Law Commons^™

Rolling John Bingham In His Grave: The Rehnquist Court Makes Sport With The 14th Amendment, Stephen E. Gottlieb

Akron Law Review

The Warren Court organized the concept of strict scrutiny in Shelton v. Tucker. Where the defendant was obligated to treat people without regard to membership in a suspect class and failed to do that, the Court would hold them liable for their behavior unless it was done for a compelling public reason and there was no less damaging alternative.

The concept of strict scrutiny had nothing to do with intentions. The issue for the Warren Court was whether one party had injured another because of a forbidden reason. That concept of causation was understood broadly. The Court was not looking …

Court Of Appeals Of New York, People V. Brown, Melanie Hendry

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Fisher V. Texas: The Limits Of Exhaustion And The Future Of Race-Conscious University Admissions, John Powell, Stephen Menendian

john a. powell

This Article investigates the potential ramifications of Fisher v. Texas and the future of race-conscious university admissions. Although one cannot predict the ultimate significance of the Fisher decision, its brief and pregnant statements of law portends an increasingly perilous course for traditional affirmative action programs. Part I explores the opinions filed in Fisher, with a particular emphasis on Justice Kennedy’s opinion on behalf of the Court. We focus on the ways in which the Fisher decision departs from precedent, proscribes new limits on the use of race in university admissions, and tightens requirements for narrow tailoring. Part II investigates the …

Bait And Switch: Why United States V. Morrison Is Wrong About Section Five, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

As the title suggests, the article examines Morrison’s creation of the rule that the Section Five power cannot be used to regulate private individuals. This is one of the most meaningful and, thus far, durable constraints that the Court has placed on federal power. It is the more surprising, then, that it turns out to be based on essentially nothing at all. The Morrison Court asserted that its rule was derived by—indeed, “controlled by”—precedent, but a closer reading of the Reconstruction-era decisions it cites shows that this is simply not the case. An independent evaluation of the rule against regulation …