Law Commons^™

Who Is A Minister? Originalist Deference Expands The Ministerial Exception, Jared C. Huber

Notre Dame Law Review

The ministerial exception is a doctrine born out of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment that shields many religious institutions’ employment decisions from review. While the ministerial exception does not extend to all employment decisions by, or employees of, religious institutions, it does confer broad—and absolute—protection. While less controversy surrounds whether the Constitution shields religious institutions’ employment decisions to at least some extent, much more debate surrounds the exception’s scope, and perhaps most critically, which employees fall under it. In other words, who is a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception?

Eroding The Bedrock: The Future Of Public Administration Without Chevron Deference, Rose Keller

Honors Projects

When Congress passes a bill, it produces words on a page. Who decides what those words mean? Historically, the onus of a statute’s interpretation has rested with the federal agencies charged with its implementation. The Chevron doctrine, a two-step standard that affords federal agencies significant latitude in interpreting their own enabling legislation, has been the applicable deference regime in statutory interpretation cases since 1984. Contrary to this tradition, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has reasserted the primacy of the judiciary in statutory interpretation cases, often ignoring Chevron entirely. In 2023, the Court granted certiorari to Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a …

Judicial Deference To Agency Action Based On Ai, Cade Mallett

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.

Taxes, Administrative Law, And Agency Expertise: Questioning The Orthodoxy, Scott Schumacher

Articles

One of the foundations of administrative law is that federal agencies and their employees are experts in their respective fields. In addition, the many judgments and decisions made by these experts are based on a thorough record after extensive factfinding. As a result, so the theory goes, courts, particularly courts of general jurisdiction like the United States District Courts, should give deference to the determinations made by these experts. But what if the facts underpinning this foundation are not true in all cases? Should courts nevertheless provide deference to decisions by agencies when it is evident that an agency's determinations …

The Ghosts Of Chevron Present And Future, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In the October 2021 term, the Supreme Court decided six cases involving federal agency interpretations of statutes, at least five of which seemingly implicated the Chevron doctrine and several of which explicitly turned on applications of Chevron in the lower courts. But while the Chevron doctrine has dominated federal administrative law for nearly four decades, not a single majority opinion during the term even cited Chevron. Three of those cases formalized the so-called “major questions” doctrine, which functions essentially as an anti-Chevron doctrine by requiring clear congressional statements of authority to justify agency action on matters of great legal and …

The Antiregulatory Arsenal, Antidemocratic Can(N)Ons, And The Waters Wars, William W. Buzbee

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Clean Water Act has become a centerpiece in an enduring multifront battle against both environmental regulation and federal regulatory power in all of its settings. This Article focuses on the emergence, elements, and linked uses of an antiregulatory arsenal now central to battles over what are federally protected “waters of the United States.” This is the key jurisdictional hook for CWA jurisdiction, and hence, logically, has become the heart of CWA contestation. The multi-decade battle over Waters protections has both drawn on emergent antiregulatory moves and generated new weapons in this increasingly prevalent and powerful antiregulatory arsenal. This array …

The Myth Of The All-Powerful Federal Prosecutor At Sentencing, Adam M. Gershowitz

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Prosecutors are widely considered to be the most powerful actors in the criminal justice system. And federal prosecutors are particularly feared. While some recent scholarship casts doubt on the power of prosecutors, the prevailing wisdom is that prosecutors run the show, with judges falling in line and doing as prosecutors recommend.

This Article does not challenge the proposition that prosecutors are indeed quite powerful, particularly with respect to sentencing. There are many structural advantages built into the system that combine to give prosecutors enormous influence over sentences. For example, prosecutors have considerable power to bring a slew of charges …

The Force Of Law After Kisor, Beau J. Baumann

Pace Law Review

No abstract provided.

Derailing The Deference Lockstep, Aaron J. Saiger

Faculty Scholarship

Key voices, most prominently that of Justice Neil Gorsuch, have embraced the position that the Chevron doctrine, under which federal courts defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its organizing statutes, is incompatible with the judicial duty to “say what the law is.” These voices include several state supreme courts, which have held (often citing Justice Gorsuch) that state-court deference to state agency interpretations likewise impinges upon the fundamental duty of state judges to decide, on their own, what state law is.

This Article urges states to resist the uncritical importation into state law of antideference arguments based on the …

Judicial Review Of Scientific Uncertainty In Climate Change Lawsuits: Deferential And Nondeferential Evaluation Of Agency Factual And Policy Determinations, Robert L. Glicksman, Daniel Kim, Keziah Groth-Tuft

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Scientific determinations are often at the heart of environmental disputes. When those disputes take the form of litigation, the courts may be called on to determine whether an administrative agency’s treatment of the science warrants deference. For several reasons, judges are inclined to apply deferential review to agency factual and policy science-based determinations. Most judges are not trained in the language and methods of science. They may be reluctant to intervene on matters on which their lack of expertise risks producing uninformed judgments. If a statute delegates to an agency the responsibility of making those determinations, courts may be loath …

How Chevron Deference Fits Into Article Iii, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, along with Professor Philip Hamburger, assert that Chevron deference-under which courts defer to reasonable agency statutory interpretations-violates Article III. Chevron does so because, they argue, it either permits agencies, not courts, "to say what the law is" or requires judges to forgo independent judgment by favoring the government's position. If they are correct, Congress could not require courts to accept reasonable agency statutory interpretations under any circumstances. This Article does what these critics, perhaps surprisingly, do not do-situates challenges to Chevron within the broad landscape of the Court's current Article III …

Deference Is Dead, Long Live Chevron, Nathan D. Richardson

Faculty Publications

Chevron v. NRDC has stood for more than 35 years as the central case on judicial review of administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes. Its contours have long been debated, but more recently it has come under increasing scrutiny, with some—including two sitting Supreme Court Justices—calling for the case to be overturned. Others praise Chevron, calling deference necessary or even inevitable. All seem to agree the doctrine is powerful and important.

This standard account is wrong, however. Chevron is not the influential doctrine it once was and has not been for a long time. It has been eroded from the outside …

The Apa And The Assault On Deference, Ronald Levin

Scholarship@WashULaw

Recently, in Kisor v. Wilkie, a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch argued at length that § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law. That section states that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law.” This issue remained unresolved in Kisor, but the Supreme Court may well return to it soon as a potential argument against the validity of Chevron deference. Although a substantial academic literature has supported Gorsuch’s position on the APA question, this article disagrees with it. It argues that the text of § 706, surrounding statutory provisions, the …

Undue Deference To States In The 2020 Election Litigation, Joshua A. Douglas

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on so much of our lives, including how to run our elections. Yet the federal courts have refused to respond appropriately to the dilemma that many voters faced when trying to participate in the 2020 election. Instead, the courts—particularly the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts—invoked a narrow test that unduly defers to state election administration and fails to protect adequately the fundamental right to vote.

Democracy, Deference, And Compromise: Understanding And Reforming Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, Scott P. Bloomberg

Faculty Publications

In Citizens United, the Supreme Court interpreted the government’s interest in preventing corruption as being limited to preventing quid pro quo—cash-for-votes—corruption. This narrow interpretation drastically circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of elections, in turn prompting scholars to propose a number of reforms for broadening the government interest in campaign finance cases. These reforms include urging the Court to recognize a new government interest such as political equality, to adopt a broader understanding of corruption, and to be more deferential to legislatures in defining corruption. Building upon that body of scholarship, this Article begins with a descriptive account of …

The Kavanaugh Court And The Schechter-To-Chevron Spectrum: How The New Supreme Court Will Make The Administrative State More Democratically Accountable, Justin Walker

Indiana Law Journal

In a typical year, Congress passes roughly 800 pages of law—that’s about a seveninch

stack of paper. But in the same year, federal administrative agencies promulgate

80,000 pages of regulations—which makes an eleven-foot paper pillar. This move

toward electorally unaccountable administrators deciding federal policy began in

1935, accelerated in the 1940s, and has peaked in the recent decades. Rather than

elected representatives, unelected bureaucrats increasingly make the vast majority

of the nation’s laws—a trend facilitated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in three

areas: delegation, deference, and independence.

This trend is about to be reversed. In the coming years, Congress will …

Montana Environmental Information Center V. Department Of Environmental Quality, Anthony P. Reed

Public Land & Resources Law Review

The DEQ renewed a 1999 MPDES Permit on September 14, 2012 that allowed Western Energy Company to discharge pollutants from the Rosebud Mine into streams. Environmental groups MEIC and the Sierra Club sued, arguing this violated both the Montana Water Quality Act and federal Clean Water Act because the DEQ’s interpretation of its own regulations that exempted waters with ephemeral characteristics from water quality standards was arbitrary and capricious. The district court agreed, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed. It held the DEQ’s interpretation was lawful and remanded for further fact finding to assess how the DEQ applied the interpretation …

Symmetry's Mandate: Constraining The Politicization Of American Administrative Law, Daniel E. Walters

Michigan Law Review

Recent years have seen the rise of pointed and influential critiques of deference doctrines in administrative law. What many of these critiques have in common is a view that judges, not agencies, should resolve interpretive disputes over the meaning of statutes—disputes the critics take to be purely legal and almost always resolvable using lawyerly tools of statutory construction. In this Article, I take these critiques, and the relatively formalist assumptions behind them, seriously and show that the critics have not acknowledged or advocated the full reform vision implied by their theoretical premises. Specifically, critics have extended their critique of judicial …

A Humble Justice, Marah S. Mcleod

Marah McLeod

Media and scholarly critics often claim that Justice Thomas's criminal law opinions reflect intentional cruelty or callousness, and dismiss his opinions without engaging seriously with their substance.
This Essay contends that judicial humility is a far more plausible explanation for Justice Thomas's criminal case decisions. If observers recognize that his approach to the law is guided by humility, rather than his own cruel or callous views, they will be more likely to consider the substance of his opinions and will benefit from wrestling with his challenging jurisprudential and historical perspective - even if they do not agree with the conclusions …

A Functional Approach To Judicial Review Of Ptab Rulings On Mixed Questions Of Law And Fact, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Articles

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has long relied on active appellate review to bring uniformity and clarity to patent law. It initially treated the PTO the same as the federal district courts, reviewing its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Following reversal by the Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Federal Circuit began giving greater deference to PTO factual findings. But it continued to review the PTO’s legal conclusions de novo, while coding an expansive list of disputed issues in patent cases as legal conclusions, even when they …

Evaluating Regulatory Interpretations: Individual Statements, Russell L. Weaver

Russell L. Weaver

No abstract provided.

Deference To Agency Interpretations Of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, Thomas A. Schweitzer, Russell L. Weaver

Russell L. Weaver

No abstract provided.

Agency Statutory Abnegation In The Deregulatory Playbook, William W. Buzbee

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

If an agency newly declares that it lacks statutory power previously claimed, how should such a move—what this article calls agency statutory abnegation—be reviewed? Given the array of strategies an agency might use to make a policy change or move the law in a deregulatory direction, why might statutory abnegation be chosen? After all, it is always a perilous and likely doctrinally disadvantageous strategy for agencies. Nonetheless, agencies from time to time have utilized statutory abnegation claims as part of their justification for deregulatory shifts. Actions by agencies during 2017 and 2018, under the administration of President Donald J. Trump, …

College Athletics: The Chink In The Seventh Circuit's "Law And Economics" Armor, Michael A. Carrier, Marc Edelman

Michigan Law Review Online

If any court is linked to the “law and economics” movement, it is the Seventh Circuit, home of former Judge Richard Posner, the “Chicago School,” and analysis based on markets and economics. It thus comes as a surprise that in college-athletics cases, the court has replaced economic analysis with legal formalisms. In adopting a deferential approach that would uphold nearly every rule the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) claims is related to amateurism, the court recalls the pre- Chicago School era, in which courts aggressively applied “per se” illegality based on a restraint’s form, rather than substance. While the …

The Application Of Title Ii Of The Americans With Disabilities Act To Employment Discrimination: Why The Circuits Have Gotten It Wrong, William Brooks

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Gun To Whose Head? Federalism, Localism, And The Spending Clause, Daniel S. Cohen

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

President Trump’s executive order rescinding federal funds from “sanctuary jurisdictions” has brought a critical, but overlooked, question of constitutional law to the forefront of the political debate: how does the Spending Clause apply to local governments? The purpose of the Spending Clause is to empower the federal government to bargain with the states to enact policies it cannot enact itself. This power, however, is constrained within the confines of federalism. The Supreme Court has sought to restrict the Spending Clause by crafting the Dole-NFIB framework, a test to determine whether a federal grant has compromised federalism. At its …

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agen­cies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doc­trine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-com­ment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is neces­sary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doc­trine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of pow­ers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial defer­ence—has helped …

Mcculloch V. Marbury, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Heath Khan

All Faculty Scholarship

This article builds on recent scholarship about the origins and creation of “our Marbury”—the contemporary understanding of the case and its significance—to argue that Marbury is in fact wholly unsuited for the role it plays in Supreme Court rhetoric and academic instruction. While Marbury is generally understood to support aggressive judicial review, or actual invalidation of a government act, it offers no guidance at all for how judicial review should be employed in particular cases—in particular, whether review should be aggressive or deferential. The actual opinion in Marbury makes no effort to justify its lack of deference to the …

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

All Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agencies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-comment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doctrine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial deference—has helped …

Judicial Review In An Age Of Hyper-Polarization And Alternative Facts, David A. Dana, Michael Barsa

San Diego Journal of Climate & Energy Law

This Article is organized as follows: Part I reviews the case law and commentary on judicial review of agency shifts in policy or practice, focusing on the technocratic case for deference and how recent political realities call such deference into question. Part II sets forth the background and history regarding fuel economy standards, leading to the Obama Administration’s adoption of standards in 2012 and the “midterm” review of those standards that Obama’s EPA declared final as of January 2017. Part II also reviews the legal issues surrounding Trump’s EPA’s “re-opening” of the midterm review. We suggest how courts could, and …