Law Commons^™

Why Choose Ltas? An Empirical Study Of Ohio Manufacturer’S Contractual Choices Through A Bargaining Lens, Juliet P. Kostritsky, Jessica Ice

Faculty Publications

This paper contributes to recent scholarship regarding Long Term Agreements (LTAs) by providing empirical evidence that suppliers are more likely to undertake the costs of an LTA if the transaction requires significant capital expenditures or the potential for large sunk costs. Through a survey of a random group of 63 Ohio supplier/manufacturers, the paper explores why supplier/manufacturers with a full range of contractual and non-contractual solutions might choose one set of arrangements over others. It then seeks to link its findings to a broader theory of how parties bargain to solve durable problems under conditions of uncertainty, sunk costs and …

The Practical Significance Of The Economic Analysis Of Law In The Legislative System Of Uzbekistan, D. Abdulov

Review of law sciences

This article describes the characteristics of economic analysis of law only to that extent that it is necessary to understand the relationship between economic analysis and Comparative law. Because of the fundamental differences between two disciplines, they complement each other and can be connected in different ways.

A Bargaining Dynamic Transaction Cost Approach To Understanding Framework Contracts, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Faculty Publications

This Article takes a different approach. It draws on the literature of these scholars but suggests that another way to understand the arrangements parties enter into in a variety of settings to purchase or sell goods or to innovate on a product or drug can best be understood in terms of a bargaining dynamic that looks at how the private interests of the parties are turned into joint interests in the agreement reached. It is a mistake to talk about the form of a contract without first understanding the bargaining needs and positions of the parties and how those needs …

Restroom Use, Civil Rights, And Free Speech "Opportunism", Timothy Zick

Faculty Publications

Commentators have expressed concerns that litigants are invoking the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause strategically, in order to compensate for the weakness or futility of other constitutional claims. The phenomenon has been given a label- "opportunism "-and scholars have examined some of its causes and consequences. This Article takes a closer and somewhat skeptical look at the concept offree speech "opportunism." It imagines that the Free Speech Clause will be invoked in challenges to laws or policies that restrict public restroom use based on a person's gender. Would such challenges be "opportunistic, " as the term has been defined? What …

Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The concepts of good faith and bad faith play a central role in many areas of private law and international law. Typically associated with honesty, loyalty, and fair dealing, good faith is said to supply the fundamental principle of every legal system, if not the foundation of all law. With limited exceptions, however, good faith and bad faith go unmentioned in constitutional cases brought by or against government institutions. This doctrinal deficit is especially striking given that the U.S. Constitution twice refers to faithfulness and that insinuations of bad faith pervade constitutional discourse.

This Article investigates these points and their …

Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann

Kenneth Ayotte

The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a complex cluster of hundreds of corporate subsidiaries under the common control of a single corporate parent. Our Article provides new theory and supportive evidence to help explain this structure. We focus, in particular on the advantages of subsidiary entities in providing the option to transfer some or all of the firm's contractual rights and obligations in the future. The theory not only sheds light on corporate subsidiaries but also illuminates a basic function of all types of legal entities, from partnerships to nonprofit corporations. We show that when, as is …

Contract Design And The Shading Problem, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Despite recent advances in our understanding of contracting behavior, economic contract theory has yet to identify the principal causes and effects of contract breach. In this Essay, I argue that opportunism is a primary explanation for why commercial parties deliberately breach their contracts. I develop a novel variation on opportunism that I identify as “shading;” a behavior that more accurately describes the vexing problems courts face in rooting out strategic behavior in contract litigation. I provide some empirical support for the claim that shading behavior is both pervasive in litigation over contract breach and extremely difficult for generalist courts to …

Opportunism As Crucible: Rethinking Equity In View Of Reliance Interests And Legal Evolution, John Ehrett

John Ehrett

This Article offers and defends a nuanced definition of opportunism in the context of legal decision-making by differentiating between opportunism in the broad sense and the particularized phenomenon of cognizably malignant opportunism. It subsequently proceeds by developing a normative critique of the case for broader invocation of counter opportunistic equitable remedies, alongside a defense of the reliance and gap-filling functions performed by opportunistic actors. Centrally, I challenge the suggestion that the existence of opportunism in private law warrants a revival of the doctrines of ex post equity. I argue instead that opportunism serves an important structural purpose where the evolution …

Tiaras, Queen Bees, Imposters And The Board Room: Lean In & Women In Corporate Governance, Christyne J. Vachon

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann

Michigan Law Review

The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a complex cluster of hundreds of corporate subsidiaries under the common control of a single corporate parent. Our Article provides new theory and supportive evidence to help explain this structure. We focus, in particular on the advantages of subsidiary entities in providing the option to transfer some or all of the firm's contractual rights and obligations in the future. The theory not only sheds light on corporate subsidiaries but also illuminates a basic function of all types of legal entities, from partnerships to nonprofit corporations. We show that when, as is …

Carrots & Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the entrepreneurial team – the startup’s founder, other executives, and common shareholders – may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to VCs’ liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45% of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt …

Rummaging Through The Bottom Of Pandora’S Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Wesley J. Heath

Shaun D. Ledgerwood

Predatory pricing doctrine is currently a dead area of the law. To proceed beyond summary judgment, a plaintiff must prove the predation created a "dangerous probability" of supracompetitive pricing as the mechanism for recouping the losses “invested” in the predation. This requires proof that the predator sold products below its average variable cost and raised an entry barrier that ultimately enabled the recoupment of profits at some later time. We offer an alternative to this two-phased recoupment model. In this paper we show that a multiproduct retailer can target loss leading behavior in a market segment to punish or eliminate …

Controlling Creditor Opportunism, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper addresses problems of creditor opportunism. “Distress investors” such as hedge funds, private equity funds, and investment banks are opportunistic when they use debt to obtain control of a financially troubled firm and extract improper gains at the expense of the firm and its other stakeholders. Examples include the mis-use of private information to short-sell a borrower’s securities and creditor self-dealing.

Creditors can act opportunistically because legal doctrines that historically checked such behavior—e.g., “lender liability”—have not kept pace with fundamental changes in the market for control of distressed firms. The recent Dodd-Frank financial reform is not likely to change …

Interpretive Risk And Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach For Maximizing Value, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

• The Article offers a theory of judicial intervention and interpretation in Contracts. It posits that the principal objective of courts interpreting, supplementing, or overriding terms is to ask whether such intervention can serve the broad objective of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing transaction costs and the costs of opportunism, collectively, an interpretive risk. It offers an economic rationale for a broad approach to interpretation and explores several examples from Contract law where courts depart from the parties’ textual choices and follow the theory suggested in this Article. These examples directly challenge the theory of the new formalists.

Interpretive Risk And Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach For Maximizing Value, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

• The Article offers a theory of judicial intervention and interpretation in Contracts. It posits that the principal objective of courts interpreting, supplementing, or overriding terms is to ask whether such intervention can serve the broad objective of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing transaction costs and the costs of opportunism, collectively, an interpretive risk. It offers an economic rationale for a broad approach to interpretation and explores several examples from Contract law where courts depart from the parties’ textual choices and follow the theory suggested in this Article. These examples directly challenge the theory of the new formalists.

Interpretive Risk And Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach For Maximizing Value, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

• The Article offers a theory of judicial intervention and interpretation in Contracts. It posits that the principal objective of courts interpreting, supplementing, or overriding terms is to ask whether such intervention can serve the broad objective of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing transaction costs and the costs of opportunism, collectively, an interpretive risk. It offers an economic rationale for a broad approach to interpretation and explores several examples from Contract law where courts depart from the parties’ textual choices and follow the theory suggested in this Article. These examples directly challenge the theory of the new formalists.

The Means/Ends Dilemma In Contract Interpretation: A Response To Professors Kraus And Scott: How The Intractability Of Express Language Affects Interpretive Authority And Legal Interventions In Contracts, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

In their recent article on Contract Design and Intent, Professors Jody Kraus and Robert Scott offer a new justification for literal enforcement of the parties’ chosen terms and for ignoring the contract’s objectives. Their argument depends on a theory of how parties trade off front end and back end costs. Kraus and Scott posit that if parties use specific terms, and fail to use open-ended terms, they have chosen to exclude courts from broadly interpreting the contract or going beyond the chosen means. As such, courts should rigorously adhere to the parties’ explicit contractual means and spurn any judicial strategy …

The Means/Ends Dilemma In Contract Interpretation: A Response To Professors Kraus And Scott: How The Intractability Of Express Language Affects Interpretive Authority And Legal Intervention In Contracts, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

In their recent article on Contract Design and Intent, Professors Jody Kraus and Robert Scott offer a new justification for literal enforcement of the parties’ chosen terms and for ignoring the contract’s objectives. Their argument depends on a theory of how parties trade off front end and back end costs. Kraus and Scott posit that if parties use specific terms, and fail to use open-ended terms, they have chosen to exclude courts from broadly interpreting the contract or going beyond the chosen means. As such, courts should rigorously adhere to the parties’ explicit contractual means and spurn any judicial strategy …

The Means/Ends Dilemma In Contract Interpretation: A Response To Professors Kraus And Scott: How The Intractability Of Express Language And Uncertainty Affects Legal Interventions In Contracts, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

In their recent article on Contract Design and Intent, Professors Jody Kraus and Robert Scott offer a new justification for such a literal enforcement of the parties’ chosen terms and for ignoring contractual objectives. Their argument depends on a theory of how parties bargain and trade off front end and back end costs. Kraus and Scott posit that if parties have invested enough transaction costs to result in specific terms, and failed to delegate decision-making to a court through open-ended terms, they have a deliberately chosen to exclude courts. In such cases courts should rigorously adhere to the explicit contractual …

Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg

Ryan M. Riegg

Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg

Ryan M. Riegg

Plain Meaning Vs. Broad Interpretation: How The Risk Of Opportunism Defeats A Unitary Default Rule For Interpretation, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation Juliet P. Kostritsky, Case Western Reserve Abstract This essay argues that it is the wrong to think that courts must make a dichotomous choice always to prefer extrinsic evidence or always to exclude it. Sometimes the appropriate interpretive methodology should explicitly forego extrinsic evidence while at other times it should embrace extrinsic evidence. The choice between the two methodologies should depend upon an assessment in each case about which interpretive methodology is most likely to (1) curb opportunistic behavior; and (2) and implement …

The Nondischargeability Of Student Loans In Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search For A Theory, John A. E. Pottow

Articles

In fiscal year 2002, approximately 5.8 million Americans borrowed $38 billion (USD) in federal student loans. This was more than triple the $11.7 billion borrowed in 1990. As a rule of thumb, tuition has been increasing at roughly double the rate of inflation in recent years. This troubling trend of accelerating tuition, coupled with the fact that real income has stagnated for men and increased only modestly for women over the past two decades, means that more and more students are going to need to turn to borrowed money to finance their degrees absent a radical restructuring of the postsecondary …

Standard Setting, Patents, And Access Lock-In: Rand Licensing And The Theory Of The Firm, Joseph S. Miller

Scholarly Works

Many leading voluntary standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have adopted intellectual property (IP) policies under which participants must promise to license any patents on technology that they contribute to a standard, and to do so on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms (RAND). The standard setting literature includes a substantial focus on the widespread use of this RAND promise. A common refrain in these analyses of the RAND promise is that its meaning is dysfunctionally uncertain. We know more about the RAND promise, however, than the existing literature suggests. I show that we already know the RAND promise's core meaning, and why it remains …

The "Branding Effect" Of Contracts, D. Gordon Smith

Faculty Scholarship

In his case study of the MasterCard IPO and its predecessor piece on the Google IPO, Victor Fleischer claims to find evidence of a branding effect of legal infrastructure. The branding effect is not aimed at reducing the potential for opportunism by a counterparty to a contract, but rather at increasing the attractiveness of a product to present and future users or improving the image of a company in the eyes of regulators, judges, and juries. In this essay commenting on Fleischer's work, I endorse the notion that deal structures have branding effects and position Fleischer's work within a larger …

The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard Form Contracts Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason S. Johnston

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper analyzes standard form contracts between firms and individual consumers (and borrowers). It presents a mix of anecdotal and empirical evidence from a large number of industries demonstrating a widespread pattern in which firms refrain from enforcing the typically clear bright line performance obligations that such standard form contracts set out (such as a consumer credit repayment terms, or a retail consumer's right to return goods). Instead, firms routinely give their supervisory employees the discretion to bargain around such terms. Within a simple and informal model, the paper explains such delegated, discretionary renegotiation as a means by which firms …

Judicial Incorporation Of Trade Usages: A Functional Solution To The Opportunism Problem, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Faculty Publications

Article 2 of the UCC directed courts to look to business norms as a primary means of interpreting contracts. Recently the new formalists have attacked this strategy of norm incorporation as a misguided one that will lead inevitably to significant error costs. Accordingly, they have embraced plain meaning as the preferred interpretive strategy. This article argues that the strategy of rejecting trade usages unless they are part of the express contract is too rigid. The rejection is premised on an overly narrow cost/benefit analysis that fails to account for the functional role that such usages may play in curbing opportunistic …

The Exit Structure Of Strategic Alliances, D. Gordon Smith

Faculty Scholarship

Today, many biotechnology firms use strategic alliances to contract with other companies. This article contends that the governance structure of these alliances - specifically, the contractual board - provides an integrated restraint on opportunism. While an alliance agreement's exit structure could provide a check on opportunism by allowing the parties to exit at will, such exit provisions also can be used opportunistically. Most alliance agreements, therefore, provide for contractual lock in of the alliance partners, with only limited means of exit. Lock in, of course, raises its own concerns, and the contractual board - which typically is composed of representatives …

The Bewitchment Of Intelligence: Language And Ex Post Illusions Of Intention, Jeffrey Marc Lipshaw

ExpressO

Lawyers who negotiate and litigate over complex deals have an intuitive notion of the value of what they do in connection with the contract. The arguments around technical contract language often are a lawyers’ game; in most cases, what is clear would have been clear on a handshake; and what is tightly negotiated bears only a random relationship to the areas of future dispute. If they happen to have drafted tight and clear language around the particular matter in dispute, it is as much luck as foresight. Thereafter complex agreements can have binding effect for years, but most of the …

Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory Of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.