Law Commons^™

Speech Without Speakers: Eliminating Artificial Barriers To Pleading Corporate Scienter In Securities Fraud Claims, Jennifer Ligansky

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

To successfully plead securities fraud claims under Rule 10b–5, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) requires that plaintiff-investors raise a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with scienter when issuing a false statement. But pleading scienter presents a challenging issue when the defendant is not a person, but an entity. When the defendant is a corporation, U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted different approaches for determining whether the plaintiff has pleaded a strong inference of scienter. Some circuits hold that plaintiffs can raise a strong inference of corporate scienter only if the complaint identifies a speaker who knew …

Working Hard Or Making Work? Plaintiffs' Attorneys Fees In Securities Fraud Class Actions, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, A. C. Pritchard

Articles

In this article, we study attorney fees awarded in the largest securities class actions: “mega- settlements.” Consistent with prior work, we find larger fee awards but lower percentages in these cases. We also find that courts are more likely to reject or modify fee requests made in connection with the largest settlements. We conjecture that this scrutiny provides an incentive for law firms to bill more hours, not to advance the case, but to help justify large fee awards—“make work.” The results of our empirical tests are consistent with plaintiffs’ attorneys investing more time in litigation against larger companies, with …

Unintended Consequences: The Link Between Judge Friendly's Texas Gulf Sulphur Concurrence And Recent Supreme Court Decisions Misconstruing Rule 10b-5, Margaret V. Sachs

Scholarly Works

In his Texas Gulf Sulphur concurrence, Judge Henry J. Friendly coun- seled the federal district courts concerning the numerous pending satellite class actions that had been filed under Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex- change Act and Rule 10b-5. In the course of so doing, he argued forcefully that private Rule 10b-5 litigation should be curtailed. Finding his argument convincing, the Supreme Court issued four major decisions restricting the Rule between 1975 and 1994, while nonetheless expanding it in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. Congress responded by blessing both aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence – imposing its own set of …

Carrot Or Stick? The Shift From Voluntary To Mandatory Disclosure Of Risk Factors, Karen K. Nelson, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This study investigates risk factor disclosures, examining both the voluntary, incentive-based disclosure regime provided by the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act as well as the SEC's subsequent mandate of these disclosures. Firms subject to greater litigation risk disclose more risk factors, update the language more from year to year, and use more readable language than firms with lower litigation risk. These differences in the quality of disclosure are pronounced in the voluntary disclosure regime, but converge following the SEC mandate as low-risk firms improved the quality of their risk factor disclosures. Consistent with these findings, …

Rebutting The Fraud On The Market Presumption In Securities Fraud Class Actions: Halliburton Ii Opens The Door, Victor E. Schwartz, Christopher E. Appel

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the “fraud on the market” presumption underlying securities fraud class action litigation. This presumption is vital to bringing suits as class actions because it excuses plaintiffs from proving individual reliance on an alleged corporate misstatement on the theory that any public statements made by the company are incorporated into its stock price and consequently relied upon by all investors. Thus, the Court’s decision to uphold the validity of the presumption has been hailed as a significant victory for those …

When May A Litigant Rely In Its Own Complaint On Allegations From Another Complaint? – Lipsky V. Commonwealth United Corp. And Its Progeny – Still An Unresolved Question, Laurence A. Steckman, Joseph T. Johnson

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Putting The “Uniform” Back In The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act Of 1998: The Case For Employing A Reasonable Relationship Approach, Christopher R. Bellacicco

Catholic University Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Pslra Discovery Stay Meets Complex Litigation: Five Questions Answered, Wendy Gerwick Couture

Articles

No abstract provided.

Don't Throw The Baby Out With The Bath Water: The Merits Of The Intermediate Approach To The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Selby P. Brown

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

The New Professional Plaintiffs In Shareholder Litigation, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the old professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, detailing Congress's efforts in the 1990s to eliminate these plaintiffs. Part II describes the new professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, combining empirical data with a discussion of illustrative cases. Part III builds on this discussion by proposing a·new conceptual framework to address the problem of professional plaintiffs in corporate litigation.

Setting Attorneys' Fees In Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment, Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino, Charles Silver

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In 1995, Congress overrode President Bill Clinton's veto and enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), a key purpose of which was to put securities class actions under the control of institutional investors with large financial stakes in the outcome of the litigation. The theory behind this policy, set out in a famous article by Professors Elliot Weiss and John Beckerman, was simple: self-interest should encourage investors with large stakes to run class actions in ways that maximize recoveries for all investors. These investors should naturally want to hire good lawyers, incentivize them properly, monitor their actions, and …

Will Motive, Opportunity Or Recklessness No Longer Constitute Scienter For Fraud? A Survey Of Recent Federal District Court Decisions After The Enactment Of The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act , Lisa A. Herrera

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Determining The Proper Pleading Standard Under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Of 1995 After In Re Silicon Graphics , Erin Brady

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Federal Discovery Stays, Gideon Mark

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In federal civil litigation, unless a discretionary stay is granted, discovery often proceeds while motions to dismiss are pending. Plaintiffs with non-meritorious cases can compel defendants to spend massively on electronic discovery before courts ever rule on such motions. Defendants who are unable or unwilling to incur the huge up-front expense of electronic discovery may be forced to settle non-meritorious claims. To address multiple electronic discovery issues, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006 and the Federal Rules of Evidence in 2008. However, the amendments failed to significantly reduce costs and failed to address the critical issue …

False Forward-Looking Statements And The Pslra's Safe Harbor, Ann Morales Olazabal

Indiana Law Journal

Voluntary public disclosure of soft information—corporate projections and predictions and other forward-looking statements—is now the norm, following a brief learning curve after the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s safe harbor for forward-looking information in 1995. As a consequence, allegations of false forward-looking statements are also quite standard in today’s class action securities fraud pleading. This work addresses an emerging trend, spearheaded by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Asher v. Baxter International, to introduce a subjective scienter or intent-like inquiry into consideration of the application of the PSLRA’s safe harbor. Numerous district courts have followed Asher’s lead, employing …

Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor's Rocky Shore, Wendy Gerwick Couture

Articles

No abstract provided.

Revitalizing Motive And Opportunity Pleading After Tellabs, Marvin Lowenthal

Michigan Law Review

Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") to prevent frivolous lawsuits that had been draining resources from businesses. This legislation included provisions for heightening the pleading requirements for the scienter, or state of mind, requirement for securities law violations. Many circuit courts debated whether the motive and opportunity test for scienter, applied initially by the Second and Third Circuits, survived the passage of the PSLRA. This Note argues that while the motive and opportunity test has been discounted by numerous circuits, it not only remains viable for pleading scienter under the PSLRA, but it accomplishes the …

Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

To outsiders, securities law is not all that interesting. The body of the law consists of an interconnecting web of statutes and regulations that fit together in ways that are decidedly counter-intuitive. Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation for complexity and dreariness. Worse yet, the subject regulated-capital markets-can be mystifying to those uninitiated in modem finance. Moreover, those markets rapidly evolve, continually increasing their complexity. If you do not understand how the financial markets work, it is hard to understand how securities law affects those markets.

The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner

Articles

We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …

Do Differences In Pleadings Standards Cause Forum Shopping In Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal And Empirical Analyses, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, Lin (Lynn) Bai

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Federal appellate courts have promulgated divergent legal standards for pleading fraud in securities fraud class actions after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. that could have resolved these differences, but did not do so. This Paper provides two significant contributions. We first show that Tellabs avoids deciding the hard issues that confront courts and litigants daily in the wake of the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard. As a consequence, the opinion keeps very much alive the circuits' disparate interpretations of …

The Screening Effect Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson

Articles

Prior research shows that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) increased the significance of merit-related factors in determining the incidence and outcomes of securities fraud class actions (Johnson et al. 2007). We examine two possible explanations for this finding: the PSLRA may have reduced the incidence of nonmeritorious litigation, or it may have changed the definition of merit, effectively precluding claims that would have survived and produced a settlement pre-PSLRA. We find no evidence that pre-PSLRA claims that settled for nuisance value would be less likely to be filed under the PSLRA regime. There is evidence, however, that pre-PSLRA …

There Are Plaintiffs And...There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, Lin (Lynn) Bai

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums - small relative to the "provable losses" suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendant-company, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears heavily …

Class Action Criminality, Lisa L. Casey

Journal Articles

This paper examines the criminal prosecution of Milberg Weiss, formerly the most successful plaintiffs’ securities class action firm in the country, for allegedly making undisclosed incentive payments to class representatives. In particular, the article examines the government’s primary charge - that the firm’s practice violated the “honest services” theory of mail and wire fraud. The government’s application of this theory presumes a fiduciary relationship between the class representatives and the class which has never been clearly delineated and, indeed, is against the weight of case law and the realities of class action litigation.

The Article proceeds on two different levels. …

Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

I begin in Part II by explaining the wrong turn that the Court took in Basic. The Basic Court misunderstood the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages. As a result, the securities class action regime established in Basic threatens draconian sanctions with limited deterrent benefit. Part III then summarizes the cases leading up to Stoneridge and analyzes the Court's reasoning in that case. In Stoneridge, like the decisions interpreting the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 that came before it, the Court emphasized policy implications. Sometimes policy implications are invoked to broaden the reach …

Reforming The Securities Class Action: On Deterrence And Its Implementation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Securities class actions impose enormous penalties, but they achieve little compensation and only limited deterrence. This is because of a basic circularity underlying the securities class action: When damages are imposed on the corporation, they essentially fall on diversified shareholders, thereby producing mainly pocket-shifting wealth transfers among shareholders. The current equilibrium benefits corporate insiders, insurers, and plaintiffs' attorneys, but not investors. The appropriate answer to this problem is not to abandon securities litigation, but to shift the incidence of its penalties so that, in the secondary market context, they fall less on the corporation and more on those actors who …

Law, Ideology, And Strategy In Judicial Decisonmaking: Evidence From Securities Fraud Actions, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

Legal academics and political scientists continue to debate whether the legal, attitudinal, or strategic model best explains judicial decision making. One limitation in this debate is the high-court bias found in most studies. This article, by contrast, examines federal district court decisions, specifically interpretations of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Initial interpretations of the Act articulated distinct liberal and conservative positions. The data compiled here support the hypothesis that the later emergence of an intermediate interpretation was the result of strategic statutory interpretation rather than simply judges acting consistently with their ideological preferences, although there is some …

Predictions, Projections, And Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings In Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, Susanna Ripken

Susanna K. Ripken

This article discusses the problems that are created when corporate insiders make public predictions about the future prospects of their business. Investors crave these types of forward-looking corporate disclosures because investors use them to make judgments about the future profitability of companies. Corporations, however, are often reluctant to make predictions and projections because sometimes the predictions fail to come true, and investors may then sue corporations for misleading the market. Congress enacted a controversial statutory safe harbor designed to encourage corporations to make forward-looking statements. The safe harbor immunizes corporations from liability so long as they include meaningful cautionary warnings …

What Counts As Fraud? An Empirical Study Of Motions To Dismiss Under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Hillary A. Sale

Articles

This article presents the findings of a study of the resolution of motions to dismiss securities fraud lawsuits since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. Our sample consists of decisions on motions to dismiss in securities class actions by district and appellate courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits for cases filed after the passage of the Reform Act to the end of 2002. These circuits are the leading circuits for the filing of securities class actions and are generally recognized as representing two ends of the securities class action spectrum. Post-PSLRA, the Second …

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Articles

When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 ("PSLRA"), the Act's "lead plaintiff' provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel's compensation. Congress's stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors-pension funds, mutual …

Did The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA or the Act) to address abuses in securities fraud class actions. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other high profile securities frauds, critics suggest that the law made it too easy to escape liability for securities fraud and thus created a climate in which frauds are more likely to occur. Others claim that the Act has largely failed because it did little to deter plaintiffs' lawyers from filing nonmeritorious cases. This article employs a database of the 1449 class actions filed from 1996 through 2001 to …