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Towards An Optimal Model Of Directors’ Duties In The Zone Of Insolvency: An Economic And Comparative Approach, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez Jan 2021

Towards An Optimal Model Of Directors’ Duties In The Zone Of Insolvency: An Economic And Comparative Approach, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

In a recent article, I analyse the primary regulatory models of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency observed internationally. From a sample of more than 20 countries from Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and North America, I distinguish six primary regulatory models: (i) the imposition of a duty to initiate insolvency proceedings, generally found in Europe; (ii) the imposition of a duty to recapitalise or liquidate the company, typically existing in Europe and Latin America; (iii) the imposition of duties towards the company’s creditors, including the duty to minimise losses for the creditors existing in the United Kingdom; …


Towards An Optimal Model Of Directors' Duties In The Zone Of Insolvency: A Comparative Assessment, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez Dec 2020

Towards An Optimal Model Of Directors' Duties In The Zone Of Insolvency: A Comparative Assessment, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

In a recent article, I analyse the primary regulatory models of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency observed internationally. From a sample of more than 20 countries from Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and North America, I distinguish six regulatory models: (i) the imposition of a duty to initiate insolvency proceedings, generally found in Europe; (ii) the imposition of a duty to recapitalise or liquidate the company, typically existing in Europe and Latin America; (iii) the imposition of a duty to minimise losses for the creditors, existing in the United Kingdom; (iv) the imposition of a duty to …


The Illegality Defence In Corporate Law Claims Against Directors And Officers, Wai Yee Wan Jan 2016

The Illegality Defence In Corporate Law Claims Against Directors And Officers, Wai Yee Wan

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

If a company incurs substantial fines or other pecuniary losses as a result of its unlawful conduct, can the company obtain an indemnity from its director/officer for having caused the company to incur such fines and losses? In particular, can the director/officer utilise the defence of illegality, notwithstanding that he has breached his duties owed to the company? The illegality defence, which raises the twin issues of the relationship between the unlawful act to the corporate claim and the attribution of the unlawful act to the company, has been the subject of detailed analysis recently in England, Singapore and Hong …


Corporate Claims Against Director For Paying Bribes On Company's Behalf: Ho Kang Peng V Scintronix (Formerly Ttl Holdings), Wai Yee Wan Nov 2014

Corporate Claims Against Director For Paying Bribes On Company's Behalf: Ho Kang Peng V Scintronix (Formerly Ttl Holdings), Wai Yee Wan

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Can a company recover the value of the bribe from a director who has paid the bribe, on behalf of the company, to a third party to secure certain benefits for the company, and where it is not alleged that the director had personally benefitted from the bribe? This question raises several complex issues relating to directors’ standard of care, corporate authorisation and corporate illegality, which were considered by the recent decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp (formerly known as TTL Holdings).


Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson Aug 2014

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …


The Checks And Balances Of Good Corporate Governance, John Lessing Aug 2010

The Checks And Balances Of Good Corporate Governance, John Lessing

John Lessing

Good corporate governance requires a range of regulatory checks and balances - or mechanisms - to be effective. If one mechanism fails, the system will fail like a chain with a weak link. This article provides an overview and brief explanation of the main checks and balances a country needs to have a good corporate governance system. It is of particular relevance to countries with transition economies. However, it is also important in developed countries as recent corporate collapses and failures in the financial system have illustrated.


Implications Of The Uk Companies Act 2006 For Institutional Investors And The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, Gordon L. Clark, Eric R. W. Knight Aug 2008

Implications Of The Uk Companies Act 2006 For Institutional Investors And The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, Gordon L. Clark, Eric R. W. Knight

Eric R Knight

Non-governmental organisations, activists, and the public-at-large hold large firms accountable on many issues including their environmental footprints and the social standards of their suppliers around the world. For those coming from European social democratic traditions, stakeholders have a legitimate voice in the affairs of the corporation especially in two-tiered governance regimes that separate supervision from management. Notwithstanding attempts to re-write their proper roles and responsibilities, the Anglo-American corporation is widely believed to be the medium for the accumulation of shareholder value.

Recently, however, a counter-argument has emerged suggesting that the UK Companies Act 2006 broke with this tradition to embrace …