Law Commons^™

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Neither Safe, Nor Legal, Nor Rare: The D.C. Circuit’S Use Of The Doctrine Of Ratification To Shield Agency Action From Appointments Clause Challenges, Damien M. Schiff

Seattle University Law Review

Key to the constitutional design of the federal government is the separation of powers. An important support for that separation is the Appointments Clause, which governs how officers of the United States are installed in their positions. Although the separation of powers generally, and the Appointments Clause specifically, support democratically accountable government, they also protect individual citizens against abusive government power. But without a judicial remedy, such protection is ineffectual—a mere parchment barrier.

Such has become the fate of the Appointments Clause in the D.C. Circuit, thanks to that court’s adoption—and zealous employment—of the rule that agency action, otherwise unconstitutional …

Preserving The Nationwide National Government Injunction To Stop Illegal Executive Branch Activity, Doug Rendleman

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.

Presidential Control Of The Elite "Non-Agency", Kimberly L. Wehle

All Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the constitutionality of legislation creating a new form of independent agency – in effect, a “non-agency” agency residing in the no-man’s land between Articles I and II of the Constitution. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) and endowed it with massive governmental powers while insulating it from traditional mechanisms for ensuring accountability. Congress deemed the PCAOB not an agency, rendered it substantially immune from judicial review, empowered Board members to set their own salaries and budget, and gave the embattled Securities and Exchange Commission – not the President …

Administrative Agencies, Joseph Vining

Book Chapters

Administrative agencies, often called the ‘‘fourth branch,’’ are entities of government that make decisions within particular substantive fields. Although these fields range over the full spectrum of public concern, the specificity of agencies’ focus distinguishes them from other decision making entities in the constitutional structure—the judiciary, the presidency, the Congress, indeed the individual citizen—each of which can be taken to have a scope of interest as broad as imagination will allow.

Government Nonacquiescence Case In Point: Social Security Litigation

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.