Law Commons^™

State Separation Of Powers And The Federal Courts, Ann Woolhandler

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The cases discussed herein mostly surfaced in the regulatory era of the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. This Article first discusses arguments as to state delegations of legislative power, and the Court’s rejection of legislative-style deference that state agencies often argued for. This Article next discusses the Court’s decisions as to state adjudicative bodies, and its refusal to treat state agency adjudicators as full-fledged courts. This Article then addresses the Court’s response to arguments for unreviewable executive discretion and to laws allowing delegations to private parties. It then addresses whether the discussion sheds light …

On The Nexus Between The Strength Of The Separation Of Powers And The Power Of The Judiciary, Rivka Weill

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article makes four novel arguments: (1) There is an inverse relationship between the strength of a separation of powers structure and the strength of the judiciary. In a strong separation of powers structure, one should expect a weaker judiciary, and vice versa. This nexus exists empirically, and is supported on normative and strategic grounds. (2) This nexus is manifested through a web of common law doctrines that developed to support a given separation of powers structure and shape the judicial oversight of the political branches. This Article identifies a list of common law doctrines—including standing, justiciability, deference, and judicial …

The Empty Promise Of The Fourth Amendment In The Family Regulation System, Anna Arons

Faculty Publications

Each year, state agents search the homes of hundreds of thousands of families across the United States under the auspices of the family regulation system. Through these searches—required elements of investigations into allegations of child maltreatment in virtually every jurisdiction—state agents invade the home, the most protected space in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Accordingly, federal courts agree that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies to family regulation home searches. But almost universally, the abstract recognition of Fourth Amendment protections runs up against a concrete expectation on the ground that state actors should have easy and expansive access to families’ homes. Legislatures …

Alexander Hamilton And Administrative Law: How America’S First Great Public Administrator Informs And Challenges Our Understanding Of Contemporary Administrative Law, Rodger D. Citron

Scholarly Works

Alexander Hamilton’s recognition and reputation have soared since the premiere of “Hamilton,” Lin-Manuel Miranda’s musical about him in 2015. For lawyers, Hamilton’s work on the Federalist Papers and service as the nation’s first Treasury Secretary likely stand out more than other aspects of his extraordinary life. Politics and economics were fundamental concerns addressed by the Framers in a number of ways, including what we now refer to as administrative law—the laws and procedures that guide government departments (or, as we say today, agencies). Indeed, “Hamilton” reminds us that questions of administration and administrative law have been with us since the …

Lessons Of The Plague Years, Barry Sullivan

Faculty Publications & Other Works

The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged governments of every description across the globe, and it surely would have tested the mettle of any American administration. But the pandemic appeared in the United States at a particularly inopportune time. January 2020 marked the beginning of a presidential election year in a deeply polarized country. President Donald Trump was a controversial figure, beginning the fourth year of a highly idiosyncratic administration. He was both a candidate for re-election and the subject of an ongoing impeachment proceeding. In these circumstances, the pandemic quickly became politicized. President Trump's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has often …

Intraparty Conflict And The Separation Of Powers, Gregory A. Elinson

College of Law Faculty Publications

Intent on reconciling constitutional theory to political reality, public law scholars have in recent decades dismissed as naïve both the logic of the Constitution’s design set forth in The Federalist and the Framers’ dismal view of political parties. They argue that contrary to the Madisonian vision competition between our two national political parties undergirds the horizontal and vertical separation of powers. But, in calling attention to the fights that take place between political parties, they underestimate the constitutional significance of the conflicts that persist within them. Reconsidering the law and theory of the separation of powers with attention to intraparty …

Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister

UF Law Faculty Publications

Over the last half-century, the federal courts have faced down two competing crises: an increase in small, low-value litigation thought unworthy of Article III attention and an increase in the numbers and complexity of “big” cases thought worthy of those resources. The choice was what to prioritize and how, and the answer the courts gave was consistent across all levels of the federal judiciary. Using what this Article calls “macro-judging,” Article III judges entrenched their own power and autonomy to focus on the work they deemed most “worthy” of their attention, while outsourcing less “important” work to an array of …

A State Within A State: Re-Examining The Federal Lands Question And Its Effect On State Sovereignty, David Wilde

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

Though the path of the public lands debate is well-trodden, this Note will seek to answer the question in novel ways. First, it uses the Corpus of Founding Era American English to perform an objective linguistic analysis of the phrase “dispose of” in the Property Clause. Through this analysis, it appears that an ordinary person at the time the Constitution was adopted would most likely have read the phrase “dispose of” in the Property Clause to mean sell, give away, bestow, or put into another’s hand or power.

Next, this Note investigates the historical and philosophical understandings of state sovereignty …

Without Limit: Why Texas's Criminal Statutes Of Limitations Violate The State Constitution's Separation Of Powers Clause, Andrew Warthen

St. Mary's Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Mutually Intelligible Principles?, Andrew J. Ziaja

Pace Law Review

Are the nondelegation, major questions, and political question doctrines mutually intelligible? This article asks whether there is more than superficial resemblance between the nondelegation, major questions, and political question concepts in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), an early nondelegation case that has become focal in recent nondelegation and major questions scholarship and jurisprudence. I argue that the nondelegation and political question doctrines do interact conceptually in Wayman, though not as current proponents of the nondelegation doctrine on the Supreme Court seem to understand it. The major questions doctrine by contrast conscripts the nondelegation …

Is It Time To Bury Barry? Why An Old Change At The Legislature Requires A New Look At Washington's Nondelegation Doctrine, Daniel A. Himebaugh

Washington Law Review Online

Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted a relaxed version of the nondelegation doctrine in a case called Barry and Barry v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The Barry rule, which only loosely restricts the delegation of policy-making power from the Legislature to other bodies, is now widely applied in Washington State. However, the Barry Court’s reasons for adjusting the nondelegation doctrine were based on an outdated understanding of the Legislature, especially its regular session schedule. While the Legislature’s regular sessions have changed since 1972—becoming longer and more frequent due to constitutional amendment—the Court has not considered how …

Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister

UF Law Faculty Publications

Over the last half-century, the federal courts have faced down two competing crises: an increase in small, low-value litigation thought unworthy of Article III attention and an increase in the numbers and complexity of “big” cases thought worthy of those resources. The choice was what to prioritize and how, and the answer the courts gave was consistent across all levels of the federal judiciary. Using what this Article calls “macro-judging,” Article III judges entrenched their own power and autonomy to focus on the work they deemed most “worthy” of their attention, while outsourcing less “important” work to an array of …

Bring On The Chicken And Hot Oil: Reviving The Nondelegation Doctrine For Congressional Delegations To The President, Loren Jacobson

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

The so-called “nondelegation doctrine” posits that Congress may not transfer its legislative power to another branch of government, and yet Congress delegates its authority routinely not only to the President, but to a whole host of other entities it has created and that are located in the executive branch, including executive branch agencies, independent agencies, commissions, and sometimes even private parties. Recognizing that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives,” the Supreme Court of the United States …

Grand Unified (Separation Of Powers) Theory: Examining The United States Marshals, Emile Katz

Pace Law Review

This Article examines a novel separation of powers issue that the Supreme Court has never directly addressed: the existence and practices of the United States Marshals. The United States Marshals serve an executive branch function—law enforcement—yet are often directly overseen and commanded by the judicial branch. In the United States federal government system—in which the executive and judicial branches are designed to act independently—the control the federal courts exercise over the marshals raises separation of powers concerns. Since no court has decided what test should apply when federal courts vicariously exercise executive power, this Article applies several separation of powers …

Some Observations On Separation Of Powers And The Wisconsin Constitution, Chad M. Oldfather

Marquette Law Review

In recent years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided several high- profile cases concerning the separation of powers under the state constitution. In the abstract, questions concerning the separation of powers do not seem inherently partisan, largely because the partisan balance of government will shift over time. Yet, as has been the case with many of its recent decisions, the justices’ votes have broken along what most observers regard as partisan lines, and the opinions have featured heated prose including accusations of result orientation and methodological illegitimacy.

A Pandemic Of Separation Of Powers Violations In Texas: The Interrelationship Of The Texas Disaster Act And Texas Gov’T Code Section 22.0035, Ron Beal

St. Mary's Law Journal

This Article is on the interrelationship of the Texas Disaster Act and Texas Government Code Section 22.0035. The author demonstrates that the Governor of Texas and the Texas Supreme Court have grossly violated the separation of powers on a continuing basis since March 29, 2020 by Governor Abbott issuing Executive Order 13, which prohibits the granting of bail to anyone awaiting trial, and the Texas Supreme Court’s unwillingness to invalidate that order administratively or judicially. Finally, the Article addresses the nearly one thousand district and county court judges who are constantly violating the separations of powers by failing to invalidate …

Nondelegation In The States, Benjamin Silver

Vanderbilt Law Review

American public law is on the precipice of a nondelegation revival. Yet scholars have largely ignored the greatest wellspring of American nondelegation law: that of the states. As a result, the nondelegation literature is badly in need of a broad and deep examination of state nondelegation. This Article takes up that task by describing the kaleidoscope of contexts in which states apply the nondelegation doctrine. Significantly, state nondelegation reaches deep into public law and covers far more than the legislature-to-agency delegations that preoccupy the discussion at the federal level. This Article analyzes this mess of state nondelegation jurisprudence, arguing that …

The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act Of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, And Other Fun Facts (Plus A Few Random Academic Speculations) About Counting Electoral Votes, Jack M. Beermann, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, and in light of the controversy that arose in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, we explain the constitutional process for counting electoral votes. In short, every four years, the Twelfth Amendment requires the President of the Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) to open certificates provided by state presidential electors and count the votes contained therein. The Constitution allows no role for Congress in this process, and thus the provisions of the Electoral Count Act purporting to grant Congress the power, by concurrent resolution, to reject a state's electoral votes are unconstitutional. …

Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder

Helm's School of Government Conference

No abstract provided.

Impartial Justice: Restoring Integrity To Impeachment Trials, Justin D. Rattey

Pepperdine Law Review

In recent decades, we have witnessed the diminution of the impeachment process by various actors—especially political parties. But the Founders envisioned a vastly different process, one that was insulated from partisanship. In Alexander Hamilton’s words, impeachment trials were assigned to the Senate because the Senate is “a tribunal sufficiently dignified [and] sufficiently independent.” Examples from the most recent impeachment trials of President Donald J. Trump reflect the Senate’s loss of dignity and independence, with Senator McConnell pledging to work with the White House throughout the first impeachment process and senators from both parties conceding that they made up their minds …

Decoding Nondelegation After Gundy: What The Experience In State Courts Tells Us About What To Expect When We're Expecting, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

The nondelegation doctrine theoretically limits Congress’s ability to delegate legislative powers to the executive agencies that make up the modern administrative state. Yet, in practice, the U.S. Supreme Court has, since the New Deal, shied away from enforcing any limits on congressional delegation. That may change in the near future. In Gundy v. United States, the Court narrowly upheld a delegation, and a dissent signaled deep doubts about the Court’s longstanding “intelligible principle” standard and offered a new framework to replace it. Subsequent events strongly suggest that the Court is poised to move in the direction contemplated by the dissent …

Litigating The Separation Of Powers, Elizabeth Earle Beske

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The Roberts Court, in marked contrast to its predecessor, has embraced the role of the federal judiciary in resolving clashes between coordinate branches, but it has done so without adequately grappling with Rehnquist-era justiciability hurdles. Constrained by Raines v. Byrd, the 1997 case in which Chief Justice Rehnquist purported in broad strokes to shut down institutional standing, the Roberts Court has relied primarily on individual litigants to raise separation-of-powers claims as defenses in enforcement proceedings. Primary reliance on individual litigants is problematic. First, it is difficult to square with conventional conceptions of injury in fact. Individual litigants have traditionally …

Do Seven Members Of Congress Have Article Iii Standing To Sue The Executive Branch?: Why The D.C. Circuit’S Divided Decision In Maloney V. Murphy Was Wrongly Decided In Light Of Two Prior District Court Decisions And Historical Separation Of Powers Jurisprudence, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The D.C. Circuit’s divided decision in Maloney v. Murphy granting standing to minority party members of the House Oversight Committee appears questionable in light of two prior district court decisions in Waxman and Cummings that had denied standing in similar circumstances. Most importantly, Maloney is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent regarding standing for individual members of Congress. In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court held that individual members of Congress generally do not have standing to enforce institutional congressional interests such as whether a statute is constitutional, but that one or both Houses of Congress must sue as an institution. …

The False Allure Of The Anti-Accumulation Principle, Kevin Stack, Michael Herz

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Today the executive branch is generally seen as the most dangerous branch. Many worry that the executive branch now defies or subsumes the separation of powers. In response, several Supreme Court Justices and prominent scholars assert that the very separation-of-powers principles that determine the structure of the federal government as a whole apply with full force within the executive branch. In particular, they argue that constitutional law prohibits the accumulation of more than one type of power-—legislative, executive, and judicial—-in the same executive official or government entity. We refer to this as the anti-accumulation principle. The consequences of this principle, …

Interpretation, Remedy, And The Rule Of Law: Why Courts Should Have The Courage Of Their Convictions, Jack M. Beermann, Ronald A. Cass

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex opens a window on a set of issues debated in different contexts for decades. These issues—how to interpret statutes and constitutional provisions, what sources to look to, whether so far as possible to adopt interpretations that avoid declaring actions of coordinate branches unconstitutional, and where such actions are deemed to have been unconstitutional whether to provide remedies that cabin the most significant implications of such a declaration—go to the heart of the judicial role and the division of responsibilities among the branches of government.

Our principal focus, however, is on the …

Charting A Course Past Spokeo And Transunion, Elizabeth Earle Beske

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez has dramatically upended standing doctrine, apparently out of concern that any other move will invite congressional manipulation and give rise to even greater evils. The Court has done so at considerable cost. TransUnion’s concreteness inquiry leaves lower courts at sea, inviting them to substitute their own policy preferences for legislative will in frustration of the separation of powers. It curtails the deferential review of economic legislation the Court has employed since the New Deal. It circumscribes Congress’s ability to act proactively to respond to novel challenges. Bearing these costs, we …

Litigating The Separation Of Powers, Elizabeth Earle Beske

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

Reasoning V. Rhetoric: The Strange Case Of “Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt”, Hugh D. Spitzer

Articles

An odd formulation has frequented American constitutional discourse for 125 years: a declaration that courts should not overturn a statute on constitutional grounds unless it is “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” This concept has been thought of as a presumption, a standard, a doctrine, or a philosophy of coordinate branch respect and judicial restraint. Yet it has been criticized because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is at root an evidentiary standard of proof in criminal cases rather than a workable theory or standard for deciding constitutional law cases. This article discusses the history and use of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” …

Violence And Nondelegation, Jacob D. Charles, Darrell A. H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

Debates over delegation are experiencing a renaissance. These debates presuppose an initial distribution of constitutional authority between actors that cannot be redistributed, or that can be redistributed only according to some clear ex ante set of rules. Nondelegation in this sense often arises in debates about separation of powers and intergovernmental delegation, although scholars have begun applying the concept to delegations to private corporations and other private actors. The public delegation doctrine restricts one branch of government from transferring its constitutional authority to another branch, while the private delegation doctrine limits transfer of government power to private entities. In this …

The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act Of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, And Other Fun Facts (Plus A Few Random Academic Speculations) About Counting Electoral Votes, Jack Beermann, Gary Lawson

FIU Law Review

In this essay, and in light of the controversy that arose in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, we explain the constitutional process for counting electoral votes. In short, every four years, the Twelfth Amendment requires the President of the Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) to open certificates provided by state presidential electors and count the votes contained therein. The Constitution allows no role for Congress in this process, and thus, the provisions of the Electoral Count Act purporting to grant Congress the power, by concurrent resolution, to reject a state’s electoral votes, is unconstitutional. …