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Articles 31 - 44 of 44
Full-Text Articles in Law
Optimal Tax Compliance And Penalties When The Law Is Uncertain, Kyle D. Logue
Optimal Tax Compliance And Penalties When The Law Is Uncertain, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
This article examines the optimal level of tax compliance and the optimal penalty for noncompliance in circumstances in which the substance of the tax law is uncertain - that is, when the precise application of the Internal Revenue Code to a particular situation is not clear. In such situations, a number of interesting questions arise. This article will consider two of them. First, as a normative matter, how certain should taxpayers be before they rely on a particular interpretation of a substantively uncertain tax rule? If a particular position is not clearly prohibited but neither is it clearly allowed, what …
Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman
Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman
Michigan Law Review
While they often rely on the threat of penalties to produce deterrence, legal systems rarely use the promise of rewards. In this Article, we consider the use of rewards to motivate director vigilance. Measures to enhance director liability are commonly perceived to be too costly. We, however demonstrate that properly designed reward regimes could match the behavioral incentives offered by negligence-based liability regimes but with significantly lower costs. We further argue that the market itself cannot implement such a regime in the form of equity compensation for directors. We conclude by providing preliminary sketches of two alternative reward regimes. While …
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, Vikramaditya Khanna, Timothy L. Dickinson
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, Vikramaditya Khanna, Timothy L. Dickinson
Michigan Law Review
Following the recent spate of corporate scandals, government enforcement authorities have increasingly relied upon corporate monitors to help ensure law compliance and reduce the number of future violations. These monitors also permit enforcement authorities, such as the Securities & Exchange Commission and others, to leverage their enforcement resources in overseeing corporate behavior. However there are few descriptive or normative analyses of the role and scope of corporate monitors. This paper provides such an analysis. After sketching out the historical development of corporate monitors, the paper examines the most common features of the current set of monitor appointments supplemented by interviews …
Getting The Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis Of Whistleblowing And Insider Trading, Jonathan Macey
Getting The Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis Of Whistleblowing And Insider Trading, Jonathan Macey
Michigan Law Review
The purpose of this Article is to show that corporate whistleblowing is not analytically or functionally distinguishable from insider trading when such trading is based on "whistleblower information," that is, the information a whistleblower might disclose to the authorities. In certain contexts, both insider trading and whistleblowing, if incentivized, would reduce the incidence of corporate pathologies such as fraud and corruption. In light of this analysis, it is peculiar that whistleblowing is encouraged and protected, while insider trading on whistleblower information is not only discouraged but criminalized. Often, insider trading will be far more effective than whistleblowing at bringing fraud …
Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger
Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger
Articles
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their liability exposure in a number of ways. Prior scholarship has dwelled primarily on the possibility that they may respond to the threat of liability by augmenting the amount of care they take.1 Defendants (I limit myself to defendants for simplicity) will increase their expenditures on care, so the theory goes, when those expenditures yield sufficient liability-reducing dividends; more care decreases liability exposure by simultaneously making it less likely that the actors will be found to have behaved tortiously in the event of an accident and …
How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter cartels optimally The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a US. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% and 22%. They …
The Theory Of Penalties And The Economics Of Criminal Law, Keith N. Hylton
The Theory Of Penalties And The Economics Of Criminal Law, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This paper presents a model of penalties that reconciles the conflicting accounts optimal punishment by Becker, who argued penalties should internalize social costs, and Posner, who suggested penalties should completely deter offenses. The model delivers specific recommendations as to when penalties should be set to internalize social costs and when they should be set to completely deter offensive conduct. I use the model to generate a positive account of the function and scope of criminal law doctrines, such as intent, necessity, and rules governing the distinction between torts and crimes. The model is also consistent with the history of criminal …
The Genie And The Bottle: Collateral Sources Under The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Kenneth S. Abraham, Kyle D. Logue
The Genie And The Bottle: Collateral Sources Under The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Kenneth S. Abraham, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund) was part of legislation enacted just eleven days after the terrorist attacks of September 11th in the wake of extraordinary national loss. It is possible, therefore, that the Fund will always be considered an urgent and unique response to the unprecedented events of September 11th. On that view, the character of the Fund will have little longterm policy significance. It is equally possible, however, that the enactment of the Fund will prove to be a seminal moment in the history of tort and compensation law. The Fund adopts a new …
Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, And Legal Progress, Kyle D. Logue
Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, And Legal Progress, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
In the literature on legal transitions, the term "transition policy" is generally understood to mean a rule or norm that influences policymakers' decisions concerning the extent to which legal change should be accompanied by transition relief, whether in the form of grandfathering or phase-ins or direct compensation. Legal change within this literature is defined broadly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, to include any resolution of the uncertainty regarding what the law will be in the future or how the law will be applied to future circumstances. Thus, a legal change would obviously include an unexpected repeal of a tax provision, such as …
Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue
Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
A tortfeasor who cannot fully pay for the harms that it causes is said to be "judgment proof." Commentators have long recognized that the existence of judgment-proof tortfeasors seriously undermines the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law. The deterrence goal is undermined because, irrespective of the liability rule, judgment-proof tortfeasors will not fully internalize the costs of the accidents they cause. The insurance goal will be undermined to the extent that the judgment-proof tortfeasor will not be able to compensate fully its victims and that first-party insurance markets do not provide an adequate response. Liability insurance can ameliorate these …
Norms Of Pride And Resistance: Psychology, Virtue, And The Blackmail Puzzle - Draft - 12-31-1992, Wendy J. Gordon
Norms Of Pride And Resistance: Psychology, Virtue, And The Blackmail Puzzle - Draft - 12-31-1992, Wendy J. Gordon
Scholarship Chronologically
Blackmail law can impact on the belief structures (moralisms) and behaviors of both the potential criminal and the potential victim; it also can affect the conceptual and value structures of lawyers and other societal onlookers. These issues surrounding what one might call the "symbolic" virtues of outlawing the act of blackmail may help to explain why blackmail law seems relatively unconcerned with the well-being of the victim.
The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For Enterprise Liability, Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue
The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For Enterprise Liability, Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
This Article explores the insurance and deterrence implications of important and long overlooked facts. Consumers are insured through first-party mechanisms against most of the risks of product accidents. However, first-party insurers rarely and imperfectly adjust premiums according to an individual consumer's decisions concerning exactly what products she will purchase, how many of those products she will purchase, and how carefully she will consume them. Such consumer decisions we refer to as "consumption choices. " This failure by first-party insurers to adjust premiums according to consumption choices gives rise to a first-party insurance externality. Based on this insight, this Article offers …
Road Signs And The Goals Of Justice, Joseph Sanders
Road Signs And The Goals Of Justice, Joseph Sanders
Michigan Law Review
Review of Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Perspectives on a Public Law Problem by Guido Calabresi
The Allocation Of Prosecution: An Economic Analysis, Michigan Law Review
The Allocation Of Prosecution: An Economic Analysis, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note uses economic theory to reassess the division of prosecutorial tasks between victims and the government for offenses other than victimless offenses. It attempts to answer in a general manner questions such as why the prosecutor should differ from offense to offense and where ,the line should be drawn between governmental and individual prosecution. Work done in the areas of welfare economics and public finance concerning the effectiveness of government and the private sector in providing different sorts of goods is drawn upon heavily. This Note views prosecution as an economic good and a victim's prosecution of an offender …