Law Commons^™

Antitrust Regulation Of Copyright Markets, Jacob Noti-Victor, Xiyin Tang

Faculty Articles

Late last year, a federal court sided with the Department of Justice and blocked the planned merger of book publishers Simon & Schuster and Penguin Random House. The decision was a rare collision between antitrust law and the deeply consolidated copyright content industries. Over the course of the past decade, acquisitions and mergers in the recording, music publishing, and audiovisual space have left just a handful of juggernaut content producers in their wake. Moreover, new technology companies that have entered the content-creation and distribution markets have begun to leverage their scale to further their own industry consolidation.

This Article examines …

Why Economists Should Support Populist Antitrust Goals, Mark Glick, Gabriel A. Lozada, Darren Bush

Utah Law Review

Antitrust policy can be a powerful tool to tackle important social and economic problems. For decades antitrust enforcement has been shackled by the so-called Consumer Welfare Standard (“CWS”) that has limited the goals considered to be “legitimate.” The CWS limits antitrust goals to those that impact demand in markets, and primarily in output markets. Recently, new voices have come forward to suggest that antitrust policy should address several other important social objectives. Such goals include the traditional antitrust goals that motivated passage of the antitrust statutes, and which were discussed in Pre-Rehnquist Court opinions, including dispersion of economic and political …

The 2010 Hmgs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here?, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this short article, which is part of a RIO Symposium on the Tenth Anniversary of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, we suggest a number of improvements that should be considered in the next revision of the Guidelines. Our analysis is based on the observation that horizontal merger policy has suffered from under-enforcement. We provide evidence that the enforcement agencies face significant resource constraints which require a triage process that inevitably leads to under-enforcement. In light of merger law placing greater weight on avoiding false negatives and under-deterrence than false positive and over-deterrence, the article suggests a number of ways in …

Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival or entrant. Importantly, the firms in such cases generally have asymmetric stakes: the defendant typically has a much larger financial interest on the line. We explore the broad policy implications of this fact using a novel model of litigation with endogenous effort. Asymmetric stakes lead dominant defendants to invest systematically more resources into litigation, causing the plaintiff's success probability to fall below the efficient level--a distortion that carries over to ex ante settlements. We explain that enhanced damages may reduce the problem, but …

What’S In Your Wallet (And What Should The Law Do About It?), Natasha Sarin

All Faculty Scholarship

In traditional markets, firms can charge prices that are significantly elevated relative to their costs only if there is a market failure. However, this is not true in a two-sided market (like Amazon, Uber, and Mastercard), where firms often subsidize one side of the market and generate revenue from the other. This means consideration of one side of the market in isolation is problematic. The Court embraced this view in Ohio v. American Express, requiring that anticompetitive harm on one side of a two-sided market be weighed against benefits on the other side.

Legal scholars denounce this decision, which, …

Intellectual Property And Competition, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A legal system that relies on private property rights to promote economic development must consider that profits can come from two different sources. First, both competition under constant technology and innovation promote economic growth by granting many of the returns to the successful developer. Competition and innovation both increase output, whether measured by quantity or quality. Second, however, profits can come from practices that reduce output, in some cases by reducing quantity, or in others by reducing innovation.

IP rights and competition policy were traditionally regarded as in conflict. IP rights create monopoly, which was thought to be inimical to …

A Skeptical View Of Information Fiduciaries, Lina M. Khan, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The concept of “information fiduciaries” has surged to the forefront of debates on online-platform regulation. Developed by Professor Jack Balkin, the concept is meant to rebalance the relationship between ordinary individuals and the digital companies that accumulate, analyze, and sell their personal data for profit. Just as the law imposes special duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty on doctors, lawyers, and accountants vis-à-vis their patients and clients, Balkin argues, so too should it impose special duties on corporations such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter vis-à-vis their end users. Over the past several years, this argument has garnered remarkably broad support …

Antitrust And The Design Of Production, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Both economics and antitrust policy have traditionally distinguished “production” from “distribution.” The former is concerned with how products are designed and built, the latter with how they are placed into the hands of consumers. Nothing in the language of the antitrust laws suggests much concern with production as such. Although courts do not view it that way, even per se unlawful naked price fixing among rivals is a restraint on distribution rather than production. Naked price fixing assumes a product that has already been designed and built, and the important cartel decision is what should be each firm’s output, or …

Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker

Presentations

Market concentration measures the extent to which market shares are concentrated between a small number of firms. It is often taken as a proxy for the intensity of competition. Indeed, in recent years changes in concentration have increasingly been used to argue that the intensity of competition is falling, that the growth of large firms with high market shares is driving up profits, damaging innovation and productivity, and increasing inequality. Some have argued that the competition rules need to be rewritten and a crackdown by overly antitrust agencies is required. The simplicity of this framing has found supporters across the …

The Corporation As Courthouse, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Despite the considerable attention paid to mandatory arbitration, few consumer disputes ever reach arbitration. By contrast, institutions such as Apple’s customer service department handle hundreds of millions of disputes annually. This Article argues that understanding businesses’ internal dispute processes is crucial to diagnosing consumers’ procedural needs. Moreover, businesses’ internal processes interact with a larger system of private actors. These actors include ratings websites that mete out reputational sanctions. The system also includes other corporations linked to the transaction, such as when American Express adjudicates a contested sale between a shopper and Home Depot. This vast private order offers promise to …

Competition Policy And Free Trade: Antitrust Provisions In Ptas, Anu Bradford, Tim Büthe

Faculty Scholarship

Trade agreements increasingly contain provisions concerning ‘behind-the-border’ barriers to trade, often beyond current World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments (Dur, Baccini and Elsig 2014). Today’s preferential trade agreements (PTAs) may include, for instance, rules regarding ‘technical’ barriers to trade that go beyond the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), accelerating the replacement of differing national product safety standards with common international standards and thus reducing the trade-inhibiting effect of regulatory measures (Buthe and Mattli 2011; World Trade Organization 2012). Today’s PTAs may also go beyond WTO rules in prohibiting preferences for domestic producers in government procurement (Arrowsmith and …

Vertical Restraints, George A. Hay

George A. Hay

No abstract provided.

Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters In Free Trade Agreements, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

Over the past ten to fifteen years, there has been an explosion of bilateral and regional free trade agreements in Latin America (together, these are called "preferential free trade agreements" or PTAs). The purpose of PTAs is to increase trade, regulatory, and investment liberalization. As effective trade liberalization requires more than just a reduction of tariffs, PTAs include "chapters" in a number of areas of domestic regulation. These chapters address domestic regulation and create binding commitments to liberalize domestic regulation that may impact foreign trade. Among chapters that address domestic regulation, many of the Latin American PTAs include a chapter …

Designing Antitrust Agencies For More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn From Restaurant Guides, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

Antitrust policy should be concerned with the quality and effectiveness of the antitrust system. Some efforts at agency effectiveness include self-study of antitrust agencies to determine the factors that lead to improving agency quality. Such studies, however, often focus only on enforcement decisions and other agency initiatives such as competition advocacy. They do not reflect at least one other part of the equation: what do non-government users of the antitrust system think about the quality of antitrust agencies? This Symposium Essay advocates the use of a ratings guide by antitrust practitioners for antitrust agencies to add to the tools in …

The North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta): Good For Jobs, For The Environment, And For America, Thomas J. Schoenbaum

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Merger Review By The Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-Nbc Universal, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

The Communications Act of 1934 created a dual review process in which mergers in the communications industry are reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as well as the antitrust authorities. Commentators have criticized dual review not only as costly and redundant, but also as subject to substantive and procedural abuse. The process of clearing the 2011 Comcast-NBC Universal merger provides a useful case study to examine whether such concerns are justified. A review of the empirical context reveals that the FCC intervened even though the relevant markets were not structured in a way that would ordinarily raise anticompetitive concerns. …

A Unified Framework For Competition Policy And Innovation Policy, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

I describe a model of competition law enforcement that treats competition and innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to be. The enforcement authority determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it sets the penalty too high it will reduce firms’ incentives to invest in innovation, and if firms do not invest, new goods and new markets will not be created. The authority therefore moderates the penalty in order to maintain innovation incentives. The implications of this framework for competition policy and for innovation policy are quite different from what is commonly observed today. I discuss implications for competition …

Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

What, if anything, are the implications of the happiness economics literature on competition policy? This Paper first examines whether competition policy should promote (or at least not impede) citizens’ opportunities to increase well-being. The Paper next surveys the happiness literature on five key issues: (i) What constitutes well-being; (ii) How do you measure well-being; (iii) What increases well-being; (iv) Do people want to be happy; and (v) Can and should the government promote total well-being? Although the happiness literature does not provide an analytical framework for analyzing routine antitrust issues, this does not mean that competition officials should discount or …

A Competition Act By India, For India: The First Three Years Of Enforcement Under The New Competition Act, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

In 2002, India unveiled its new Competition Act. The Act substantially improves upon the previous competition regime, which regulated and condemned dominance even absent culpable conduct. Despite improvements, provisions of the Act have proven difficult for the fledgling Competition Commission (“the Commission”) to implement. For one, the Act overwhelmingly prefers rule of reason analysis to per se illegality for horizontal and vertical agreements. While this approach gives the Commission the flexibility to conduct a nuanced inquiry, the economic analysis required is challenging. So far, the Commission has struggled when applying basic antitrust economics in the hundred or so orders that …

Screens In The Gas Retail Market: The Brazilian Experience, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo

carlos ragazzo

No abstract provided.

Outpost Years For A Start-Up Agency: The Ftc From 1921-1925, William E. Kovacic, Marc Winerman

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

The challenges and questions surrounding the design of a competition system are part of an identifiable life cycle that characterizes the development of a competition agency. The core challenges are to set priorities and execute them, but there are various potential obstacles. This article looks at the FTC’s experiences in its first decade, a period bringing extraordinary technological dynamism that reshaped the U.S. economy and transitions in political leadership, to shed light on how a new or reformed agency might go about facing predictable problems in its first years and to suggest how these agencies can improve their effectiveness.

New …

Copyright, Collecting Societies And The Accc: Call For (New) Guidelines, Tyrone Berger

Dr Tyrone Berger

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) released draft guidelines on copyright licensing and collecting societies in November 2006 for public comment. The purpose of the guidelines was to provide general information to potential licensees and users of copyright material. After four years since the release of the draft guidelines, this author argues that it is time for a new set of guidelines to clarify and explain their purpose.

Designing Antitrust Agencies For More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn From Restaurant Guides, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

Antitrust policy should be concerned with the quality and effectiveness of the antitrust system. Some efforts at agency effectiveness include self-study of antitrust agencies to determine the factors that lead to improving agency quality. Such studies, however, often focus only on enforcement decisions and other agency initiatives such as competition advocacy. They do not reflect at least one other part of the equation: what do non-government users of the antitrust system think about the quality of antitrust agencies? This Symposium Essay advocates the use of a ratings guide by antitrust practitioners for antitrust agencies to add to the tools in …

Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy & The Role Of Behavioral Economics, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Although the behavioral economics and happiness economic literature are hot areas in legal and economic scholarship, the U.S. policymakers, until recently, have not embraced the literature. That is changing with the financial crisis. Policymakers are re-examining the assumptions underlying many neoclassical economic theories embedded in their policies.

This article addresses one cornerstone of neoclassical economic theory, namely that rational consumers pursue their economic self-interests. It is commonly associated with Adam Smith’s famous statement: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own …

Competition Policy And The Application Of Section 5 Of The Federal Trade Commission Act, William E. Kovacic, Mark Winerman

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Since the 1970’s, U.S. courts generally have narrowed the range of single-firm behavior subject to condemnation as monopolization under the Sherman Act. This article examines the possibility of applying principles from Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to address apparent instances of anticompetitive conduct that go beyond the reach of other federal antitrust statutes. The FTC, through Section 5, offers a superior platform for elaborating competition policy, has the tools to perform empirical and policy work that can inform the design of legal rules, and is a specialized tribunal whose Section 5 decisions have no collateral effect in …

A Strategy For Cooperation In Global Competition Policy, Andrew Guzman

Andrew T Guzman

No abstract provided.

The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The May 13, 2009 decision by the European Commission ('EC') holding that Intel violated Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and should be fined a record amount and prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, set off a predictable four part chorus of denunciations:

1. Intel did nothing wrong and was just competing hard;
2. Intel's discounts were good for consumers;;
3. The entire matter is just another example of Europeans protecting their own against a more efficient U.S. company; and;
4. Even if Intel did engage in anticompetitive activity, the fine was much too large. These assertions will be addressed in turn.;

Comments Of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions To Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants, Jonathan Baker, William Baumol, Kenneth Arrow, Susan Athey, Coleman Bazelon, Timothy Brennan, Timothy Bresnahan, Jeremy Bulow, Yeon-Koo Che, Peter Cramton, Daniel Ackerberg, James Alleman, Gregory Crawford, Peter Demarzo, Gerald Faulhaber, Jeremy Fox, Ian Gale, Jacob Goeree, Brent Goldfarb, Shane Greenstein, Robert Hahn, Robert Hall, Ward Hanson, Barry Harris, Robert Harris, Janice Hauge, Jerry Hausman, Thomas Hazlett, Kenneth Hendricks, Heather Hudson, Mark Jamison, John Kagel, Alfred Kahn, Ilan Kremer, Vijay Krishna, William Lehr, Thomas Lenard, Jonathan Levin, Yuanchuan Lien, John Mayo, David Mcadams, Paul Milgrom, Roger Noll, Bruce Owen, Charles Plott, Robert Porter, Philip Reny, Michael Riordan, David Salant, Scott Savage, William Samuelson, Richard Schmalensee, Marius Schwartz, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Vernon Smith, Daniel Vincent, Joel Waldfogel, Scott Wallsten, Robert Weber, Bradley Wimmer, Glenn Woroch, Lixin Ye, John Hayes, Gregory Rosston

Congressional and Other Testimony

The signatories to this document are economists who have studied telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make stimulus spending as efficient as possible. To that end, we have come together to encourage the National Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA) and Rural Utilities Service (RUS) to adopt auction mechanisms to allocate broadband stimulus grants.The broadband stimulus NOI asks which mechanisms NTIA and RUS should use to distribute grants and how those mechanisms address shortcomings in traditional grant and loan programs. In this note we explain …

United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The development of marginalist, or neoclassical, economics led to a fifty-year long crisis in competition theory. Given an industrial structure with sufficient fixed costs, competition always became "ruinous," forcing firms to cut prices to marginal cost without sufficient revenue remaining to pay off investment. Early neoclassicists such as Alfred Marshall were not able to solve this problem, and as a result many economists were hostile toward the antitrust laws in the early decades of the twentieth century. The ruinous competition debate came to an abrupt end in the early 1930's, when Joan Robinson and particularly Edward Chamberlin developed models that …

Upstream Without A Paddle: Gene Patenting And The Protection Of The "Infostructure", Seth Shulman

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The U.S. patent system, designed to protect rights to specific, marketable gadgets, has increasingly over the past few decades granted patents on comparatively abstract and amorphous ideas that stretch the system beyond recognition. Overly broad patents, and patents too far "upstream" from the marketplace, I argue, undermine the patent regime, hamper innovation, and prove exceedingly difficult to adjudicate. Using a series of conceptual and historical analogies, I attempt to assess the patenting of genes and other broad, "upstream" patents from a public policy context, emphasizing, as many are coming to realize, that things work best in the knowledge-based economy when …