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Full-Text Articles in Law
Article Ii Vests Executive Power, Not The Royal Prerogative, Julian Davis Mortenson
Article Ii Vests Executive Power, Not The Royal Prerogative, Julian Davis Mortenson
Articles
Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power” in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presidential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities. Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional originalists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom. But it is also demonstrably wrong. Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf, this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” referred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the power to execute law. …
Originalism And A Forgotten Conflict Over Martial Law, Bernadette Meyler
Originalism And A Forgotten Conflict Over Martial Law, Bernadette Meyler
Northwestern University Law Review
This Symposium Essay asks what a largely forgotten conflict over habeas corpus and martial law in mid-eighteenth-century New York can tell us about originalist methods of constitutional interpretation. The episode, which involved Abraham Yates, Jr.—later a prominent Antifederalist—as well as Lord Loudoun, the commander of the British forces in America, and New York Acting Governor James De Lancey, furnishes insights into debates about martial law prior to the Founding and indicates that they may have bearing on originalist interpretations of the Suspension Clause. It also demonstrates how the British imperial context in which the American colonies were situated shaped discussions …
The Elephant Problem, Richard Primus
The Elephant Problem, Richard Primus
Reviews
In their new book, "A Great Power of Attorney": Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution, Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman argue that, as a matter of original meaning, the Constitution should be understood as analogous to a power of attorney, that interpretive devices applicable to powers of attorney should therefore be used in constitutional interpretation, and that interpreting the Constitution that way would produce results congenial to modern libertarian preferences, such as the unconstitutionality of the Affordable Care Act and the invalidity, on nondelegation grounds, of much of the federal administrative state. But the book fails to carry any of its central …
Constructing The Original Scope Of Constitutional Rights, Nathan Chapman
Constructing The Original Scope Of Constitutional Rights, Nathan Chapman
Scholarly Works
In this solicited response to Ingrid Wuerth's "The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations," I explain and justify Wuerth's methodology for constructing the original scope of constitutional rights. The original understanding of the Constitution, based on text and historical context, is a universally acknowledged part of constitutional law today. The original scope of constitutional rights — who was entitled to them, where they extended, and so on — is a particularly difficult question that requires a measure of construction based on the entire historical context. Wuerth rightly proceeds one right at a time with a careful consideration …
Animus And Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle And Judicial Prudence, Daniel O. Conkle
Animus And Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle And Judicial Prudence, Daniel O. Conkle
Articles by Maurer Faculty
In a series of cases addressing sexual orientation and other issues, the Supreme Court has ruled that animus-based lawmaking is constitutionally impermissible. The Court treats animus as an independent and sufficient basis for invalidation. Moreover, it appears to regard animus as a doctrine of first resort, to be utilized even when an alternative constitutional rationale, such as declaring a challenged classification suspect or quasi-suspect, would readily justify the same result. Responding especially to Professor William D. Araiza’s elaboration and defense of the Court’s animus doctrine, I agree that this doctrine is sound, indeed compelling, as a matter of constitutional principle. …
Article Ii And Antidiscrimination Norms, Aziz Z. Huq
Article Ii And Antidiscrimination Norms, Aziz Z. Huq
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Trump v. Hawaii validated a prohibition on entry to the United States from several Muslim-majority countries and at the same time repudiated a longstanding precedent associated with the Japanese American internment of World War II. This Article closely analyzes the relationship of these twin rulings. It uses their dichotomous valences as a lens on the legal scope for discriminatory action by the federal executive. Parsing the various ways in which the internment of the 1940s and the 2017 exclusion order can be reconciled, the Article identifies a tension between the Court’s two holdings in Trump …