Law Commons^™

No Trespassing: The Legal Origins Of Louisiana’S Water Access Dispute, Karly Kyzar Dorr

Journal of Civil Law Studies

Since the birth of the civil law tradition, the public’s right to access and use running waters has been recognized and protected through written legal sources, statutes, and codes. However, although the State of Louisiana is often lauded as the “Sportsman’s Paradise,” the current judicial interpretation of water access rights has restricted the public’s ability to use waterways, in particular running waters, for recreational pursuits such as fishing and hunting. The purpose of this essay is first to highlight the trajectory of the development of the law relative to the public’s right to access and use running waters. The analysis …

Originalism, Official History, And Perspectives Versus Methodologies, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper addresses a well-worn topic: originalism, the theory that judges should interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent with the intent of its framers. I am interested in the real-world effects of originalism. The primary effect advanced by originalists is the tendency of the approach to constrain the discretion of judges. However, another effect of originalism that I identify is the creation of official histories, a practice that imposes a hidden tax on society. Another question I consider is whether originalism should be considered a methodology of analyzing the law or a perspective on the law. I argue that …

Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt

Arkansas Law Review

In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War, Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus” on slavery. According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery within the states. Legal scholars who support the modern reach of federal powers have thus conventionally argued …

Originalism's Implementation Problem, Michael L. Smith, Alexander S. Hiland

Faculty Articles

Originalism has received a great deal of recent, mainstream attention. President Donald Trump's nomination of three justices to the Supreme Court amplified discussions of their judicial philosophies during and following their confirmation proceedings. Supporters of these nominations highlighted the nominees' originalist credentials, arguing that originalism was the dominant approach to constitutional interpretation.

In the academic sphere, volumes of articles and books set forth originalist theories and methodology. Its academic proponents also refer to it as the dominant form of constitutional interpretation—often asserting that opponents of originalism have failed to enunciate a coherent alternative theory. Some argue that originalism (at least, …

Slavery And The History Of Congress’S Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt

School of Law Faculty Publications

In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War, Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus” on slavery. According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery within the states. Legal scholars who support the modern reach of federal powers have thus conventionally argued …

American Common Market Redux, Richard Collins

Publications

The Tennessee Wine case, decided in June of 2019, had a major effect on the path of the law for an issue not argued in it. The Supreme Court affirmed invalidity of a protectionist state liquor regulation that discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant commerce clause doctrine. Its holding rejected a vigorous defense based on the special terms of the Twenty-first Amendment that ended Prohibition—an issue of interest only to those involved in markets for alcoholic drinks. However, the Court’s opinion removed serious doubts about validity of the Doctrine itself, even though the petitioner and supporting amici …

A Matter For Interpretation: An Inquiry Into Confederate Symbolism And The Florida State Flag, Nicholas Mignanelli, Sarah C. Slinger

University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review

Are the red bars found on Florida’s state flag a remnant of early twentieth-century nostalgia for the Confederacy? Who first proposed this design and why? What did this change mean to the citizens who witnessed it? This Article is an attempt to answer these questions by approaching them through the lenses of original intent and original meaning. In doing so, the Authors advance new strategies for decision-makers interested in uncovering the motives of those who first erected or affixed allegedly Confederate monuments and symbols.

Unifying Original Intent And Original Public Meaning, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport

Northwestern University Law Review

Original intent and original public meaning are generally thought to be opposing camps within originalism. Both theories assert that that the meaning of a constitutional provision was fixed at the time it was enacted. But they disagree fundamentally on the nature of interpretation. Original intent asserts that the meaning sought is that intended by the Constitution’s enactors. Original public meaning asserts that the meaning sought is that revealed by the text as reasonably understood by a well-informed reader at the time of the provision’s enactment.

In this Essay, we unite these two conflicting principles of originalism under the original methods …

The Elephant Problem, Richard Primus

Reviews

In their new book, "A Great Power of Attorney": Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution, Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman argue that, as a matter of original meaning, the Constitution should be understood as analogous to a power of attorney, that interpretive devices applicable to powers of attorney should therefore be used in constitutional interpretation, and that interpreting the Constitution that way would produce results congenial to modern libertarian preferences, such as the unconstitutionality of the Affordable Care Act and the invalidity, on nondelegation grounds, of much of the federal administrative state. But the book fails to carry any of its central …

United States V. Hubbell: Encryption And The Discovery Of Documents, Gregory S. Sergienko

Greg Sergienko

Five years ago, in a contribution to these pages, I suggested that the Supreme Court's oldest precedents and the original intent of the framers of the Constitution precluded the use of evidence produced under a grant of immunity against the producer, even though the material produced included documents that the producer had not been compelled to write. This implied that information concealed with a cryptographic key could not be used in a criminal prosecution against someone from whom the key had been obtained under a grant of immunity. The issue, however, was doubtful given the tendency of the Court to …

Original Understanding And The Constitution, Michael E. Tigar

Akron Law Review

Those who do not understand civil procedure are condemned to repeat it.

So far as I know, I have never had a student who wanted to repeat civil procedure, or any other course that I taught. The person who warned us about history was suggesting, in a broader sense, that if you really understood the past, you would not want to do it over again. Rather, you would appreciate that in every field of human endeavor we try to stand on the shoulders of those who have gone before, so that we can see farther and maybe do better.

But …

The Founders’ Origination Clause (And Implications For The Affordable Care Act), Prof. Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This Article is the first comprehensive examination of the original legal force of the Constitution’s Origination Clause, drawing not merely on the records of the 1787-90 constitutional debates, but on founding-era British and American legislative practice and other sources. This Article defines the bills governed by the Origination Clause, the precise meaning of the House origination requirement, and the extent of the Senate’s amendment power. For illustrative purposes, the Article tests against its findings the currently-litigated claim that the financial penalty for failure to acquire individual health insurance under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is invalid as a …

Original Intent And The Fourteenth Amendment: Into The Black Hole Of Constitutional Law, Paul Finkelman

Chicago-Kent Law Review

This article explores and examines William E. Nelson’s masterful study of the origins and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principal to Judicial Doctrine (1988). The article explains that a quarter of a century after he wrote this book, Nelson’s study of the origins and adoption of the Amendment remains the best exploration of these issues. His book illustrates the difficulties of determining the “original intent” of the framers of this complicated and complex Amendment. At the same time, however, Nelson demonstrates that for many issues we can come to a strong understanding of the goals …

Does “The Freedom Of The Press” Include A Right To Anonymity? The Original Meaning, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This Article examines relevant evidence to determine whether, as some have argued, the original legal force of the First Amendment’s “freedom of the press” included a per se right to anonymous authorship. The Article concludes that, except in cases in which freedom of the press had been abused, it did. Thus, from an originalist point of view, Supreme Court cases such as Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which upheld statutes requiring disclosure of donors to political advertising, were erroneously decided.

Does “The Freedom Of The Press” Include A Right To Anonymity? The Original Meaning, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This Article examines relevant evidence to determine whether, as some have argued, the original legal force of the First Amendment’s “freedom of the press” included a per se right to anonymous authorship. The Article concludes that, except in cases in which freedom of the press had been abused, it did. Thus, from an originalist point of view, Supreme Court cases such as Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which upheld statutes requiring disclosure of donors to political advertising, were erroneously decided.

Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen

Book Chapters

If the Supreme Court mythologizes Blackstone, it is equally true that Blackstone himself was engaged in something of a mythmaking project. Far from a neutral reporter, Blackstone has some stories to tell, in particular the story of the hero law. The problems associated with using the Commentaries as a transparent window on eighteenth-century American legal norms, however, do not make Blackstone’s text irrelevant today. The chapter concludes with my brief reading of the Commentaries as a critical mirror of some twenty-first-century legal and social structures. That analysis draws on a long-term project, in which I am making my way through …

The Origins And Meaning Of “Vacancies That May Happen During The Recess” In The Constitution’S Recess Appointments Clause, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

There has been longstanding uncertainty about the meaning of “the Recess” and “Vacancies that may happen” in the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause. This Article finds that both “the Recess” and close variants of “Vacancies that may happen” were standard terms in Founding-Era legislative practice, and appear copiously in legislative records. Those records inform us that “the Recess” means only the intersession recess and that a vacancy “happens” only when it first arises.

The Thirteenth Amendment And Constitutional Change, William M. Carter Jr.

Articles

This article builds upon remarks the author originally delivered at the Nineteenth Annual Derrick Bell Lecture on Race in American Society at NYU Law in November of 2014. The Article describes the history and purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment’s proscription of the badges and incidents of slavery and argues that an understanding of the Amendment's context and its Framers' intent can provide the basis for a more progressive vision for advancing civil rights. The Article discusses how the Thirteenth Amendment could prove to be more effective in addressing persisting forms of inequality that have escaped the reach of the Equal …

A Concise Guide To Using Dictionaries From The Founding Era To Determine The Original Meaning Of The Constitution, Gregory E. Maggs

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

This Article explains how dictionaries published in the Founding Era may provide evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution. In addition, the Article identifies and discusses six potential problems with relying on definitions from these dictionaries, and cautions that these potential problems must be considered when using Founding Era dictionaries either to make claims about the Constitution’s original meaning or to evaluate claims about original meaning made by others. Finally, the Article includes an Appendix describing nine English language dictionaries and four legal dictionaries from the Founding Era that the Supreme Court has cited in constitutional cases, and indicates …

A Concise Guide To Using Dictionaries From The Founding Era To Determine The Original Meaning Of The Constitution, Gregory E. Maggs

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

This Article explains how dictionaries published in the Founding Era may provide evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution. In addition, the Article identifies and discusses six potential problems with relying on definitions from these dictionaries, and cautions that these potential problems must be considered when using Founding Era dictionaries either to make claims about the Constitution’s original meaning or to evaluate claims about original meaning made by others. Finally, the Article includes an Appendix describing nine English language dictionaries and four legal dictionaries from the Founding Era that the Supreme Court has cited in constitutional cases, and indicates …

California Adopts The Unproven Federal Minority View Of Entrapment , Steven D. Campen

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Founding-Era Conventions And The Meaning Of The Constitution’S “Convention For Proposing Amendments”, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

Under Article V of the U.S. Constitution, two thirds of state legislatures may require Congress to call a “Convention for proposing Amendments.” Because this procedure has never been used, commentators frequently debate the composition of the convention and the rules governing the application and convention process. However, the debate has proceeded almost entirely without knowledge of the many multi-colony and multi-state conventions held during the eighteenth century, of which the Constitutional Convention was only one. These conventions were governed by universally-accepted convention practices and protocols. This Article surveys those conventions and shows how their practices and protocols shaped the meaning …

The Promises Of Freedom: The Contemporary Relevance Of The Thirteenth Amendment, William M. Carter Jr.

Articles

This article, an expanded version of the author's remarks at the 2013 Honorable Clifford Scott Green Lecture at the Temple University Beasley School of Law, illuminates the history and the context of the Thirteenth Amendment. This article contends that the full scope of the Thirteenth Amendment has yet to be realized and offers reflections on why it remains an underenforced constitutional norm. Finally, this article demonstrates the relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to addressing contemporary forms of racial inequality and subordination.

Justice Kennedy’S Use Of Sources Of The Original Meaning Of The Constitution, Gregory E. Maggs

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

The essay concerns one aspect of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, namely, his use of some of the principal sources of the original meaning of the Constitution in his written opinions. By the term “sources of the original meaning of the Constitution,” I refer to the records from the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, the records of the state ratifying conventions, the Federalist Papers, dictionaries showing usage of language during the Founding period, and the acts of the First Congress. The goals of this essay are first to identify, quote, and describe passages in which Justice Kennedy has cited these sources, and …

The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding Of Original Intent, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This Article addresses whether the American Founders expected evidence of their own subjective views to guide future interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. The Article considers a range of evidence largely overlooked or misunderstood in earlier studies, such as contemporaneous rules of legal interpretation, judicial use of legislative history, early American public debate, and pronouncements by state ratifying conventions. Based on this evidence, the Article concludes that the Founders were “original-understanding originalists.” This means that they anticipated that constitutional interpretation would be guided by the subjective understanding of the ratifiers when such understanding was coherent and recoverable and, otherwise, by the …

A Republic, Not A Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, And The Constitution's Guarantee Clause, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article debunks the myth, first arising in the 1840s, that the Founders sharply distinguished between a "republic" and a "democracy." It explains that by a "republic," most of the Founders meant a government controlled by the citizenry, following the rule of law, and without a king. Accordingly, state provisions for initiative and referendum are fully consistent with the Constitution's requirement that each state have a republican form of government; in fact, most of the governments the Founders called "republics" had featured analogous forms of direct democracy.

Paper Money And The Original Understanding Of The Coinage Clause, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

Over a century ago, the Supreme Court decided the Legal Tender Cases, holding that Congress could authorize legal tender paper money in addition to metallic coin. In recent years, some commentators have argued that this holding was incorrect as a matter of original understanding or original meaning, but that any other holding would be absolutely inconsistent with modern needs. They further argue that the impracticality of functioning without paper money demonstrates that originalism is not a workable method of constitutional interpretation. Those who rely on the Legal Tender Cases to discredit originalism are, however, in error. This Article shows that …

A Concise Guide To The Records Of The Federal Constitutional Convention Of 1787 As A Source Of The Original Meaning Of The U.S. Constitution, Gregory E. Maggs

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

The article describes the Constitutional Convention and the various kinds of records that were kept of its proceedings. The essay then explains, with examples, how judicial opinions and academic works draw upon the records for evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning, including both the meaning that the Framers may have subjectively intended the document to have and also other possible meanings. The essay next identifies and assesses seven important potential grounds for impeaching assertions about what the records show. Each of these potential grounds has merit in some contexts, but all of them are also subject to significant limitations or …

The Case For Original Intent, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

This Article seeks to situate the constitutional culture's heavy reliance on the Convention debates within an academic environment that is generally hostile to original intent arguments. The Article argues that intentionalist-friendly sources like the Convention records and The Federalist remain important not because they supply evidence of original meaning but rather because the practice of advancing historical arguments is best understood as a rhetorical exercise that derives persuasive authority from the heroic character of the Founding generation. This exercise fits within a long tradition of originalist argument and need not be abandoned in the quest for a more perfect originalism.

The Constitution As An Exploding Cigar And Other “Historian’S Heresies” About A Constitutional Orthodoxy, R.B. Bernstein

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.