Law Commons^™

Building Resilience By Removing Barriers: Addressing Structural Impediments To Advocacy By Nonprofit Organizations On Behalf Of The Unenfranchised, Kirsten Widner, Heather M. Kolinsky

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Charitable contributions, particularly from private foundations, are an essential source of support for many nonprofit charitable organizations. However, the ability to accept these contributions comes with significant restrictions on lobbying and advocacy. Using vulnerability theory and an original survey of nonprofit advocacy organizations, we show that current restrictions on 501(c)(3) organizations disproportionally limit advocacy on behalf of the most politically disadvantaged groups—those without the right to vote. This, in turn, reinforces existing inequalities in whose voices are heard and whose interests are considered by policymakers. This Article argues that reforming the laws that structure what organizations can take tax-deductible charitable …

Applying The First Amendment To The Internal Revenue Code: Minnesota Voters Alliance And The Tax Law’S Regulation Of Nonprofit Organizations’ Political Speech, Edward A. Zelinsky

Articles

On its face, Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky is about which T-shirts, hats and buttons voters can wear at the polls. However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis in Minnesota Voters Alliance extends beyond apparel at polling places. That decision impacts the ongoing debate about the Johnson Amendment, the now controversial provision of the Internal Revenue Code which forbids Section 501(c)(3) organizations from intervening in political campaigns. Minnesota Voters Alliance also affects the proper construction of Section 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying by tax-exempt entities as well as other provisions of the tax law taxing and precluding campaign intervention by …

Business Lobbying As An Informational Public Good: Can Tax Deductions For Lobbying Expenses Promote Transparency?, Michael Halberstam, Stuart G. Lazar

Stuart Lazar

The view that “lobbying is essentially an informational activity” has persistently served the suggestion that lobbying provides a public good by educating legislators about policy and the consequences of legislation. In this article, we link a proposed tax reform with a substantive disclosure requirement to promote the kind of “information subsidy” that serves the public interest, while mitigating – at least to some extent – the distortion that may result from the imbalance of financial resources on the business side and other institutional contraints identified in the literature. We argue that corporate lobbying should be encouraged – by allowing business …

Churches' Lobbying And Campaigning: A Proposed Statutory Safe Harbor For Internal Church Communications, Edward A. Zelinsky

Articles

President Trump, reiterating the position he took during the presidential campaign, has recently reaffirmed his pledge to “get rid of and totally destroy the Johnson Amendment,” the provision of the Internal Revenue Code which prohibits tax-exempt institutions from participating in political campaigns. The Code also bars tax-exempt institutions, including churches, from substantial lobbying activities.

Rather than the blanket repeal of the Johnson Amendment proposed by President Trump, I argue for a statutory safe harbor for the internal communications of churches. This limited safe harbor would protect in-house church discussions from both Section 501(c)(3)’s ban on substantial lobbying and from that …

Business Lobbying As An Informational Public Good: Can Tax Deductions For Lobbying Expenses Promote Transparency?, Michael Halberstam, Stuart G. Lazar

Journal Articles

The view that “lobbying is essentially an informational activity” has persistently served the suggestion that lobbying provides a public good by educating legislators about policy and the consequences of legislation.

In this article, we link a proposed tax reform with a substantive disclosure requirement to promote the kind of “information subsidy” that serves the public interest, while mitigating – at least to some extent – the distortion that may result from the imbalance of financial resources on the business side and other institutional contraints identified in the literature. We argue that corporate lobbying should be encouraged – by allowing business …

Rendering Unto Caesar Or Electioneering For Caesar--Loss Of Church Tax Exemption For Participation In Electoral Politics, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

The restriction on church participation in political campaigns contained in the Internal Revenue Code operates uneasily. It appears to serve the useful purpose of separating the spheres of religion and electoral politics. But the separation often is only apparent, as churches in practice signal support for a particular candidate in a variety of rays that historically have not cost them their exemptions. Although the limited enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service has reflected the sensitive nature of the First Amendment values present, the federal government should provide more formal elaboration by statute or regulation. Focus on the use of funds …

How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy: "Rent-Seeking" Charities Or Virtuous Politicians?, Nancy J. Knauer

Nancy J. Knauer

Tax-exempt charitable organizations exert considerable influence over Congress, the Department of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service in matters dealing with exemption from federal income tax and the tax deductibility of charitable contributions. This Article uses both public choice and public interest analysis to help identify various features of the charitable community and explain how exempt organizations weild political influence despite the restrictions placed on their activities under the tax code. Arguing that the influence of charitable organizations over tax policy can be explained from either a public choice or public interest vantage point, the Article concluds that the …