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Articles 1 - 30 of 41
Full-Text Articles in Law
Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “combine or conspire” to monopolize—all without explanation. Section 2 is the antitrust law’s only provision that reaches entirely unilateral conduct, although it has often been used to reach collaborative conduct as well. In general, § 2 requires greater amounts of individually held market power than do the other antitrust statutes, but it is less categorical about conduct. With one exception, however, the statute reads so broadly that criticisms of the nature that it is outdated cannot be based on faithful readings of the text.
The one …
Indikasi Predatory Pricing Pada Praktik Perang Harga Antara Pelaku Usaha Financial Technology (Fintech) Ditinjau Berdasarkan Hukum Persaingan Usaha Di Indonesia, Yohanna Ameilya Panjaitan
Indikasi Predatory Pricing Pada Praktik Perang Harga Antara Pelaku Usaha Financial Technology (Fintech) Ditinjau Berdasarkan Hukum Persaingan Usaha Di Indonesia, Yohanna Ameilya Panjaitan
"Dharmasisya” Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI
The rapid development of the digital world has opened wider networks for the formation of the global economy, which has also led to the emergence of various business transactions involving many financial technology-based financial companies (Fintech), which provide services similar to banking functions. Fintech is expected to drive the industrial revolution in the form of online digital technology, which is based on new technology that will change the entire production and management chain in each branch of industry. The Fintech company is growing rapidly and significantly in Indonesia, where the Fintech sub-sector is seen to flourish, namely lending and e-wallet …
Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality To The Law Of Predatory Pricing, C. Scott Hemphill, Philip J. Weiser
Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality To The Law Of Predatory Pricing, C. Scott Hemphill, Philip J. Weiser
Publications
This Feature offers a roadmap for bringing and deciding predatory pricing cases under the Supreme Court’s restrictive Brooke Group decision. Brooke Group requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant set a price below cost and had a sufficient likelihood of recouping its investment in predation. This framework, which was adopted without any contested presentation of its merits, has endured despite its flaws. Beyond this framework, the Court opined in dicta that predation is implausible.
We identify points of flexibility within the Court’s framework that permit an empirically grounded evaluation of the predation claim. Under the price-cost test, a plaintiff …
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Khan
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
Amazon is the titan of twenty-first century commerce. In addition to being a retailer, it is now a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud server space. Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth, it generates meager profits, choosing to price below-cost and expand widely instead. Through this strategy, the company has positioned itself at the center of e-commerce and now serves as essential infrastructure for a host of other …
Economic Authority And The Limits Of Expertise In Antitrust Cases, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
Economic Authority And The Limits Of Expertise In Antitrust Cases, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
William H. Page
In antitrust litigation, the factual complexity and economic nature of the issues involved require the presentation of economic expert testimony in all but a few cases. This dependence on economics has increased in recent years because of the courts' narrowing of per se rules of illegality and the courts' expansion of certain areas of factual inquiry. At the same time, however, courts have limited the scope of allowable expert testimony through the methodological strictures of Daubert and its progeny and through heightened sufficiency requirements. In this Article, Professors Page and Lopatka make four important points about these judicially imposed constraints …
Book Review: Anti-Dumping Law In A Liberal Trade Order. Richard Dale. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980., Edward R. Easton
Book Review: Anti-Dumping Law In A Liberal Trade Order. Richard Dale. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980., Edward R. Easton
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
"Response To Book Review", Richard Dale
"Response To Book Review", Richard Dale
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Predatory Pricing Under The Areeda-Turner Test, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Predatory Pricing Under The Areeda-Turner Test, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Few works of legal scholarship have had the impact enjoyed by Areeda and Turner's 1975 article on predatory pricing. Proof of predatory pricing under the Areeda-Turner test requires two things. The plaintiff must show a market structure such that the predator could rationally foresee "recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of competition." This requirement, typically called "recoupment," requires the plaintiff to show that, looking from the beginning of the predation campaign, the predator can reasonably anticipate that the costs of predation will be more than offset by the present value of a future period of monopoly …
The European Commission's Ecs/Akzo Standard For Predatory Pricing In The E.E.C.: Deterrence Or Disorder?, Thomas G. Ehr
The European Commission's Ecs/Akzo Standard For Predatory Pricing In The E.E.C.: Deterrence Or Disorder?, Thomas G. Ehr
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Single Firm Conduct, George A. Hay
Single Firm Conduct, George A. Hay
George A. Hay
My assignment is to discuss likely future developments involving single firm conduct. I will first discuss general trends and then move on to discuss some specific areas of the law. At the outset, however, I should remind the reader that what follows are predictions, not endorsements.
Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay
Pigeonholes In Antitrust, George A. Hay
The Economics Of Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay
The Economics Of Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay
George A. Hay
The revival of interest among economists in predatory pricing, spawned by Areeda and Turner's 1975 article, and the tidal wave of literature which has followed, creates a serious problem for the lawyer interested in keeping up with what economists are saying on the subject. Articles appearing in the standard economics journals are often inaccessible, due to the advanced level of mathematics normally employed, and seem of little apparent relevance, due to the detailed but often artificially sounding assumptions used to generate conclusions. The materials appearing in law reviews, while perhaps less technical, is voluminous and not always original, Worst of …
Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories And The Evolution Of Legal Standards, Joseph F. Brodley, George A. Hay
Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories And The Evolution Of Legal Standards, Joseph F. Brodley, George A. Hay
George A. Hay
Recent years have witnessed a virtual explosion in the legal and economic literature dealing with predatory pricing. Equally dramatic has been the swift adoption by several courts of policy conclusions derived from this literature—a development that is startling, given the complexity and volume of the literature and the lack of consensus among legal and economic scholars. The result has been to raise an acute problem for lawyers and judges who must assess the validity and applicability of competing economic models, mold stubborn and unruly facts to fit abstract economic theories, translate economic theories into legal doctrines, and resolve puzzling cost …
The Ftc And Pricing: Of Predation And Signaling, George A. Hay
The Ftc And Pricing: Of Predation And Signaling, George A. Hay
George A. Hay
This paper summarizes and comments on two recent FTC cases. The first case involved accusations of predatory pricing against Borden, the manufacturer of ReaLemon, the dominant brand of reconstituted lemon juice. The second involved price-signaling and other so-called facilitating practices by the four makers of lead-based antiknock compounds.
Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin
Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Judge Breyer famously worried that aggressive prohibitions of predatory pricing throw away a bird in hand (low prices during the alleged predatory period) for a speculative bird in the bush (preventing higher prices thereafter). Here, I argue that there is no bird in hand because entry cannot be presumed. Moreover, it is plausibly commonplace that low prices or the threat of low prices produce anticompetitive results by reducing entry, inducing exit, and keeping prices high. I analyze three potential standards for identifying predatory pricing. Two are traditional but have been tangled together and must be distinguished. First, a price-cost test …
Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting: A Response To Professor Elhauge, Thomas A. Lambert
Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting: A Response To Professor Elhauge, Thomas A. Lambert
Thomas A. Lambert
Professor Einer Elhauge’s highly acclaimed article, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (Dec. 2009), contests two propositions on which efficiency-minded antitrust scholars have largely agreed: (1) that there should be no tying liability absent substantial tied market foreclosure (a position contrary to the legal status quo), and (2) that courts should recognize a safe harbor for any bundled discount that results in above-cost pricing that could be matched by an equally efficient, single-product rival. Elhauge maintains that tie-ins that do not cause substantial tied market foreclosure may nonetheless occasion …
Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting, Thom Lambert
Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting, Thom Lambert
Faculty Publications
This article asserts a comprehensive response to Elhauge’s provocative arguments. With respect to tying, the article shows that governing Supreme Court precedent does not deem the non-foreclosure “power” effects of the practice to be anticompetitive and that those effects are unlikely to reduce social welfare in the long run, especially after accounting for dynamic efficiencies. With respect to bundled discounting, the article shows that Elhauge’s proposed liability rule is both inapposite to consumer harm and inadministrable and that both “linked” market foreclosure and a form of below-cost pricing are necessary for anticompetitive harm and should therefore be prerequisites to antitrust …
Predatory Bundling And The Exclusionary Standard, J. Shahar Dillbary
Predatory Bundling And The Exclusionary Standard, J. Shahar Dillbary
Washington and Lee Law Review
Recent decisions-all relying on a stylized example first provided by the Ortho court-hold that a multi-product seller that uses a bundled discount in a way that excludes an equally or more efficient competitor engages in predatory bundling. According to these decisions, a bundle can be considered 'predatory" even when the price of the bundle exceeds its cost. This Article shows that the Ortho court's stylized example and its monopoly leveraging theory are erroneous. This Article further demonstrates that even when a bundle's price excludes more efficient competitors and even when a component in the bundle is priced below cost, and …
The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The FTC has explicit antitrust authority to enforce the Clayton Act, although not the Sherman Act. More than a half century ago, however, the Supreme Court held that the FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition” reaches everything the Sherman Act reaches and also a “penumbra” of practices that are not technical Sherman Act violations. That view, which had fallen into disuse in recent decades, is now being revived.
This essay defends a limited version of that “penumbra” view and suggests several applications. First, while both Sherman Act provisions are open ended in their coverage, they have limitations. Section …
Rarely Tried, And . . . Rarely Successful: Theoretically Impossible Price Predation Among The Airlines, Christopher L. Sagers
Rarely Tried, And . . . Rarely Successful: Theoretically Impossible Price Predation Among The Airlines, Christopher L. Sagers
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
Two large bodies of literature bearing on the competitive health of the deregulated airlines are in sharp conflict: (1) the volumes of judicial and academic output to the effect that the phenomenon of predatory pricing is, as a practical matter, impossible; and (2) the similarly massive body of industry-specific theory and empirical evidence that predation not only occurs in airline markets, but has been a key tool to preserve market power held by the surviving legacy carriers. This article seeks to establish from the latter that the former is a poor basis for policy, especially if there is nothing really …
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Articles
Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …
The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Herbert Hovenkamp
The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp
ABSTRACT A price squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm “squeezes’ a rival’s margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival, and a low output price to consumers for whom the two firms compete. Price squeezes have been a recognized but controversial antitrust violation for two-thirds of a century. We examine the law and economics of the price squeeze, beginning with Judge Hand’s famous discussion in the Alcoa case in 1945. While Alcoa has been widely portrayed as creating a “fairness” or “fair profit” test for unlawful price squeezes, Judge Hand actually adopted a …
Developing An Antitrust Injury Requirement For Injunctive Relief That Reflects The Probability Of Anticompetitive Harm, Yavar Bathaee
Developing An Antitrust Injury Requirement For Injunctive Relief That Reflects The Probability Of Anticompetitive Harm, Yavar Bathaee
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
The Predatory Pricing Puzzle: Piecing Together A Unitary Standard, Kimberly L. Herb
The Predatory Pricing Puzzle: Piecing Together A Unitary Standard, Kimberly L. Herb
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Law Of Exclusionary Pricing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Law Of Exclusionary Pricing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The success of the Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing and the Supreme Court's adoption of demanding proof requirements in its 1993 Brooke Group decision have made it very difficult for plaintiffs to win conventional predatory pricing claims. While many challenges to exclusionary pricing continue to be made, the legal theory has evolved away from classical predation to a variety of other theories. These include challenges to quantity and market share discounts, single item and package discounts, and various purchasing practices, including slotting fees, overinvestment in fixed cost assets, and overbuying of variable cost inputs. Plaintiffs have enjoyed somewhat greater success …
Weyerhaeuser And The Search For Antitrust's Holy Grail, Thom Lambert
Weyerhaeuser And The Search For Antitrust's Holy Grail, Thom Lambert
Faculty Publications
A general definition of exclusionary conduct has become a sort of Holy Grail for antitrust scholars. At present, four proposed definitions appear most promising: (1) conduct that could exclude an equally efficient rival; (2) conduct that raises rivals' costs unjustifiably; (3) conduct that, on balance, impairs consumer welfare by creating market power without providing countervailing consumer benefits; and (4) conduct that makes no economic sense but for its exclusionary effect on rivals.
Economic Authority And The Limits Of Expertise In Antitrust Cases, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
Economic Authority And The Limits Of Expertise In Antitrust Cases, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
In antitrust litigation, the factual complexity and economic nature of the issues involved require the presentation of economic expert testimony in all but a few cases. This dependence on economics has increased in recent years because of the courts' narrowing of per se rules of illegality and the courts' expansion of certain areas of factual inquiry. At the same time, however, courts have limited the scope of allowable expert testimony through the methodological strictures of Daubert and its progeny and through heightened sufficiency requirements. In this Article, Professors Page and Lopatka make four important points about these judicially imposed constraints …
The Fable Of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, Avishalom Tor
The Fable Of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, Avishalom Tor
Michigan Law Review
Legal scholars have recently advanced a behavioral approach to the law and economics school of thought in an attempt to improve its external validity and predictive power. The hallmark of this new approach is the replacement of the perfectly rational actor with a "boundedly rational" decisionmaker who, apart from being affected by emotion and motivation, has only limited cognitive resources. To function effectively in a complex :world, boundedly rational individuals must rely on cognitive heuristics - simplifying mental shortcuts - that inevitably lead people to make some systematic decision errors; as a result, their behavior necessarily deviates from that predicted …
Still Preying On Strategic Reputation Models Of Predation, Peter H. Huang
Still Preying On Strategic Reputation Models Of Predation, Peter H. Huang
Publications
No abstract provided.