case Against Close-Out Netting, Vincent R. Johnson
Faculty Articles
In financial transactions today, a practice called “close-out netting” plays a key role in controlling and allocating risks. If anchored in the parties’ chosen contractual language and recognized by law, close-out netting can circumvent normal bankruptcy processes by providing for the acceleration of mutual obligations and the efficient calculations and settlement of the net balance. When correctly implemented, close-out netting can eliminate the risk that arises under ordinary bankruptcy principles.
Despite the support for close-out netting by lenders, scholars, regulators, and policy makers, a few attentive observers of financial law argue that close-out netting is unsound, and the argument against …
The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support In Money Market Fund Reform, Jill E. Fisch
The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support In Money Market Fund Reform, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
Since the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck,” money market funds (MMFs) have been the subject of ongoing policy debate. Many commentators view MMFs as a key contributor to the crisis because widespread redemption demands during the days following the Lehman bankruptcy contributed to a freeze in the credit markets. In response, MMFs were deemed a component of the nefarious shadow banking industry and targeted for regulatory reform. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) misguided 2014 reforms responded by potentially exacerbating MMF fragility while potentially crippling large segments of the MMF industry.
Determining the …
Implementing Symmetric Treatment Of Financial Contracts In Bankruptcy And Bank Resolution, E. J. Janger, John A.E. Pottow
Implementing Symmetric Treatment Of Financial Contracts In Bankruptcy And Bank Resolution, E. J. Janger, John A.E. Pottow
Articles
Financial contracts come in many forms and serve many functions in both the financial system and the broader economy. Repos secured by U.S. Treasury securities act as money substitutes and can play an important role as part of the money supply, while similarly structured repos, secured by more volatile collateral, may be used as speculative devices or hedges. Swaps can be used to insure against various types of market risk, from interest rates to oil prices, or they can operate as vehicles for highly leveraged investments. The parties to these instruments are sometimes major financial institutions and, other times, ordinary …
License To Deal: Mandatory Approval Of Complex Financial Products, Saule Omarova
License To Deal: Mandatory Approval Of Complex Financial Products, Saule Omarova
Saule T. Omarova
“There is definitely going to be another financial crisis around the corner because we haven’t solved any of the things that caused the previous crisis,” said hedge fund legend Mark Mobius, speaking in Tokyo nearly a full year after the United States officially embarked upon the greatest reform of financial services regulation since the New Deal. Today, the world is still reeling from the recent financial crisis, which ravaged even the strongest economies and left them battling recession, budget deficits, soaring unemployment, and political discontent. Facing another financial crisis in this situation is a frightening prospect. National governments, individually or …
Coming Up Short: The United States' Second-Best Strategies For Corralling Purely Speculative Derivatives, Timothy E. Lynch
Coming Up Short: The United States' Second-Best Strategies For Corralling Purely Speculative Derivatives, Timothy E. Lynch
Faculty Works
Purely speculative derivatives (PSDs) are derivatives in which neither counterparty is engaged in hedging. Unless used for entertainment purposes, PSDs are irrational, less-than-zero-sum transactions. Entities that engage in PSDs jeopardize their stakeholders and increase systemic risk. PSDs can also increase moral hazard, be used for regulatory arbitrage, and redirect resources away from efficient allocation of market capital. PSDs should be unenforceable, void for public policy reasons, except where expressly permitted to provide gambling entertainment, enhance price discovery, or increase liquidity for hedgers. In the U.S., however, PSDs are often legal and enforceable, even after the financial crisis of 2008 that …