Law Commons^™

Countersupermajoritarianism, Frederic M. Bloom, Nelson Tebbe

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

How should the Constitution change? In Originalism and the Good Constitution, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue that it ought to change in only one way: through the formal mechanisms set out in the Constitution’s own Article V. This is so, they claim, because provisions adopted by supermajority vote are more likely to be substantively good. The original Constitution was ratified in just that way, they say, and subsequent changes should be implemented similarly. McGinnis and Rappaport also contend that this substantive goodness is preserved best by a mode of originalist interpretation.

In this Review, we press two main arguments. …

The Condorcet Jury Theorem And Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply To Saul Levmore, Maxwell L. Stearns

Faculty Scholarship

In Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, Professor Saul Levmore explores the "division of labor" between the various thresholds of agreement required for collective action - supermajority, simple majority, or plurality rule. His particular emphasis is on the choice between the last two options. To improve our understanding of this choice in various settings, Professor Levmore considers the relationship between two well-known contributions to the study of group decisionmaking, namely, the Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Condorcet Criterion, which have not generally been treated together. This essay explores the relationship between these two insights in the context of judicial decisionmaking. Counterintuitively, …

On Legal Interpretations Of The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

There has been a spate of interest in the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to issues in the law. This theorem holds that a majority vote among a suitably large body of voters, all of whom are more likely than not to vote correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome. Its uses have ranged from estimating the correct size of juries to justifying the voting of creditors in Chapter 11 reorganizations. While the mathematics is unassailable, the legal interpretation of the conclusion is dependent on the model of probability one uses when invoking the assumption that the …

Conjunction And Aggregation, Saul Levmore

Michigan Law Review

This Article begins with the puzzle of why the law avoids the issue of conjunctive probability. Mathematically inclined observers might, for example, employ the "product rule," multiplying the probabilities associated with several events or requirements in order to assess a combined likelihood, but judges and lawyers seem otherwise inclined. Courts and statutes might be explicit about the manner in which multiple requirements should be combined, but they are not. Thus, it is often unclear whether a factfinder should assess if condition A was more likely than not to be present - and then go on to see whether condition B …