Law Commons^™

The Commander In Chief's Authority To Combat Climate Change, Mark P. Nevitt

Mark P Nevitt

Climate change is the world’s greatest environmental threat. And it is increasingly understood as a threat to domestic and international peace and security. In recognition of this threat, the President has taken the initiative to prepare for climate change’s impact – in some cases drawing sharp objections from Congress. While both the President and Congress have certain constitutional authorities to address the national security threat posed by climate change, the precise contours of their overlapping powers are unclear. As Commander in Chief, the President has the constitutional authority to repel sudden attacks and take care that the laws are faithfully …

Article Iii And Seventh Amendment Challenges To Sec Administrative Proceedings After Dodd-Frank, Daniel P. Dwyer Esquire

Daniel P. Dwyer Esquire

This article is a discussion of the evolution of enforcement remedies available to the United States Securities & Exchange Commission and the possibility that, with the enactment of the 2010 Dodd-Frank amendments to the securities laws, Congress encroached on Article III of and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. Section of 929P of Dodd-Frank, which allows the SEC to pursue monetary penalties and other forms of relief against unregulated persons in administrative proceedings, is a particular focus. The article relies on a chronological analysis of these areas of law and close case reading to reconcile the disparate and sometimes seemingly …

Before There Were Mouseholes: Resurrecting The Non-Delegation Doctrine, Joel Hood

Joel Hood

Most people are unaware that James Madison original drafted 17 amendments for the Bill of Rights. Even fewer know that the 16th was an express non-delegation amendment meant to protect the American people:

The powers delegated by the Constitution to the government of the United States, shall be exercised as therein appropriated, so that the Legislative shall never exercise the powers vested in the Executive or Judicial; not the Executive the powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial; nor the Judicial the powers vested in the Legislative or Executive.

There are now over five-hundred federal agencies and departments. Some are …

The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

When a court concludes that an agency’s decision is erroneous, the ordinary rule is to remand to the agency to consider the issue anew (as opposed to the court deciding the issue itself). Despite that the Supreme Court first articulated this ordinary remand rule in the 1940s and has rearticulated it repeatedly over the years, little work has been done to understand how the rule works in practice, much less whether it promotes the separation-of-powers values that motivate the rule. This Article is the first to conduct such an investigation—focusing on judicial review of agency immigration adjudications and reviewing the …

The Death Of Tax Court Exceptionalism, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

Tax exceptionalism—the view that tax law does not have to play by the administrative law rules that govern the rest of the regulatory state—has come under attack in recent years. In 2011, the Supreme Court rejected such exceptionalism by holding that judicial review of the Treasury Department’s interpretations of the tax code is subject to the same Chevron deference regime that applies throughout the administrative state. The D.C. Circuit followed suit by rejecting the IRS’s position that its notices are not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This Article calls for the demise of another instance …

The Separation Of Powers, Constitutionalism And Governance In Africa: The Case Of Modern Cameroon, John Mukum Mbaku

JOHN MUKUM MBAKU

The Separation of Powers, Constitutionalism and Governance in Africa: The Case of Modern Cameroon

John Mukum Mbaku, Esq.

Abstract

Countries incorporate the principle of the separation of powers in their constitutions in an effort to meet several goals, the most important of which is to minimize government-induced tyranny. Specifically, countries that make this principle part of their constitutional practice intend to limit public servants by national laws and institutions, enhance government accountability, minimize opportunistic behaviors by civil servants and politicians, provide for checks and balances, and generally improve government efficiency. Cameroon, like many other African countries that transitioned to democratic …

Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton

Sarah L Brinton

The Supreme Court has erred on sovereign immunity. The current federal immunity doctrine wrongly gives Congress the exclusive authority to waive immunity (“exclusive congressional waiver”), but the Constitution mandates that Congress share the waiver power with the Court. This Article develops the doctrine of a two-way shared waiver and then explores a third possibility: the sharing of the immunity waiver power among all three branches of government.

Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton

Sarah L Brinton

The Supreme Court has erred on sovereign immunity. The current federal immunity doctrine wrongly gives Congress the exclusive authority to waive immunity (“exclusive congressional waiver”), but the Constitution mandates that Congress share the waiver power with the Court. This Article develops the doctrine of a two-way shared waiver and then explores a third possibility: the sharing of the immunity waiver power among all three branches of government.

Parliamentary Oversight Of The Executive In India, Anirudh Burman

Anirudh Burman

The need for a strong monitoring mechanism of the executive in India has been made clearer by recent allegations of corruption against high-ranking officials of the central government. The Indian Parliament is the ideal institution to perform such a monitoring function through oversight of the central executive. The executive in India is directly accountable to the Parliament. Making oversight by Parliament stronger and more effective would therefore increase the accountability of the executive. Additionally, an increased oversight role would allow for greater policy inputs from Parliament to the executive. It would also increase the general level of expertise within Parliament …

A Multiple Choice Legislative Certification Procedure: Asking Congressional Preferences In Statutory Interpretation, Danieli Evans

Danieli Evans

In response to failed efforts at enhancing judicial-legislative collaboration, I propose a procedure that would enable the Court to take account of congressional preferences in a pending statutory interpretation decision, without requiring Congress to amend the ambiguous law. In “hard cases” the Court could certify, through a fast-track procedure, a question presenting Congress with two multiple choices that the Court predetermines to be viable readings of the statute. This procedure avoids constitutional problems because congressional input is voluntary and non-binding for both branches, and judicial constraint enforces rule of law and constitutional values.

Proxy Sovereignty And The Problem Of Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton

Sarah L Brinton

The U.S. Constitution creates a three-branch federal government that acts on behalf of the sovereign people. Each constitutional branch—Congress, the executive, and the judiciary—is constrained to exercise only the powers and act only in the roles assigned it by the sovereign people via the Constitution. Despite this tripartite, proxy-sovereign nature of the U.S. national government, current federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence affords Congress the exclusive right to act as sovereign to waive immunity. This Article argues that the Constitution more faithfully supports another configuration of the waiver power. To do so, this Article introduces the proxy-sovereign framework, which assumes that (1) …

Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey Love, Arpit Garg

Jeffrey Love

James Madison famously articulated a functional account of our governmental structure; he and his Federalist brethren created overlapping authority to prevent any single branch of government from acting unilaterally to dictate policy for the nation as a whole. And for more than two hundred years, the focus has been on just that: action. But the Framers and their intellectual heirs have failed to update their story to account for the government we have. In the modern administrative state, the President’s refusal to enforce duly enacted statutes—what we call “presidential inaction”—will often dictate national policy and yet will receive virtually none …

Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey Love, Arpit Garg

Jeffrey Love

James Madison famously articulated a functional account of our governmental structure; he and his Federalist brethren created overlapping authority to prevent any single branch of government from acting unilaterally to dictate policy for the nation as a whole. And for more than two hundred years, the focus has been on just that: action. But the Framers and their intellectual heirs have failed to update their story to account for the government we have. In the modern administrative state, the President’s refusal to enforce duly enacted statutes—what we call “presidential inaction”—will often dictate national policy and yet will receive virtually none …

Hope, Fear And Loathing, And The Post-Sebelius Disequilibrium: Assessing The Relationship Between Parties, Congress, And Courts In Tea Party America, Bruce Peabody

Bruce Peabody

The article examines recent website commentary by members of the U.S. House on the judiciary, court cases, and judicial power. We consider member websites both before and after the just-completed 2011 Supreme Court term. With this unique data at our disposal, we argue that three features of today’s political environment—the rise of the Tea Party, instability in traditional party allegiances to courts, and low voter ratings of the legislature’s institutional performance—have combined to create a moment of disequilibrium when it comes to Congress’s public assessments of the judiciary. We sketch a picture of institutional, partisan, and ideological engagement with the …

Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey Love, Arpit Garg

Jeffrey Love

James Madison famously articulated a functional account of our governmental structure; he and his Federalist brethren created overlapping authority to prevent any single branch of government from acting unilaterally to dictate policy for the nation as a whole. And for more than two hundred years, the focus has been on just that: action. But the Framers and their intellectual heirs have failed to update their story to account for the government we have. In the modern administrative state, the President’s refusal to enforce duly enacted statutes—what we call “presidential inaction”—will often dictate national policy and yet will receive virtually none …

Reasserting Its Constitutional Role: Congress's Power To Independently Terminate A Treaty, David (Dj) C. Wolff

David (Dj) C. Wolff

Who has the authority to terminate a treaty? The Constitution’s text is silent on the matter and historical precedent has been anything but consistent. Recently, the debate has focused on whether the President can unilaterally terminate a treaty without considering Congressional concerns: witness President Carter’s termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan and President Bush’s 2001 termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. There has been comparatively little analysis of the converse question; does Congress have the unilateral power to terminate a treaty in the face of Presidential opposition? This question invokes strong separation of powers considerations; …

Equitable Power In The Time Of Budget Austerity: The Problem Of Judicial Remedies For Unconstitutional Delays In Claims Processing By Federal Agencies, James Ridgway

James D. Ridgway

This article begins the important work of synthesizing two areas of law that have been on a collision course recently: federal administrative law and structural reform remedies. The urgency of this problem is highlighted by two recent cases by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. They demonstrate both that the courts are unwilling to continue ignoring the widespread crises in federal agencies that manage benefit programs, and that the current model of equitable remedies for failing institutions is not up to the task of providing effective solutions. This article addresses the core case law and theory in both areas, …

Congressional Inquiry And The Federal Criminal Law, Richard Broughton

Richard Broughton

Federal criminal law has become so far-reaching that scholars and commentators on both the political left and political right have joined forces to demand serious reforms related to defining, prosecuting, and punishing federal crimes. This Article makes the case for greater attention to, and use of, congressional inquiry powers – investigation and oversight – to constrain the massive federal criminal law regime. This Article first identifies, through existing law and scholarship, some of the problems of the federal regime, including over-federalization, anemic limits on prosecutorial power, and the ordinary politics that contribute to these problems. Using the 2009 and 2010 …

Negative Lawmaking Delegations: Discretionary Executive Authority To Amend, Waive, And Cancel Statutory Text, R. Craig Kitchen

R. Craig Kitchen

Over a decade ago, the Supreme Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act by invoking Article I, Section 7: Congress may not give the Executive the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes because amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with bicameralism and presentment. This Article shows that this holding has had limited, if any, impact on judicial review of lawmaking delegations.

In analyzing the limited impact of the Court’s holding, this Article proposes an analytical framework for lawmaking delegations based on the effect that the delegated power has on statutory text. …

A Constitutional And Empirical Analysis Of Iowa's Administrative Rules Review Committee Procedure, Jerry L. Anderson

Jerry L. Anderson

Iowa gives a joint legislative committee, called the Administrative Rules Review Committee, significant power over agency rulemaking. The ARRC can delay a rule, either for a 70-day period, or until the end of the next legislative session. It can also object to a rule, which switches the burden of proof to the agency in any future judicial challenge and makes the agency liable for the litigation costs of successful challengers. In this article, the authors study fifteen years of ARRC activity to determine how the committee has used its authority, in order to assess the degree to which this mechanism …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …