Law Commons^™

Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are And What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Corporate directors play an important role in governing American business, in the capital formation process, and are key to economic growth. Texas businesses play a disproportionately important role among the states in aggregate U.S. job creation, responsible for 37% of all net new American jobs since the recovery began. It is the job of the board of directors to govern the corporation. Director’s duties and responsibilities include: the duty of care; duty of loyalty; and duty of good faith. The recently published Trautman’s Guide™ to Texas Corporate Directors, provides biographical data for most of the approximately 20,000 for-profit corporate directors …

Midwest Corporate Law Scholars Conference Presentation: Mitigating The Harmful Effects Of Proxy Access (Sec Rule 14a-11), Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Presentation given at the Midwest Corporate Law Scholars Conference (June 15, 2011)

Women On Corporate Boards Of Directors - A Global Snapshot, Douglas M. Branson

douglas m branson

This paper builds on earlier books by the author (No Seat at the Table - How Governance and Law Keep Women Out of the Boardroom (2007) and The Last Male Bastion - Gender and the CEO Suite at America's Public Companies (2010)). The article identifies, describes, and critiques six movements or programs from various parts of the globe, all intended and designed to place additonal women directors on corporate baords of directors and in senior corporate management.

Beyond The Board Of Directors, Kelli A. Alces

Kelli A. Alces

The law of corporate governance places the board of directors at the top of the corporate decisionmaking structure. So, accountability for corporate decisions rests primarily on the shoulders of part-time employees who lack the time and thorough knowledge of the firm necessary to perform the board’s duties effectively. Corporate governance scholarship is similarly preoccupied with the board of directors. Scholars have debated whether to enhance or diminish the board’s authority within the firm, but all accept that a board of directors should preside over corporate decisionmaking. This Article argues that scholars on both sides of the debate have missed the …

Assessing The Foundations Of Neo-Classical Professionalism In Law And Business, Robert E. Atkinson Jr.

Robert E. Atkinson Jr.

This paper offers a neo-classical approach to corporate reform: Remodeling the private practice of corporate law and the management of for-profit business to make both occupations better serve, together, their proper public functions. Without dismissing the recent focus of reform on external regulation of corporations or internal restructuring of corporate governance, this paper seeks the foundation for a different approach, encouraging corporate managers and lawyers as professionals to serve their occupation’s correlate values: prosperity and justice. This focus on the primary agents of modern capitalism, corporate managers and lawyers, responds both to early management reformers like Brandeis in the U.S. …

Beyond The Board Of Directors, Kelli A. Alces

Kelli A. Alces

The law of corporate governance places the board of directors at the top of the corporate decisionmaking structure. So, accountability for corporate decisions rests primarily on the shoulders of part-time employees who lack the time and thorough knowledge of the firm necessary to perform the board’s duties effectively. Corporate governance scholarship is similarly preoccupied with the board of directors. Scholars have debated whether to enhance or diminish the board’s authority within the firm, but all accept that a board of directors should preside over corporate decisionmaking. This Article argues that scholars on both sides of the debate have missed the …

Beyond The Board Of Directors, Kelli A. Alces

Kelli A. Alces

The law of corporate governance places the board of directors at the top of the corporate decisionmaking structure. So, accountability for corporate decisions rests primarily on the shoulders of part-time employees who lack the time and thorough knowledge of the firm necessary to perform the board’s duties effectively. Corporate governance scholarship is similarly preoccupied with the board of directors. Scholars have debated whether to enhance or diminish the board’s authority within the firm, but all accept that a board of directors should preside over corporate decisionmaking. This Article argues that scholars on both sides of the debate have missed the …

Beyond The Board Of Directors, Kelli A. Alces

Kelli A. Alces

The law of corporate governance places the board of directors at the top of the corporate decisionmaking structure. So, accountability for corporate decisions rests primarily on the shoulders of part-time employees who lack the time and thorough knowledge of the firm necessary to perform the board’s duties effectively. Corporate governance scholarship is similarly preoccupied with the board of directors. Scholars have debated whether to enhance or diminish the board’s authority within the firm, but all accept that a board of directors should preside over corporate decisionmaking. This Article argues that scholars on both sides of the debate have missed the …

How The Strong Negotiating Position Of Wall Street Employees Impacts The Corporate Governance Of Financial Firms, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Several prominent figures in the field of corporate governance have put the blame for the financial crisis of 2008 squarely on the shoulders of greedy shareholders. Moreover, they argued that the financial crisis of 2008 was the result of directors and managers of financial firms focusing too strongly on the short-term interests of its shareholders. If so, the financial crisis can be understood as a corporate governance failure relating to a pernicious form of shareholder primacy.

Yet, how can that argument be reconciled with the behavior of Wall Street firms in regard to the large bonus payments it made to …

Towards A Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory Of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, Katharine Jackson

Katharine Jackson

The governance regime of the public corporation in America, while tending to promote the concentration of economic and social power in company leadership, often encourages that leadership to advance the interests of their company’s short-term shareholders. The result is a board of directors beholden, if to anything at all, to short-term stock prices. This prioritization often comes at the expense of the corporation’s long-term sustainability and to its other constituents: its work force, creditors, and community. In contrast, governance in Continental European countries like Germany persuades corporate leadership to embrace social obligations and long-term outlooks through, e.g., enforced stakeholder representation …

Is The Eu Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay On The Impotence Of Shareholdership In Corporate Europe, Pavlos E. Masouros

Pavlos E. Masouros

This article critically analyzes the Shareholder Rights Directive ("SRD") (Directive 2007/36/EC). It is essentially an attempt to show that the deficit in the European corporate governance model with regard to the status of the shareholders persists even in the post-SRD era and that we still have a long distance to cover in order to truly empower shareholders in the EU. The SRD along with certain other Company Law Directives and the various European national corporate laws form a synthesis that falls short of providing shareholders with the full potential of getting their corporate governance voice through within listed corporations.

First …

A Japanese Calpers Or A New Model For Institutional Investor Activism? Japan's Pension Fund Association And The Emergence Of Shareholder Activism In Japan, Bruce Aronson

Bruce Aronson

If activist institutional investors are arguably the primary external monitors of management under leading corporate governance systems in the United States and the United Kingdom, who might assume that role in other countries? And, more importantly, what activist shareholder strategies may be possible under different corporate governance systems and operating environments that are generally less supportive of shareholder activism than the United States and the United Kingdom? This Article seeks to address that question through a comparison of the well-known strategy of CalPERS with that of a rare, real-world example of institutional investor activism outside of the “Anglo-Saxon” model—Japan’s Pension …

Auditors' Multi-Layered Liability Regime, Paolo E. Giudici

Paolo E. Giudici

The proposals to limit auditor liability, principally aimed at protecting the Big-4 from the risk of a catastrophic exposure to damages, are grounded on the assumption that auditors are generally over-deterred. The 2008 EC Commission Recommendation on auditor liability relies heavily on this assumption and the economic rationale that underpins it, which is entirely focused on liability towards investors and the US narrative concerning securities class actions. However, the case is much more complex. Any discussion about auditor liability must investigate the following questions: who the auditor’s principals are; whether they are in a position to negotiate in order to …

"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond The Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, Virginia E. Ho

Virginia E Ho

The global financial crisis has led to calls for greater corporate accountability and heightened controls over public corporations. As a result, the past year has seen a marked increase in regulatory initiatives that give shareholders a greater voice in corporate affairs. While debate continues to rage in the academy and beyond over the promise and pitfalls of shareholder empowerment, an important undercurrent in the controversy is the potential impact of "shareholder democracy" on corporate stakeholders.

This Article urges a vision of the corporation and its purpose that transcends the shareholder-stakeholder divide. Under this "enlightened shareholder value" approach, which has been …

"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond The Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, Virginia E. Harper Ho

Virginia E Ho

The global financial crisis has led to calls for greater corporate accountability and heightened controls over public corporations. As a result, the past year has seen a marked increase in regulatory initiatives that give shareholders a greater voice in corporate affairs. While debate continues to rage in the academy and beyond over the promise and pitfalls of shareholder empowerment, an important undercurrent in the controversy is the potential impact of "shareholder democracy" on corporate stakeholders.

This Article urges a vision of the corporation and its purpose that transcends the shareholder-stakeholder divide. Under this "enlightened shareholder value" approach, which has been …

Voluntary And Mandatory Skin In The Game:Understanding Outside Directors' Stock Holdings, Sanjai Bhagat

Sanjai Bhagat

We examine the determinants of equity ownership by outside directors as well as the relationship between ownership and operating performance. Unlike previous studies of equity ownership by directors, we use hand-collected data on firm-level policies requiring director ownership for S&P 500 firms during the years 2003 and 2005. Ownership requirements allow us to shed further light on the determinants of director holdings and to separate voluntary from mandatory holdings of directors. If ownership requirements reflect optimal ownership levels, they provide a useful identification tool in the examination of ownership-performance relationships. Our primary findings are as follows: ownership requirements are more …

Corporate Governance And The Impact Of Controlling Shareholders, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Good corporate governance practices at a publicly held firm will not necessarily be good practices at a publicly traded firm in which there is a controlling shareholder. This is because board independence, a key concept in structuring appropriate corporate governance practices, has a different meaning when a controlling shareholder is present.

However, identifying whether or not a board is truly independent is just the first step in evaluating the quality of corporate governance at a controlled corporation. After all, a controlling shareholder still has the power to dominate an independent board through his direct voting power and by threats of …

Oregon's Experiment With Sustainable Corporate Governance: A Friendly Critique, Robert C. Illig

Robert C Illig

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective Jennifer G. Hill* Abstract US corporate law is undergoing a seismic shift in relation to shareholder power. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate raised shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. The global financial crisis has given the issue further impetus, and an unprecedented array of reforms and proposals to increase shareholder power are now on the table in the US. There has, however, been great resistance to adjusting the …

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective Jennifer G. Hill* Abstract US corporate law is undergoing a seismic shift in relation to shareholder power. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate raised shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. The global financial crisis has given the issue further impetus, and an unprecedented array of reforms and proposals to increase shareholder power are now on the table in the US. There has, however, been great resistance to adjusting the …

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective Jennifer G. Hill* Abstract US corporate law is undergoing a seismic shift in relation to shareholder power. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate raised shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. The global financial crisis has given the issue further impetus, and an unprecedented array of reforms and proposals to increase shareholder power are now on the table in the US. There has, however, been great resistance to adjusting the …

On The Role And Regulation Of Private Negotiations In Governance, Joseph W. Yockey

Joseph W. Yockey

Developments in corporate law continue to give shareholders greater levels of power over public companies. Instead of using their power to seek changes within firms through such traditional means as proxy contests and litigation, shareholders are increasingly relying on private negotiations with directors as a key component of their governance activities. Regulations enacted in response to the recent financial crisis will likely trigger even more widespread use of negotiations in the years to come. In this Article, I analyze the legal and policy implications generated by the use of private negotiations as a means of corporate governance. I make two …

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

Effects Of Strategic Tax Behaviors On Corporate Governance, Nicola Sartori

Nicola Sartori

This paper addresses agency tensions and conflicts that may emerge between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) as a result of aggressive tax planning strategies adopted by publicly held corporations. The interactions between corporate governance and taxation are bilateral and biunique: in fact, on one side, the manner in which corporate governance rules are structured affects the way a corporation fulfills its tax obligations; on the other side, the way tax designs (from the government perspective) and related tax strategies (from the corporation perspective) are planned influences corporate governance dynamics. This article investigates such bilateral relationship limiting the analysis to the …

The Legitimate Rights Of Public Shareholders, Lawrence E. Mitchell

Lawrence E. Mitchell

In recent years there has been significant ongoing academic debate over the expansion of public shareholders’ participation rights in corporate governance. The debate has accompanied a dramatic increase in institutional shareholder and hedge fund activism attempting to influence the conduct of corporate affairs.

The legitimacy of shareholder participation rights depends upon the actual role public shareholders play in contributing to the corporation’s function of providing goods and services and, ultimately, to economic growth and social welfare. Nobody in the debate has stopped to examine this question. This paper presents original empirical evidence that demonstrates that public shareholders do not, on …

The Legitimate Rights Of Public Shareholders, Lawrence E. Mitchell

Lawrence E. Mitchell

In recent years there has been significant ongoing academic debate over the expansion of public shareholders’ participation rights in corporate governance. The debate has accompanied a dramatic increase in institutional shareholder and hedge fund activism attempting to influence the conduct of corporate affairs.

The legitimacy of shareholder participation rights depends upon the actual role public shareholders play in contributing to the corporation’s function of providing goods and services and, ultimately, to economic growth and social welfare. Nobody in the debate has stopped to examine this question. This paper presents original empirical evidence that demonstrates that public shareholders do not, on …

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who's Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective JENNIFER G. HILL University of Sydney – Faculty of Law; Visiting Professor, Vanderbilt University – School of Law; Research Associate – European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Abstract Shareholder power is back on the regulatory agenda. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate and the Paulson Committee report both raise shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. Yet, in spite of calls for stronger shareholder rights, there has been great resistance to …