Law Commons^™

How Separation Of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, Cynthia R. Farina

Cynthia R. Farina

No abstract provided.

Cleaning House: Congressional Commissioners For Standards, Josh Chafetz

Josh Chafetz

Given the profusion of congressional ethics scandals over the past two years, it is unsurprising that the new Democratic majority in the 110th Congress has made ethics reform a priority. But although both the House and the Senate have tightened their substantive rules, the way the rules are enforced has received almost no attention at all. This Comment argues that ethics enforcement should remain within the houses of Congress themselves. Taking enforcement power away from the houses is constitutionally questionable (under the Speech or Debate Clause), structurally unwise (given general concerns about separation of powers), and institutionally problematic (as it …

Executive Branch Contempt Of Congress, Josh Chafetz

Josh Chafetz

After former White House Counsel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten refused to comply with subpoenas issued by a congressional committee investigating the firing of a number of United States Attorneys, the House of Representatives voted in 2008 to hold them in contempt. The House then chose a curious method of enforcing its contempt citation: it filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that Miers and Bolten were in contempt of Congress and an injunction ordering them to comply with the subpoenas. The district court ruled for the House, although that ruling was subsequently stayed …

Who Speaks For The ‘People’ On Policy?, Alan E. Garfield

Alan E Garfield

No abstract provided.

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …

Lobue V. Christopher: Age-Old Separation Of Powers Debate Rages On As Court Rules Extradition Statute Unconstitutional, Joseph G. Silver

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Separation Of Powers And Unilateral Executive Action: The Constitutionality Of President Clinton's Mexican Loan Initiative, Kimberly D. Chapman

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Separation Of Powers Crisis: The Case Of Argentina, Manuel José J. García-Mansilla

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Interpreting Force Authorization, Scott Sullivan

Scott Sullivan

Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In their recent article, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014) Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins make the case against congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of federal statutes. They conclude that Congress, or a single House of Congress, may not defend the constitutionality of federal statutes in court even when the Executive Branch has decided not to do so but may litigate only in furtherance of Congress’s investigatory and disciplinary powers. Grove and Devins claim that congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates two separate but …

Institutional Autonomy And Constitutional Structure, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

This Review makes two claims. The first is that Paul Horwitz’s excellent book, "First Amendment Institutions," depicts the institutionalist movement in robust and provocative form. The second is that it would be a mistake to assume from its immersion in First Amendment jurisprudence (not to mention its title) that the book's implications are limited to the First Amendment. Professor Horwitz presents First Amendment institutionalism as a wide-ranging theory of constitutional structure whose focus is as much on constraining the authority of political government as it is on facilitating expression. These are the terms on which the book's argument — and, …

Is The Supreme Court Disabling The Enabling Act, Or Is Shady Grove Just Another Bad Opera?, Robert J. Condlin

Robert J. Condlin

After seventy years of trying, the Supreme Court has yet to agree on whether the Rules Enabling Act articulates a one or two part standard for determining the validity of a Federal Rule. Is it enough that a Federal Rule regulates “practice and procedure,” or must it also not “abridge substantive rights”? The Enabling Act seems to require both, but the Court is not so sure, and the costs of its uncertainty are real. Among other things, litigants must guess whether the decision to apply a Federal Rule in a given case will depend upon predictable ritual, judicial power grab, …

Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent Barnett

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

Three competing constitutional and practical concerns surround federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”), who preside over all formal adjudications within the executive branch. First, if ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), as five current Supreme Court Justices have suggested, the current method of selecting many ALJs likely violates the Appointments Clause. Second, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision reserved the question whether the statutory protections that prevent ALJs from being fired at will impermissibly impinge upon the President’s supervisory power under Article II. Third, these same protections from removal may, on the other hand, be too limited to satisfy impartiality …

Curiouser And Curiouser: The Supreme Court's Separation Of Powers Wonderland, Bernard Schwartz

Notre Dame Law Review

No abstract provided.

Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg

Michigan Law Review

Imagine two presidents. The first campaigned on an issue that requires him to expand the role of the federal government-—maybe it was civil rights legislation or stricter sentencing for federal criminals. In contrast, the second president pushes policies—-financial deregulation, perhaps, or drug decriminalization—-that mean less government involvement. Each is elected in a decisive fashion, and each claims a mandate to advance his agenda. The remaining question is what steps each must take to achieve his goals. The answer is clear, and it is surprising. To implement his preferred policies, the first president faces the full gauntlet of checks and balances-—from …

Toil And Trouble: How The Erie Doctrine Became Structurally Incoherent (And How Congress Can Fix It), Alan M. Trammell

Fordham Law Review

The Erie doctrine is still a minefield. It has long been a source of frustration for scholars and students, and recent case law has exacerbated the troubles. Although other scholars have noted and criticized these developments, this Article explores a deeper systemic problem that remains undeveloped in the literature. In its present form, the Erie doctrine fails to protect any coherent vision of the structural interests that supposedly are at its core—federalism, separation of powers, and equality.

This Article argues that Congress has the power to fix nearly all of these problems. Accordingly, it proposes a novel statute to revamp …

A Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, William R. Sherman

Michigan Law Review

These things we know to be true: Our modern administrative state is a leviathan unimaginable by the Founders. It stands on thin constitutional ice, on cracks between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It burdens and entangles state and local governments in schemes that threaten federalism. And it presents an irresolvable dilemma regarding democratic accountability and political independence. We know these things to be true because these precepts animate some of the most significant cases and public law scholarship of our time. Underlying our examination of administrative agencies is an assumption that the problems they present would have been bizarre …

Law Matters, Even To The Executive, Julian Davis Mortenson

Michigan Law Review

In both constitutional and international law, many legal rules cannot be implemented without what most people would describe as the voluntary compliance of their target. Is that really “law”? Or is rule compliance in such circumstances just an expression of “interests”? Forget jurisprudence for the moment. As a practical matter, what does it mean to work as a lawyer in a field where the rules are not coercively enforced against private parties by an independent judiciary whose orders are implemented by a cooperative executive? This question has particularly high stakes for national security policy, where we find judicial deference at …

Bond, Buckley, And The Boundaries Of Separation Of Powers Standing, William Marks

Vanderbilt Law Review

A constitutional crisis is at hand. It is 2017, and a new President of the United States has taken office.' The new President generally opposes environmental regulations and accordingly nominated a candidate for Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") with a deregulatory track record. The Senate, however, stood in the way: a proenvironment party holds the majority and threatened to filibuster. New presidents in this situation typically withdraw their nominations to avoid political embarrassment. But this time was different. In a forceful display of executive authority, the President unilaterally installed the nominee as the EPA Administrator. True, this action …

Judicial Independence And Social Welfare, Michael D. Gilbert

Michigan Law Review

Judicial independence is a cornerstone of American constitutionalism. It empowers judges to check the other branches of government and resolve cases impartially and in accordance with law. Yet independence comes with a hazard. Precisely because they are independent, judges can ignore law and pursue private agendas. For two centuries, scholars have debated those ideas and the underlying tradeoff: independence versus accountability. They have achieved little consensus, in part because independence raises difficult antecedent questions. We cannot decide how independent to make a judge until we agree on what a judge is supposed to do. That depends on one’s views about …

Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof

Michigan Law Review

The recent controversy surrounding President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions illustrates the need to reach a new understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. For the Recess Appointments Clause to be functional, it must fulfill two essential constitutional purposes: it must act as a fulcrum in the separation of powers, and it must ensure the continued exercise of the executive power. Achieving this functionality depends not only on the formal constructions of the Clause but also on the ways in …

Clapper V. Amnesty International: Two Or Three Competing Philosophies Of Standing Law?, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In its 2013 decision Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Supreme Court invoked separation of powers principles in holding that public interest groups alleging that the Government was spying on their foreign clients failed to demonstrate Article III standing because they could not prove that the future surveillance injury that they purportedly feared was “certainly impending.” Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion argued “commonsense” suggested that the Government was spying on the plaintiffs’ foreign clients and proposed a “reasonable” or “high” probability standing test. Implicitly, the Clapper decision presented a third approach to standing decisions. In footnote 5, the majority opinion acknowledged that …

The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

When a court concludes that an agency’s decision is erroneous, the ordinary rule is to remand to the agency to consider the issue anew (as opposed to the court deciding the issue itself). Despite that the Supreme Court first articulated this ordinary remand rule in the 1940s and has rearticulated it repeatedly over the years, little work has been done to understand how the rule works in practice, much less whether it promotes the separation-of-powers values that motivate the rule. This Article is the first to conduct such an investigation—focusing on judicial review of agency immigration adjudications and reviewing the …

The Death Of Tax Court Exceptionalism, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

Tax exceptionalism—the view that tax law does not have to play by the administrative law rules that govern the rest of the regulatory state—has come under attack in recent years. In 2011, the Supreme Court rejected such exceptionalism by holding that judicial review of the Treasury Department’s interpretations of the tax code is subject to the same Chevron deference regime that applies throughout the administrative state. The D.C. Circuit followed suit by rejecting the IRS’s position that its notices are not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This Article calls for the demise of another instance …

Does State National Bank Of Big Spring V. Geithner Stand A Fighting Chance?, Devon J. Steinmeyer

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Two years after the start of the 2008 financial crisis and during one of the worst economic recessions since the Great Depression, Congress passed a law designed to insure a financial crisis of the same magnitude would not occur again, and if it did, it would not have the same wide-reaching effects the 2008 crisis had. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sought to, among other things, end “too big to fail,” consolidate the consumer protection agencies, and provide for the orderly liquidation of defaulting systematically important companies. State National Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, a …

The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

Although the framers of the Australian Constitution adopted many features of the United States Constitution, they rejected the separation of legislative and executive power in favour of responsible government in a parliamentary system like that of the United Kingdom. In doing so, Australians depended on existing conventions about the nature of responsible government instead of specification of its attributes in constitutional text. The United States Constitution contains detailed provisions about separation of powers, but unwritten conventions have produced some central features of American government. This article reviews conventions developed by Congress that constrain Presidents in the domestic sphere with regard …

Self-Help And The Separation Of Powers, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

Self-help doctrines pervade the law. They regulate a legal subject's attempts to cure or prevent a perceived wrong by her own action, rather than through a mediated process. In their most acute form, these doctrines allow subjects to take what international lawyers call countermeasures – measures that would be forbidden if not pursued for redressive ends. Countermeasures are inescapable and invaluable. They are also deeply concerning, prone to error and abuse and to escalating cycles of vengeance. Disciplining countermeasures becomes a central challenge for any legal regime that recognizes them.

How does American constitutional law meet this challenge? This Article …

To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The U.S. Constitution imposes three key limits on the design of federal agencies. It constrains how agency officers are appointed, the extent of their independence from the President, and the range of issues that they can decide. Scholars have trumpeted the importance of these safeguards with soaring rhetoric. And the Supreme Court has permitted regulated parties to vindicate these safeguards through implied private rights of action under the Constitution. Regulated parties, for their part, have been successfully challenging agency structure with increased frequency. At the same time, regulated parties, courts, and scholars have largely ignored the practical question of “structural …

Institutional Autonomy And Constitutional Structure, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

This Review makes two claims. The first is that Paul Horwitz’s excellent book, "First Amendment Institutions," depicts the institutionalist movement in robust and provocative form. The second is that it would be a mistake to assume from its immersion in First Amendment jurisprudence (not to mention its title) that the book's implications are limited to the First Amendment. Professor Horwitz presents First Amendment institutionalism as a wide-ranging theory of constitutional structure whose focus is as much on constraining the authority of political government as it is on facilitating expression. These are the terms on which the book's argument — and, …

Treaty Termination And Historical Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

The termination of U.S. treaties provides an especially rich example of how governmental practices can provide a “gloss” on the Constitution’s separation of powers. The authority to terminate treaties is not addressed specifically in the constitutional text and instead has been worked out over time through political-branch practice. This practice, moreover, has developed largely without judicial review. Despite these features, Congress and the President—and the lawyers who advise them—have generally treated this issue as a matter of constitutional law rather than merely political happenstance. Importantly, the example of treaty termination illustrates not only how historical practice can inform constitutional understandings …