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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Sec's Compensation Clawback Loophole, David I. Walker Jan 2023

The Sec's Compensation Clawback Loophole, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

The SEC has recently released final rules implementing the executive incentive compensation recovery or “clawback” provisions of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. These rules are aimed at recovering from executives incentive compensation determined to be excessive in light of a subsequent accounting restatement. Unfortunately, the SEC’s rules create a loophole by excluding purely time-vested stock and stock option grants from the reach of the new clawback regime. This aspect of the rulemaking seems inconsistent with the intent of Congress, and the result likely will be to distort executive pay practices in a perverse fashion, shifting compensation back in the direction of …


Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons For Executive Compensation From Minor League Baseball, Garrett R. Broshuis Jan 2012

Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons For Executive Compensation From Minor League Baseball, Garrett R. Broshuis

Saint Louis University Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Righting Others' Wrongs: A Critical Analysis Of Clawback Suits In The Wake Of Madoff-Type Ponzi Schemes And Other Financial Frauds, Amy Sepinwall Dec 2011

Righting Others' Wrongs: A Critical Analysis Of Clawback Suits In The Wake Of Madoff-Type Ponzi Schemes And Other Financial Frauds, Amy Sepinwall

Amy J. Sepinwall

In a typical Ponzi scheme, early investors earn “profits” not through any legitimate investment activity on the part of the Ponzi scheme operator; instead the operator simply transfers money that later investors deposit to the earlier investors who seek redemptions. As such, when the scheme goes bust, as it must, the Ponzi scheme operator will not have enough money to cover all of the investors’ deposits, let alone the earnings on those deposits that the investors thought they were owed. Should the scheme’s winners – i.e., those who withdrew more money than they deposited – be compelled to return their …


Of Charities And Clawbacks: The European Union Proposal On Successions And Wills As A Threat To Charitable Giving, Aaron Schwabach Jan 2011

Of Charities And Clawbacks: The European Union Proposal On Successions And Wills As A Threat To Charitable Giving, Aaron Schwabach

Aaron Schwabach

In the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent the United States, an inter vivos gift, once given, cannot be reclaimed by the giver’s heirs. In civil law countries the situation is quite different: Not only spouses, but issue and in some cases even ascendants, are entitled to a forced share of a decedent’s estate – and these forced shares are assessed against a notional “estate” that includes the testator’s inter vivos gifts. If the total of these forced shares exceeds the amount actually available in the decedent’s estate at death, the recipients of the gifts, or their successors, may …


Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa M. Fairfax Jan 2011

Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa M. Fairfax

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Corporate governance scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which corporate directors failed in their responsibility to monitor the corporation and its managers, especially in terms of the latter's’ misdeeds. Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors' roles by seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient incentives to engage in effective oversight and to hold the boards more accountable. The current financial crisis has ushered in an era of significant government reform of the financial system and involvement in corporate governance matters. Such involvement has increased board of directors' responsibilities but has not reconciled those responsibilities with board …


Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa M. Fairfax Jan 2011

Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa M. Fairfax

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Corporate governance scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which corporate directors failed in their responsibility to monitor the corporation and its managers, especially in terms of the latter's’ misdeeds. Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors' roles by seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient incentives to engage in effective oversight and to hold the boards more accountable. The current financial crisis has ushered in an era of significant government reform of the financial system and involvement in corporate governance matters. Such involvement has increased board of directors' responsibilities but has not reconciled those responsibilities with board …


Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax Jan 2011

Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

Corporate governance scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which corporate directors failed in their responsibility to monitor the corporation and its managers, especially in terms of the latter's’ misdeeds. Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors' roles by seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient incentives to engage in effective oversight and to hold the boards more accountable. The current financial crisis has ushered in an era of significant government reform of the financial system and involvement in corporate governance matters. Such involvement has increased board of directors' responsibilities but has not reconciled those responsibilities with board …


Reply: Clawback To The Future, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong Jan 2010

Reply: Clawback To The Future, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong

All Faculty Scholarship

In an earlier article also available on Scholarship Commons, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 94, p. 368, 2009, Professors Miriam Cherry and Jarrod Wong set out an initial description and analysis of contractual clawback provisions. In this Reply, Profs. Cherry and Wong address three aspects of Michael Macchiarola's Response: its application of the clawback doctrine to the recoupment of executive compensation; the criticism that the clawbacks doctrine introduces latent subjectivity into contractual analysis; and the apparent operational difficulties in implementing clawbacks.


Reply: Clawback To The Future, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong Jan 2010

Reply: Clawback To The Future, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes (the “Article”), we undertook the task of proposing a doctrine of clawbacks that would not only furnish a framework for analyzing the term more systematically, but would also describe the ways the doctrine would relate to established rules of contract law. With his response, In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: In Response to Professors Cherry & Wong (the “Response”), Michael Macchiarola has provided us with an opportunity to articulate these thoughts on the doctrine of clawbacks further, and for that opportunity and his …


Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures In An Era Of Excessive Executive Compensation And Ponzi Schemes, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong Jan 2009

Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures In An Era Of Excessive Executive Compensation And Ponzi Schemes, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong

All Faculty Scholarship

In the spring of 2009, public outcry erupted over the multi-million dollar bonuses paid to AIG executives even as the company was receiving TARP funds. Various measures were proposed in response, including a 90% retroactive tax on the bonuses, which the media described as a "clawback." Separately, the term "clawback" was also used to refer to remedies potentially available to investors defrauded in the multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff. While the media and legal commentators have used the term "clawback" reflexively, the concept has yet to be fully analyzed. In this article, we propose a doctrine of …


Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures In An Era Of Excessive Executive Compensation And Ponzi Schemes, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong Jan 2009

Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures In An Era Of Excessive Executive Compensation And Ponzi Schemes, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

Months after insurance giant American International Group (AIG) faltered and the federal government provided financial assistance to keep the company afloat, executive compensation and bonus practices at the company came under scrutiny. Taxpayers balked when evidence came to light that large bonuses were being paid to executives—the same executives, in certain instances, who had been responsible for AIG's losses. The disconnect between AIG's huge losses and the multi-million dollar bonus payments is a striking example of "pay without performance," a phenomenon that Professors Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk documented in their book of the same name. Responding to public …