Law Commons^™

Arrests: Legal And Illegal, Daniel Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. An arrest—manifesting a police intention to transport a suspect to the stationhouse for booking, fingerprinting, and photographing—is a mode of seizure. Because arrests are so intrusive, they require roughly a fifty percent chance that an arrestable offense has occurred. Because nonarrest seizures (aka Terry stops), though no “petty indignity,” are less intrusive than arrests, they require roughly just a twenty-five percent chance that crime is afoot. Any arrest not supported by probable cause is illegal. It would therefore seem to follow that any arrest supported by probable cause is legal. But it …

Police Frisks, David S. Abrams, Hanming Fang, Priyanka Goonetilleke

All Faculty Scholarship

The standard economic model of police stops implies that the contraband hit rate should rise when the number of stops falls, ceteris paribus. We provide empirical corroboration of such optimizing models of police behavior by examining changes in stops and frisks around two extraordinary events of 2020 - the pandemic onset and the nationwide protests following the killing of George Floyd. We find that hit rates from pedestrian and vehicle stops generally rose as stops and frisks fell dramatically. Using detailed data, we are able to rule out a number of alternative explanations, including changes in street population, crime, police …

Fourth Amendment Protection In The Digital Age, Daniel Sorkin

GGU Law Review Blog

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carpenter v United States, a case that offers the Court another opportunity to address how far Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches and seizures extend. Specifically, the issue before the Court was “whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the locations and movement of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.”

On appeal before the Sixth Circuit, a divided three-judge panel held that “no search occurred under the Fourth Amendment because Carpenter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in …

Terry Stops And Frisks: The Troubling Use Of Common Sense In A World Of Empirical Data, David A. Harris, David Rudovsky

Articles

The investigative detention doctrine first announced in Terry v. Ohio and amplified over the past fifty years has been much analyzed, praised, and criticized from a number of perspectives. Significantly, however, over this time period commentators have only occasionally questioned the Supreme Court’s “common sense” judgments regarding the factors sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for stops and frisks. For years, the Court has provided no empirical basis for its judgments, due in large part to the lack of reliable data. Now, with the emergence of comprehensive data on these police practices, much can be learned about the predictive power of …

Terry Stops And Frisks: The Troubling Use Of Common Sense In A World Of Empirical Data, David Rudovsky, David A. Harris

All Faculty Scholarship

The investigative detention doctrine first announced in Terry v. Ohio and amplified over the past fifty years has been much analyzed, praised, and criticized from a number of perspectives. Significantly, however, over this time period commentators have only occasionally questioned the Supreme Court’s “common sense” judgments regarding the factors sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for stops and frisks. For years, the Court has provided no empirical basis for its judgments, due in large part to the lack of reliable data. Now, with the emergence of comprehensive data on these police practices, much can be learned about the predictive power of …

Certain Certiorari: The Digital Privacy Rights Of Probationers, Daniel Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent oral argument, a judge on the California Court of Appeal told me they had "at least 50" pending cases on the constitutionality of probation conditions authorizing suspicionless searches of digital devices. As counsel of record in three of those cases, I feel positioned to comment on this hot topic within criminal law. My intention here is less to reconcile California's cases on suspicionless searches of probationers' digital devices than to locate them within the precedents of the United States Supreme Court, which is bound before long to pick up a case for the same purpose.

Tightening The Ooda Loop: Police Militarization, Race, And Algorithmic Surveillance, Jeffrey L. Vagle

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the role military automated surveillance and intelligence systems and techniques have supported a self-reinforcing racial bias when used by civilian police departments to enhance predictive policing programs. I will focus on two facets of this problem. First, my research will take an inside-out perspective, studying the role played by advanced military technologies and methods within civilian police departments, and how they have enabled a new focus on deterrence and crime prevention by creating a system of structural surveillance where decision support relies increasingly upon algorithms and automated data analysis tools, and which automates de facto penalization and …

Appellate Division, First Department, People V. Celaj, Danielle Dupré

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Apellate Division, Third Department, People V. Kelley, Elyssa Lane

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Court Of Appeals Of New York, People V. Johnson, Denise Shanley

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Government Dragnets, Christopher Slobogin

Law and Contemporary Problems

Slobogin describes the nature and effects of dragnet actions. They do so primarily through the prism of Supreme Court and lower court cases, but these sections also look at law-enforcement efforts that have yet to lead to litigation and imagine future dragnet efforts as well, with a special emphasis on the role technology can play in motivating dragnets and carrying them out. He then summarizes the Supreme Court's approach to group searches and the most significant alternative proposals for dealing with them.

How The Post-Framing Adoption Of The Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest And Search Power, Thomas Y. Davies

Law and Contemporary Problems

Davies exposes a story that has been almost entirely overlooked: that the now-accepted doctrine that probable cause alone can justify a criminal arrest or search did not emerge until well after the framing of the Bill of Rights in 1789 and constituted a significant departure from the criminal-procedure standards that the Framers of the Bill thought they had preserved.

A Response To Professor Steinberg’S Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

Professor David Steinberg believes that the Fourth Amendment was intended only to provide some protection against physical searches of homes through imposition of a specific warrant requirement because the Framers' only object in promulgating the Fourth Amendment was to ban physical searches of homes under general warrants or no warrants at all. This response essay takes issue with his thesis by (1) discussing its implications, (2) reviewing some concerns with his methodology in reviewing the historical record, and (3) examining the theoretical implication underlying his thesis that, except as to homes, we have a majoritarian Fourth Amendment, and questioning whether …

In The Trenches: Searches And The Misunderstood Common-Law History Of Suspicion And Probable Cause, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

A detailed analysis of the common law during the Framers’ era, and of how it reflected the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions, shows that many judges believed they could issue search warrants without independently assessing the adequacy of probable cause, and that this view persisted even after the Fourth Amendment became effective. This conclusion challenges the leading originalist account of the Fourth Amendment, which Professor Thomas Davies published in the Michigan Law Review in 1999.

Learned treatises in particular, and to a lesser extent a few case decisions, had articulated a judicial duty to monitor probable cause. But it is a mistake …

Originalism & Early Civil Search Statutes: The Misunderstood History Of Suspicion & Probable Cause, Fabio Arcila, Jr.

Fabio Arcila Jr.

Originalist analyses of the Framers’ views about governmental search power have devoted insufficient attention to the civil search statutes they promulgated. What attention has been paid, primarily as part of what I term the “conventional account,” has it that the Framers were divided about how accessible search remedies should be. This article explains why this conventional account is mostly wrong, and explores the lessons to be learned from the statutory choices the Framers made with regard to search and seizure law.

In enacting civil search statutes, the Framers chose to depart from common law standards and instead largely followed the …

Overcoming Hiddenness: The Role Of Intentions In Fourth Amendment Analysis, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

This Article rehearses a response to the problems posed to and by the Supreme Court's attempts to work out the meaning and operation of the word "search." After commencing Part II by meditating on the notion of privacy, I take up its relation to the antecedent suspicion or knowledge that Fourth-Amendment law requires as a justification for all privacy invasions. From there, I look specifically at that uneasy relation in Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has come to privilege privacy over property as a Fourth Amendment value. From there, Part III reviews the sources or bases that can tell us what …

Special Needs And Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches In The Modern Regulatory State, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

This Article examines the Supreme Court’s application of the "special needs" principle, which is part of its Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence, with an emphasis on suspicionless searches. It argues that both courts and commentators have insufficiently acknowledged the tension between the modern regulatory state, which is significantly dependent upon such searches, and adequately protecting liberty interests. The commentators who criticize the Court’s deference ignore that a deferential approach can be justified. Suspicionless civil searches, for example, are not necessarily incompatible with original intent. Moreover, the many proposals for reforming suspicionless civil search jurisprudence, such as reinvigorating the individualized …

Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

This Article will reflect on (1) how the Whren v. United States failure to acknowledge what counts as a pretext accounts for the residual confusion as to whether or not Whren really has killed off the pretext argument in constitutional criminal procedure, and (2) the extent to which the Court in Sullivan compounded that failure, which I hope to lightly correct here by distinguishing motives from intentions and then by elaborating the role that each plays, or at least should play, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Searches And Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Searches And Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Searches And Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Searches And Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Searches And Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Searches And Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Searches And Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Searches And Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Recent Cases, Laurence M. Hamric, William G. Scott, Mitchell M. Purvis, George M. Kryder, Iii, Richard M. Pitt

Vanderbilt Law Review

Laurence M. Hamric

The instant decision demonstrates the inability of the Court, on its own or with the meager guidance provided by Congress, to discern a clear standard by which to measure the propriety of union organizational activity in light of current federal labor and antitrust law. Faced with a fact pattern that did not embody an apparent anticompetitive intent, a classic conspiracy between labor and non-labor entities, or activity clearly unrelated to the legitimate union interest in achieving better wages and working conditions, the Court was forced to abandon the "clear showing" test of Pennington," the"intimately related" test of …