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Articles 1 - 30 of 75
Full-Text Articles in Law
Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert Hovenkamp
Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert Hovenkamp
William & Mary Law Review
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “combine or conspire” to monopolize—all without explanation. Section 2 is the antitrust law’s only provision that reaches entirely unilateral conduct, although it has often been used to reach collaborative conduct as well. In general, § 2 requires greater amounts of individually held market power than do the other antitrust statutes, but it is less categorical about conduct. With one exception, however, the statute reads so broadly that criticisms of the nature that it is outdated cannot be based on faithful readings of the text.
The one …
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Senior Honors Theses
Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …
Ftc V. Qualcomm And The Need To Reboot Antitrust Goals, Beatriz Del Chiaro Da Rosa
Ftc V. Qualcomm And The Need To Reboot Antitrust Goals, Beatriz Del Chiaro Da Rosa
University of Miami Business Law Review
The antitrust community is facing a demanding question: Is antitrust enforcement ultimately about protecting consumers, competition, or both? This question has sparked debates about the ultimate goals of antitrust law. On one side of the debate, supporters of the consumer welfare standard; and on the other side, supporters of the Neo-Brandeisian standard of enforcement. At this crucial time in the debate of overarching antitrust goals, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated, one of the most important antitrust cases in the twenty-first century, poses many issues for the consumer welfare standard and antitrust enforcement in the …
Racially Collusive Boycotts: African American Purchasing Power In The Wigs And Hair Extensions Market, Felix B. Chang, Janelle Thompson, Anisha Rakhra
Racially Collusive Boycotts: African American Purchasing Power In The Wigs And Hair Extensions Market, Felix B. Chang, Janelle Thompson, Anisha Rakhra
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
This Essay analyzes expressive boycotts in the market for wigs and hair extensions, where consumers are primarily African Americans and producers are almost uniformly Korean Americans. This type of ethnically segmented and misaligned (“ESM”) market raises unique doctrinal and theoretical questions. Under antitrust caselaw, the treatment of a campaign to divert business from Korean American–owned to African American–owned hair stores is uncertain because of the campaign’s mixed social and economic motives. Delving into the theoretical implications of this ESM market can help steer the doctrine appropriately. Along the way, such an exercise illuminates the nuances of racial solidarity and market …
Don't Abolish Employee Noncompete Agreements, Alan J. Meese
Don't Abolish Employee Noncompete Agreements, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
For over three centuries, Anglo-American courts have assessed employee noncompete agreements under a Rule of Reason. Despite long-standing precedent, some now advocate banning all such agreements. These advocates contend that employers use superior bargaining power to impose such "contracts of adhesion," preventing employees from selling their labor to the highest bidder and reducing wages. Abolitionists also contend that such agreements cannot produce cognizable benefits and that employers could achieve any benefits via less restrictive alternatives without limiting employee autonomy.
This Article critiques the Abolitionist position. Arguments for banning noncompete agreements echo hostile critiques of other nonstandard contracts during antitrust law's …
Tech Giant Exclusion, John B. Kirkwood
Tech Giant Exclusion, John B. Kirkwood
Faculty Articles
There is no topic in regulatory policy that is more pressing and more controversial than what to do about the tech giants – Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Apple. Critics claim that that these powerful platforms crush competitors, distort the political process, and elude antitrust law because it cares only about consumer prices. The only solution, they argue, is to break them up.
This diagnosis is mistaken. The tech giants have indeed engaged in anticompetitive conduct. They have excluded rivals selling products on their platforms by demoting them in search results, copying their products, or refusing to deal with them. While …
Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng
Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng
University of Cincinnati Law Review
In recent years, states have launched several antitrust investigations targeting digital platforms. A major difficulty in these investigations is demonstrating the extent of a digital platform’s market power. Market power is defined as the control of the output or the price without the loss of business to competitors. As will be explored in this Article, market power is a critical component in an antitrust analysis. On several occasions, courts have adopted the switching costs approach in their analysis of market power. According to this approach, market power may be inferred when the costs of switching from one supplier to another …
The Looming Crisis In Antitrust Economics, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Looming Crisis In Antitrust Economics, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
As in so many areas of law and politics in the United States, antitrust’s center is at bay. It is besieged by a right wing that wants to limit antitrust even more than it has been limited over the last quarter century. On the left, it faces revisionists who propose significantly greater enforcement.
One thing the two extremes share, however, is denigration of the role of economics in antitrust analysis. On the right, the Supreme Court’s two most recent antitrust decisions at this writing reveal that economic analysis no longer occupies the central role that it once had. On the …
Is The Digital Economy Too Concentrated?, Jonathan Klick
Is The Digital Economy Too Concentrated?, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
Concentration in the digital economy in the United States has sparked loud criticism and spurred calls for wide-ranging reforms. These reforms include everything from increased enforcement of existing antitrust laws, such as challenging more mergers and breaking up firms, to an abandonment of the consumer welfare standard. Critics cite corruption and more systemic public choice problems, while others invoke the populist origins of antitrust to slay the digital Goliaths. On the other side, there is skepticism regarding these arguments. This chapter continues much of that skepticism.
Is China Stealing Our Tech? A Look Into The Role Of Intellectual Property Rights In Us-China Trade Relations, Ryan Chester
Is China Stealing Our Tech? A Look Into The Role Of Intellectual Property Rights In Us-China Trade Relations, Ryan Chester
Honors Scholar Theses
This thesis aims to further the current scholarship on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and their effects on international trade and the US-China trade relationship more specifically. The main analysis of this thesis is a quantitative cross-country analysis of over 100 countries to see how IPR plays a role in international trade, while analyzing how the Sino-US trade relationship fits into larger trends. This thesis aims to answer the questions as follows: What are the current policies surrounding Intellectual Property Rights between China and the US? Does increasing the strength of IPR laws influence imports? Does the strength of a country’s …
House Judiciary Inquiry Into Competition In Digital Markets: Statement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
House Judiciary Inquiry Into Competition In Digital Markets: Statement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This is a response to a query from the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, requesting my views about the adequacy of existing antitrust policy in digital markets.
The statutory text of the United States antitrust laws is very broad, condemning all anticompetitive restraints on trade, monopolization, and mergers and interbrand contractual exclusion whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.” Federal judicial interpretation is much narrower, however, for several reasons. One is the residue of a reaction against excessive antitrust enforcement in the 1970s and earlier. However, since that time antitrust …
Intellectual Property For Breakfast: Market Power And Informative Symbols In The Marketplace, P. Sean Morris
Intellectual Property For Breakfast: Market Power And Informative Symbols In The Marketplace, P. Sean Morris
Cleveland State Law Review
This Article continues to examine an important question: are trademarks a source of market power, or, put differently, when are trademarks an antitrust problem? This fundamental question is a cause of division among antitrust and intellectual property law scholars. However, by raising the question and presenting some scenarios that can provide answers, my hope is that contemporary antitrust and intellectual property scholars can explore some of its implications. As part of my own quest to address this question, I explore the proposition that creative deception and the wealth-generating capacity of trademarks are unorthodox elements that actually contribute to allegations of …
Given Today's New Wave Of Protectionsim, Is Antitrust Law The Last Hope For Preserving A Free Global Economy Or Another Nail In Free Trade's Coffin?, Allison Murray
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review
No abstract provided.
Platforms And The Rule Of Reason: The American Express Case, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Platforms And The Rule Of Reason: The American Express Case, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In Ohio v. American Express Co., the Supreme Court applied antitrust’s rule of reason to a two-sided platform. The challenge was to an “anti-steering” rule, a vertical restraint preventing merchants from shifting customers who offered an AmEx card from to a less costly alternative such as Visa or Mastercard.
A two-sided platform is a business that depends on relationships between two different, noncompeting groups of transaction partners. For example, a printed periodical such as a newspaper earns revenue by selling both advertising and subscriptions to the paper itself. Success depends on a platform’s ability to maintain the appropriate balance …
Market Power And Antitrust Enforcement, John B. Kirkwood
Market Power And Antitrust Enforcement, John B. Kirkwood
Faculty Articles
Antitrust is back on the national agenda. The Democratic Party, leading Senators, progressive organizations, and many scholars are calling for stronger antitrust enforcement. One important step, overlooked in the discussion to date, is to reform how market power — an essential element in most antitrust violations — is determined. At present the very definition of market power is unsettled. While there is widespread agreement that market power is the ability to raise price profitably above the competitive level, there is no consensus on how to determine the competitive level. Moreover, courts virtually never measure market power (or its larger variant, …
Market Power And American Express, John B. Kirkwood
Market Power And American Express, John B. Kirkwood
University of Miami Business Law Review
The Second Circuit ruled that American Express did not have market power because it operated in a two-sided market and any leverage it exercised over merchants derived from its successful competition for cardholders. As a result, the relevant market had to include both sides of a credit card transaction, the company’s market share was modest, and it could not exploit both merchants and cardholders. In Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement (forthcoming in B.U. L. REV.), I propose a new approach that infers market power from the likely effects of the challenged conduct. This approach shows that American Express clearly exercised …
Hipster Antitrust: New Bottles, Same Old W(H)Ine?, Christopher S. Yoo
Hipster Antitrust: New Bottles, Same Old W(H)Ine?, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
Although the debate over hipster antitrust is often portrayed as something new, experienced observers recognize it as a replay of an old argument that was resolved by the global consensus that antitrust should focus on consumer welfare rather than on the size of firms, the levels of industry concentration, and other considerations. Moreover, the history of the Federal Trade Commission’s Section 5 authority to prevent unfair methods of competition stands as a reminder of the dangers of allowing enforcement policy to be guided by vague and uncertain standards.
An Antitrust Approach To Corporate Free Exercise Claims, Ronald J. Colombo
An Antitrust Approach To Corporate Free Exercise Claims, Ronald J. Colombo
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), the United States Supreme Court held that the religious liberty protections contained in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act apply to for-profit business corporations. Although many laud the decision as a hard-fought victory for religious freedom, others fear the consequences of the decision. Two consequences in particular have been most commonly identified by the decision’s detractors.
First, Burwell may give businesses a “license to discriminate,” by allowing them to opt out of laws that protect minorities and other groups on religious grounds. This threatens to undo decades of …
A Rose By Any Other Name: Elucidating The Intersection Of Patent And Antitrust Laws In Tying Arrangement Cases, Kyle R. Friedman
A Rose By Any Other Name: Elucidating The Intersection Of Patent And Antitrust Laws In Tying Arrangement Cases, Kyle R. Friedman
Maine Law Review
In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., an ink manufacturer sought to invalidate patents held by a printing system manufacturer by alleging that the patents resulted in illegal tying and monopolization in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. This action was preceded by an infringement action brought by Illinois Tool Works (ITW), which was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Independent Ink (Independent) responded by seeking a judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of patents against ITW. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ITW on both counts. The court of appeals reversed …
Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker
Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker
Presentations
Market concentration measures the extent to which market shares are concentrated between a small number of firms. It is often taken as a proxy for the intensity of competition. Indeed, in recent years changes in concentration have increasingly been used to argue that the intensity of competition is falling, that the growth of large firms with high market shares is driving up profits, damaging innovation and productivity, and increasing inequality. Some have argued that the competition rules need to be rewritten and a crackdown by overly antitrust agencies is required. The simplicity of this framing has found supporters across the …
Antitrust And Information Technologies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And Information Technologies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Technological change strongly affects the use of information to facilitate anticompetitive practices. The effects result mainly from digitization and the many products and processes that it enables. These technologies of information also account for a significant portion of the difficulties that antitrust law encounters when its addresses intellectual property rights. In addition, changes in the technologies of information affect the structures of certain products, in the process either increasing or decreasing the potential for competitive harm.
For example, digital technology affects the way firms exercise market power, but it also imposes serious measurement difficulties. The digital revolution has occurred in …
Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker
Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
As is well known among financial economists but not previously recognized within the antitrust community, large and diversified institutional investors such as BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard collectively own roughly two-thirds of the shares of publicly traded U.S. firms overall, up from about one-third in 1980. Recent economic research involving airlines and banking raises the possibility that overlapping ownership of horizontal rivals by diversified financial institutions facilitates anticompetitive conduct throughout the economy, and that the problem has been growing for decades, unnoticed until now. This response to an article by Professor Einer Elhauge, explains why it may be more …
The Corporation As Courthouse, Rory Van Loo
The Corporation As Courthouse, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
Despite the considerable attention paid to mandatory arbitration, few consumer disputes ever reach arbitration. By contrast, institutions such as Apple’s customer service department handle hundreds of millions of disputes annually. This Article argues that understanding businesses’ internal dispute processes is crucial to diagnosing consumers’ procedural needs. Moreover, businesses’ internal processes interact with a larger system of private actors. These actors include ratings websites that mete out reputational sanctions. The system also includes other corporations linked to the transaction, such as when American Express adjudicates a contested sale between a shopper and Home Depot. This vast private order offers promise to …
United Nations Set Of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles And Rules For The Control Of Restrictive Business Practices, General Assembly Resolution 35/63 (1980)., Schaun Griffin
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa
International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Antitrust And Information Technologies, Herbert Hovenkamp
Antitrust And Information Technologies, Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp
Technological change strongly affects the use of information to facilitate anticompetitive practices. The effects result mainly from digitization and the many products and processes that it enables. These technologies also account for a significant portion of the difficulties that antitrust law encounters when its addresses intellectual property rights. Changes in the technologies of information also affect the structures of certain products, in the process either increasing or decreasing the potential for competitive harm. For example, digital technology affects the way firms exercise market power, but it also imposes serious measurement difficulties. In purely digital markets intellectual property rights are crucial …
Antitrust, Competition Policy, An Inequality, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop
Antitrust, Competition Policy, An Inequality, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Economic inequality recently has entered the political discourse in a highly visible way. This political impact is not a surprise. As the U.S. economy has begun to recover from the Great Recession since mid-2009, economic growth has effectively been appropriated by those already well off, leaving the median household less well off. The serious economic, political and moral issues raised by inequality can be addressed through a panoply of public policies including competition policy, the focus of this article. The article describes the channels through which market power contributes to inequality, and sets forth a range of possible antitrust policy …
Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, John M. Newman
Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, John M. Newman
Articles
"Zero-price markets," wherein firms set the price of their goods or services at so, have exploded in quantity and variety. Creative content, software, search functions, social media platforms, mobile applications, travel booking, navigation and mapping systems, and myriad other goods and services are now widely distributed at zero prices. But despite the exponential increase in the volume of zero-price products being consumed, antitrust institutions and analysts have failed to provide an adequate response to markets without prices.
Modern antitrust law is firmly grounded in neoclassical economics, which is in turn centered on price theory. Steeped in price theory, preeminent antitrust …
Antitrust, Competition Policy, And Inequality, Jonathan B. Baker, Steven C. Salop
Antitrust, Competition Policy, And Inequality, Jonathan B. Baker, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Economic inequality recently has entered the political discourse in a highly visible way. This political impact is not a surprise. As the U.S. economy has begun to recover from the Great Recession since mid-2009, economic growth has effectively been appropriated by those already well off, leaving the median household less well off. The serious economic, political and moral issues raised by inequality can be addressed through a panoply of public policies including competition policy, the focus of this article. The article describes the channels through which market power contributes to inequality, and sets forth a range of possible antitrust policy …
Market Power In Antitrust, George A. Hay
Market Power In Antitrust, George A. Hay
George A. Hay
The concept of market power is at the core of antitrust. Philosophically, antitrust policy is aimed primarily at preventing firms from achieving, retaining, or abusing market power. Operationally, assessing whether a firm or firms have market power or any reasonable prospect for achieving it is often the first (and sometimes, the only) step in performing an antitrust analysis. Few would dispute that market power should play a prominent role in antitrust analysis. Nevertheless, important questions remain. Some of these questions quite naturally focus on the precise degree of importance given to market power. Is it an essential ingredient in antitrust …