Law Commons^™

The Federal Option: Delaware As A De Facto Agency, Omari Scott Simmons

Washington Law Review

Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States has not adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Instead, Delaware is the “Federal Option” for corporate law and adjudication. The contemporary federal corporate chartering debate is, in part, a referendum on its role. Although the federal government has regulated other aspects of interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations and preempt Delaware pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, it has not done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly discussion of Delaware’s jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator remains underdeveloped. This Article addresses …

Ask The Smart Money: Shareholder Votes By A "Majority Of The Quality Shareholders", Lawrence A. Cunningham

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Corporate directors, shareholders, judges and scholars are on edge. Directors yearn for a certain kind of shareholder, especially one that is patient and focused on the company, as opposed to indexers, who must hold it as part of their basket, or traders, who own fleetingly. Shareholders want a voice, and that patient-focused cohort has the softest one today, crowded out by indexers, like BlackRock, and legions of day traders, like those stalking GameStop. Courts, struggling under the conflicting weight of the business judgment rule and fairness scrutiny, look to shareholder voice as a solution. Yet scholars are troubled by the …

Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting In Corporate Law, Sean J. Griffith, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a disinterested vote of shareholders as the pathway out of heightened judicial scrutiny. The stated rationale for this policy is that shareholders, the real party at interest, are better protected by the ballot box than by the courtroom. As long as informed, disinterested shareholders with an economic stake in the outcome of the vote can effectively express their preferences through voting — the court need not scrutinize the underlying transaction. Rather, it can defer to the outcome under the business judgment rule.

But shareholder voting is not always as direct as this reasoning implies. Instead, voting …

Appraisal Arbitrage: In Case Of Emergency, Break Glass, Malaina J. Weldy

Notre Dame Law Review

Part I of this Note introduces the appraisal remedy, outlining its history, purpose, and modern justifications. It also details the procedural process for bringing an appraisal claim. Part II examines the rise of appraisal in its current arbitrage form, delving into the various reasons set forth to explain its rise, as well as how the recent amendments to the Delaware appraisal statute have addressed these issues. This Part also analyzes Delaware’s recent merger price “presumption” trend. Part III puts forth several arguments in light of this trend, with the intent that such arguments will both justify and protect the remedy’s …

Lyman Johnson’S Invaluable Contribution To Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Jack B. Jacobs

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Reform Of The Corporate Duty Of Care In China -- From The Introspection Of Delaware And Taiwan, Jui-Chien Cheng

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

The concept of fiduciary duty, derived from common law, was introduced to the Company Law of People’s Republic of China in 2005. The fiduciary duty plays an extremely important role in common law, particularly in U.S. corporate law. For this reason, one might have expected dramatic consequences from its introduction to Chinese law. In reality, however, few fiduciary lawsuits have been brought to the courts of China since 2005. There are three main reasons for the rarity of due care lawsuits.

First, Chinese fiduciary law has neither clear content nor a practical enforcement. This is especially true of the body …

Delaware’S Familiarity, Brian J. Broughman, Darian M. Ibrahim

San Diego Law Review

This Article builds on our prior empirical research showing that, everything else equal, start-up firms financed by out-of-state investors are more likely to incorporate in Delaware. We argue that this finding is due to out-of-state investors’ familiarity with Delaware corporate law, and relative lack of familiarity with the corporate law of the start-up’s home state. In the current project, we extend our prior research by (i) developing an informal model distinguishing investor familiarity from related economic theories of network effects and learning effects, (ii) showing that our data are more consistent with familiarity than with these alternative explanations, and (iii) …

Delaware's Familiarity, Brian J. Broughman, Darian M. Ibrahim

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Why do corporations choose to incorporate in Delaware over other states? The existing literature primarily falls into two camps — the “race-to-the-top” and the “race-to-the-bottom” — both of which credit Delaware’s success to the quality of its corporate law and the expertise of its judges. We consider an alternative explanation for Delaware’s continued success: familiarity. After decades of dominance, business parties have become increasingly familiar with Delaware law. Using data from a sample of startups financed by venture capital, we find that firms domicile in Delaware as much for familiarity reasons as for its substantive features. The Article finishes by …

Majority Control And Minority Protection, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter examines legal issues concerning majority control and minority protection in firms with concentrated ownership governance structures, with particular emphasis on the tradeoff between the goals of protecting minority shareholders and allowing controllers to pursue their vision and how corporate law should balance these conflicting goals. Focusing primarily on Delaware corporate law, it suggests that holding a control block allows majority shareholders to pursue their idiosyncratic vision in the manner they see fit, even against minority investors’ objections. Idiosyncratic vision refers to the subjective value that entrepreneurs attach to their business idea or vision, and this chapter considers its …

The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

Delaware corporate law requires directors to manage firms for the benefit of the firm’s shareholders, and not for any other constituency. Delaware jurists have been clear about this is in their case law, and they are not coy about it in extra-judicial settings, such as in speeches directed at law students and practicing members of the corporate bar. Nevertheless, the reader of leading corporate law scholarship is continually exposed to the scholarly assertion that the law is ambiguous or ambivalent on this point, or even that case law affirmatively empowers directors to pursue non-shareholder interests. It is shocking, and troubling, …

Shareholder Bylaws And The Delaware Corporation, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

Much like hostile tender offers in the 1980s and 1990s, shareholder bylaws purporting to limit board authority in key areas of corporate governance are, once again, forcing Delaware's courts to grapple with the fundamental nature of the corporate form.

In this (short) essay written for a roundtable discussion at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, I discuss CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan - the 2008 opinion in which the Delaware Supreme Court began to define the nature and scope of the shareholders' bylaw authority. In CA, Inc. the court held that a proposed …

Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, And The Interpretation Of Venture Capital Contracts, D. Gordon Smith

Faculty Scholarship

Venture capital contracts are inherently incomplete. When interpreting such contracts, courts could deal with the expectations of parties formally by inquiring only about the plain meaning of the contract or qualitatively by enforcing the presumed expectations of the parties, regardless of whether those expectations are expressed in the contract. The Delaware courts have opted for a formal approach. In doing so, they appear to be engaged in an effort to force contracting parties toward completeness. While the duty of good faith appears to respond to the inevitable incompleteness of contracts, the courts largely ignore this duty in preferred stock cases. …

Corporations-Effect Of Merger Upon Apparent Rights Of Stockholders Under Preferred Stock Contracts, Charles M. Soller S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this comment to examine the effect of merger upon some of the provisions of the preferred stock contract.