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Full-Text Articles in Law
Patent Trolls Among Us, Kent R. Acheson
Patent Trolls Among Us, Kent R. Acheson
Kent R Acheson
As Acheson (2012) suggested in A Study of the Need to Change United States Patent Policy, software should not be patented, but the Intellectual Property Rights should be protected in another manner that does not entail a Copyright, Trademark, or secrecy. A new form of protection should be created based on certain criteria, such as useful life of a patent, incremental innovation, value to society, and or value to life.
Patent Trolls Among Us, Kent R. Acheson
Patent Trolls Among Us, Kent R. Acheson
Kent R Acheson
As Acheson (2012) suggested in A Study of the Need to Change United States Patent Policy, software should not be patented, but the Intellectual Property Rights should be protected in another manner that does not entail a Copyright, Trademark, or secrecy. A new form of protection should be created based on certain criteria, such as useful life of a patent, incremental innovation, value to society, and or value to life. Congress should devise a shorter-term idea protection specifically for the sequential or disruptive innovation, but not on the product.
Licensing Complementary Patents: ‘Patent Trolls’, Market Structure, And ‘Excessive’ Royalties, Anne S. Layne-Farrar, Klaus Schmidt
Licensing Complementary Patents: ‘Patent Trolls’, Market Structure, And ‘Excessive’ Royalties, Anne S. Layne-Farrar, Klaus Schmidt
Anne S. Layne-Farrar
The infamous Blackberry case brought new attention to so-called “patent trolls” and began the general association of trolls with “non-practicing” patent holders. This has had important legal consequences: Namely, patent holders have been denied injunctive relief because they did not practice the patents themselves. In this paper we analyze how patent holders –– both non-practicing and vertically integrated –– choose their royalties depending on the structure of the upstream and downstream markets and the types of licensing agreements available. We show that a vertically integrated firm has an incentive to raise its rivals’ costs and to restrict entry on the …