Law Commons^™

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Structural Integrity And A Call For Adaptive And Incremental Agency Design Policy, Hannah Clendening

Indiana Law Journal

INTRODUCTION

I. UNDERSTANDING AND RATIONALIZING COMPETING DESIGN OBJECTIVES

A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE CFPB’S FORMATION

B. D.C. CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN PHH CORP. V. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

C. BASIC TENETS OF LEADING ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORIES

D. ANOTHER LOOMING CONSIDERATION: AGENCY CAPTURE

II. A NEED FOR ADAPTIVE AND INCREMENTAL APPROACHES TO AGENCY DESIGN

CONCLUSION

Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an …

Controlling Presidential Control, Kathryn A. Watts

Michigan Law Review

Presidents Reagan and Clinton laid the foundation for strong presidential control over the administrative state, institutionalizing White House review of agency regulations. Presidential control, however, did not stop there. To the contrary, it has evolved and deepened during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Indeed, President Obama’s efforts to control agency action have dominated the headlines in recent months, touching on everything from immigration to drones to net neutrality. Despite the entrenchment of presidential control over the modern regulatory state, administrative law has yet to adapt. To date, the most pervasive response both inside and outside the …

Responding To Agency Avoidance Of Oira, Nina A. Mendelson, Jonathan B. Wiener

Faculty Scholarship

Concerns have recently been raised that US federal agencies may sometimes avoid regulatory review by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In this article, we assess the seriousness of such potential avoidance, and we recommend a framework for evaluating potential responses. After summarizing the system of presidential regulatory oversight through OIRA review, we analyze the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA. We identify a wider array of agency avoidance tactics than has past scholarship, and a wider array of corresponding response options available to OIRA, the President, Congress, and the courts. We argue …

Responding To Agency Avoidance Of Oira, Nina A. Mendelson, Jonathan B. Wiener

Articles

This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a background of the system of presidential oversight of regulation through OIRA review. Part II analyzes: (1) the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA, (2) a broad array of agency avoidance tactics, and (3) corresponding response options (especially in a repeat-player relationship). Part III argues that response options to agency avoidance should not be unquestioningly pursued or rejected. Instead, they should be evaluated using many of the same principles OIRA employs in reviewing agency regulation, including a systematic consideration of the benefits and costs of particular response actions and …

Whilte House Review Of Regulation: Myths And Realities, Cass R. Sunstein

The Regulatory Review in Depth

No abstract provided.

Evaluating Rules And How We Measure Their Effects, Rena I. Steinzor, Michael Patoka

Rena I. Steinzor

The Center for Progres­sive Reform undertook an empirical study of the Office of Information of Regulatory Affairs, the White House office that reviews every significant regulation issue by Executive Branch agencies. The study assembled an unprecedented portrait of its behav­ior during the decade from October 16, 2001, when notices of meetings with outside parties were first available on the Internet, until June 1, 2011. OIRA conducted 6,194 separate reviews of regulatory submissions, holding 1,080 meetings that involved 5,759 ap­pearances by outside par­ticipants. Both the final report and the database we assembled are available on the CPR website, at pro­gressivereform.org. OIRA …

Evaluating Rules And How We Measure Their Effects, Rena I. Steinzor, Michael Patoka

Faculty Scholarship

The Center for Progres­sive Reform undertook an empirical study of the Office of Information of Regulatory Affairs, the White House office that reviews every significant regulation issue by Executive Branch agencies. The study assembled an unprecedented portrait of its behav­ior during the decade from October 16, 2001, when notices of meetings with outside parties were first available on the Internet, until June 1, 2011. OIRA conducted 6,194 separate reviews of regulatory submissions, holding 1,080 meetings that involved 5,759 ap­pearances by outside par­ticipants. Both the final report and the database we assembled are available on the CPR website, at pro­gressivereform.org.

OIRA …

The Case For Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review , Rena Steinzor

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

A series of catastrophic regulatory failures have focused attention on the weakened condition of regulatory agencies assigned to protect public health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment. The destructive convergence of funding shortfalls, political attacks, and outmoded legal authority have set the stage for ineffective enforcement, unsupervised industry self-regulation, and a slew of devastating and preventable catastrophes. From the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico to the worst mining disaster in forty years at the Big Branch mine in West Virginia, the signs of regulatory dysfunction abound. Many stakeholders expected that President Barack Obama would recognize and …

Rationalism In Regulation, Christopher C. Demuth, Douglas H. Ginsburg

Michigan Law Review

Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health, by Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore, aims to convince those who favor more government regulation-in particular environmental groups-that they should embrace cost-benefit analysis and turn it to their purposes. Coauthored by a prominent law school dean and a recent student with a background in environmental advocacy, the book is a jarring combination of roundhouse political polemics and careful academic argument. Sweeping pronouncements are followed by qualifications that leave the sweep of the pronouncements in doubt- rather like the give-and-take of the law school classroom …

The Legacy Of John Graham: Strait-Jacketing Risk Assessment, Rena I. Steinzor

Rena I. Steinzor

No abstract provided.

Testimony Before The U.S. House Of Representatives, Committee On Science And Technology, Subcommittee On Investigations And Oversight. 111th Congress, 1st Session (2009)., Rena I. Steinzor

Rena I. Steinzor

No abstract provided.

Testimony Before The U.S. House Of Representatives, Committee On Science And Technology, Subcommittee On Investigations And Oversight. 111th Congress, 1st Session (2009)., Rena I. Steinzor

Congressional Testimony

No abstract provided.

Legitimacy, Selectivity, And The Disunitary Executive: A Reply To Sally Katzen, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Michael P. Vandenbergh

Michigan Law Review

This reply addresses the thoughtful comments that former OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen has provided on our Article, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control. Our Article is the first to investigate the agency perspective on White House involvement in agency rule-making. We interviewed 30 of the 35 top political officials in the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") during the George H.W. Bush ("Bush I") and the William J. Clinton Administrations during 1989-2001. Prior to our study, empirical studies of White House involvement in agency rule-making had focused almost exclusively on the White House side, …

A Reality Check On An Empirical Study: Comments On "Inside The Administrative State", Sally Katzen

Michigan Law Review

Presidential control is the term used for the process (or some would say, the model) by which agency decision-making (more particularly, rulemaking) is brought under the direction of the president to "render such decision- making accountable and effective." Until now scholars, who have generally endorsed both the theory and the practice of the process, have written from the perspective of those who exercise presidential control - those at the White House or the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"). In a recent article in the Michigan Law Review, Lisa Schultz Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh ("the authors") decided to …

Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance Or Regulatory Usurpation? Part I And Part Ii: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On Science And Technology, 110th Cong., Feb. 13, 2007 (Statement Of Professor David C. Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

The Legacy Of John Graham: Strait-Jacketing Risk Assessment, Rena I. Steinzor

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulatory Accounting: Costs And Benefits Of Federal Regulations: Testimony Before The H. Subcomm. On Energy Policy, Natural Resources, And Regulatory Affairs, Of The H. Comm. On Government Reform, Hearing On Regulatory Accounting, 107th Cong., Mar. 12, 2002 (Statement Of Lisa Heinzerling, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Lisa Heinzerling

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Reagan To Appoint Former Dean To Post

Sheldon Plager (1977-1984)

No abstract provided.