Law Commons^™

The Lawyer As Dream Enabler, Gerald S. Reamey

Faculty Articles

In law school and in law practice, the power of preparation is reinforced. Generations of law students have heard me extol the virtue of preparation above all others. While it is true, even the best preparation will never beat luck; luck is fickle and not subject to our control. On the other hand, we totally control the amount and quality of the preparation we put into any project. I discovered preparation is more important than good looks, nice clothes, a shiny leather briefcase, eloquence, experience, or even intelligence.

Is This A Christian Nation?: Virtual Symposium September 25, 2020, Roger Williams University School Of Law

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Law School News: 'Injustice Dehumanizes Everyone It Touches' 1-31-2020, Michael M. Bowden

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

The 15th Annual Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Celebration Keynote Address 1-28-2020, Roger Williams University School Of Law, Michael M. Bowden, Andrea Hansen

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms That Go Public?, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Black & Gilson (1998) argue that an IPO-welcoming stock market stimulates venture deals by enabling VCs to give founders a valuable "call option on control." We study 18,000 startups to investigate the value of this option. Among firms that reach IPO, 60% of founders are no longer CEO. With little voting power, only half of the others survive three years as CEO. At initial VC financing, the probability of getting real control of a public firm for three years is 0.4%. Our results shed light on control evolution in startups, and cast doubt on the plausibility of the call-option theory …

What's Driving Acquisitions? An In-Depth Analysis Of Ceo Drivers Determining Modern Form Acquisition Strategy, Jennifer E. Wuebker

University of Richmond Law Review

Part I provides an overview of the acquisition landscape, including

a brief history of the prevalence and success of acquisitions

as well as an analysis of acquisitions today. Part II outlines

the acquisition process and highlights the importance and dynamics

of decision making, both in principle and in practice. Part

III explores two theories of acquisitive strategy driving CEO decision

making: value enhancement and private interest. Part IV

analyzes the implications of CEO personality and psychological

drivers on acquisition strategy and decision making. This article

argues that CEO traits are central decision drivers, but that no

particular set of traits …

“Because That's Where The Money Is”: A Theory Of Corporate Legal Compliance, William C. Bradford

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The study and regulation of firms per se as agents of compliance may be misguided. Firms are abstractions that exist only in the legal, and not the natural, sense, and, as such, utterly lack decisional capacity. Firms do not decide whether to comply with law; people, specifically officers who exercise decisional authority on their behalf, do. Any theory that would explain or predict firm compliance must account for the individual level of analysis. However, most corporate legal compliance research minimizes the salience of personality. Accordingly, Part II traces associations between personalities of CEOs and firm compliance with obligations arising under …

An Experiment On The Role Of Penalty Clauses And The Level Of Legal Remedies For Breach Of Contract On The Prevention Of The Hold-Up Problem In Colombian Contract Law, Juan Antonio Gaviria

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

This article analyzes the results of an experiment with Colombian students testing the theories thatpenalty clauses and a high level of legal remedies for breach of contract prevent the hold-up problem. While the results of this experiment failed to statistically confirm the predictions of the theory, they did not reject them. Furthermore,the results show that held-up parties were better off after the parties renegotiated the contract when either a penalty clause was provided or the law increased the level of legal remedies in comparison with a benchmark scenario. On the other hand, the results are a contribution to the field …

An Empirical Analysis Of Noncompetition Clauses And Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Employment contracts for most employees are not publicly available, leaving researchers to speculate about whether they contain postemployment restrictions on employee mobility, and if so, what those provisions look like. Using a large sample of publicly available CEO employment contracts, we are able to examine these noncompetition covenants, including postemployment covenants not to compete ("CNCs" or "noncompetes'), nonsolicitation agreements ("NSAs"), and nondisclosure agreements ("NDAs'). What we found confirms some long-held assumptions about restrictive covenants but also uncovers some surprises.

We begin by discussing why employers use restrictive covenants and examining how the courts have treated them. We then analyze an …

Whistleblowers And Rogues: An Urgent Call For An Affirmative Defense To Corporate Criminal Liability, Marcia Narine

Catholic University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Executive Trade Secrets, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

The law discriminates among a corporation’s secrets. In the eyes of the law, commercial secrets of corporations are legitimate secrets that deserve legal protection and nondisclosure, but personal secrets of executives are not as deserving of legal protection and nondisclosure. This divergent treatment of secrets has resulted in a legal landscape of perplexing, paradoxical paths for corporations and executives concerning executive disclosures — a precarious landscape that has left corporations and investors dangerously susceptible to revelations of private facts that shock market valuation and institutional stability.

This Article explores this divergent treatment of secrets in the context of public corporations …

The Corporate Governance Of Iconic Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Essay explores the special corporate governance challenges posed by iconic executives. Iconic executives are complex, bittersweet figures in corporate governance narratives. They are alluring, larger-than-life corporate figures who often govern freely. Iconic executives frequently rule like monarchs over their firms, offering lofty promises to shareholders, directors, and managers under their reign. But like many stories of powerful and influential figures, the narratives of iconic executives also contain adversity and danger. Part of the acquiescence and enchantment with such figures is rooted in the virtuous promises embodied by their presence, promises of unity, accountability, and effectiveness in corporate governance. Unfortunately, …

Good Faith After Disney: Justice Berger’S Closing Discussion, Carolyn Berger

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Last Male Bastion: In Search Of A Trojan Horse, Joan Macleod Heminway

Scholarly Works

Numerous legal scholars and commentators have written about the paucity of women in the boardroom at influence-wielding U.S. public companies. Fewer have written about the scarcity of female Chief Executive Officers, and fewer yet have written about the relatively low numbers of female executive officers, at U.S. public companies.

This brief essay (an edited version of my remarks offered at the University of Dayton School of Law’s symposium on "Perspectives on Gender and Business Ethics: Women in Corporate Governance") does not endeavor to add to the collective understanding of observed gender disparities in boardrooms and the C-suite — the senior …

Plato, The Prince, And Corporate Virtue: Philosophical Approaches To Corporate Social Responsibility, Colin P. Marks, Paul S. Miller

Faculty Articles

Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) has been a topic of discussion within corporate law and policy for over 40 years. CSR, in its broadest sense, explores what obligations a corporation should or can undertake to further the goals of society. Business academics have described four social responsibilities that any company has to society: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic. The progressive advocates within the legal academic debate surrounding CSR argue that a corporation should seek to do more than just turn a profit; it should seek to make society “better.” However, by seeking to make society “better,” the corporation begins to act …

Arbitration Clauses In Ceo Employment Contracts: An Empirical And Theoretical Analysis, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin, Erin O'Connor

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A bill currently pending in Congress would render unenforceable mandatory arbitration clauses in all employment contracts. Some perceive these provisions as employer efforts to deprive employees of important legal rights. Company CEOs are firm employees, and, unlike most other firm employees, they can actually negotiate their employment contracts, very often with attorney assistance. Moreover, many CEO employment contracts are publicly available, so they can be examined empirically. In this paper, we ask whether CEOs bargain to include binding arbitration provisions in their employment contracts. After exploring the theoretical arguments for and against including such provisions in these agreements, we use …

Organizations Matter: They Are Institutions, After All, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

Judge Posner (2010) offers a substantial agenda for organization economics. He advises us on how organization economics can shed substantial light on some of the most pressing social problems of the day. I comment on two of the areas he selects for discussion and offer some comments on the relationship of organization economics to new institutional economics. Judge Posner surely is right to argue that organization economics can help us understand the failures of corporate governance in regulating executive pay. Moreover, with additional and more institutionally nuanced theorizing, organizational economics should further our understanding of the work of judiciaries in …

Wanted: Female Corporate Directors (A Review Of Professor Douglas M. Branson's No Seat At The Table), Joan Macleod Heminway, Sarah A. Walters

Scholarly Works

In his 2007 book No Seat at the Table, Professor Douglas Branson aptly describes how patterns of male dominance inherent in the legal structures of corporate governance reproduce themselves again and again to keep women out of executive suites and boardrooms, and then he offers a practical way to break this cycle of dominance-through paradigm shifting. A central value of Professor Branson's book derives from this thesis, as well as his use of nontraditional empirical data and interdisciplinary literature (in addition to more traditional decisional law and legal scholarship) to support the positions he takes. Moreover, No Seat at …

Lessons From The Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing Ceo Autonomy, Steven A. Ramirez

Saint Louis University Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Ceo Postings: Leveraging The Internet’S Communications Potential While Managing The Message To Maintain Corporate Governance Interests In Information Security, Reputation And Compliance, Margo E. K. Reder

Margo E. K. Reder

CEO POSTINGS –

LEVERAGING THE INTERNET’S COMMUNICATIONS POTENTIAL WHILE MANAGING THE MESSAGE TO MAINTAIN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTERESTS IN INFORMATION SECURITY, REPUTATION AND COMPLIANCE

By Margo E. K. Reder

For approximately eight years, Whole Foods Market, Inc. [Whole Foods] CEO John Mackey posted messages to Yahoo! Financial’s online message board for Whole Foods. Rather than using his real name, Mr. Mackey like many posters to chat rooms, created an online alter ego and posted his comments under a pseudonym. As “Rahodeb” Mr. Mackey promoted his Whole Foods chain, boasted about personal stock gains in Whole Foods stock, company plans and performance …

A Social Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, James Fanto

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Two Goals For Executive Compensation Reform, Brett H. Mcdonnell

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Disney Examined: A Case Study In Corporate Governance And Ceo Succession, Lawrence Lederman

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Power Of Law Firm Partnership: Why Dominant Rainmakers Will Impede The Immediate, Widespread Implementation Of An Autocratic Management Structure, Matthew Scott Winings

ExpressO

Consultants and commentators have suggested that law firms would benefit from the implementation of effective business management practices. Specifically, a number of observers maintain that the partnership model by which virtually all law firms operate is outdated and inefficient. To alleviate this inefficiency, commentators claim that law firms could experience tremendous gains through the adoption of a corporate management model. Although the proposals advanced by observers differ slightly, the basic premise of the suggested solutions requires law firms to replace (or at least modify) their partnerships with a rational management structure in favor of a centralized leader who can best …

An Empirical Analysis Of Ceo Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, Randall Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this paper, we examine the key legal characteristics of 375 employment contracts between some of the largest 1500 public corporations and their Chief Executive Officers. We look at the actual language of these contracts, asking whether and in what ways CEO contracts differ from what are thought of as standard employment contract features for other workers. Our data provide some empirical answers to several common assertions or speculations about CEO contracts, and shed light on whether these contracts are negotiated solely to suit the preferences of CEOs or have provisions that insure that the employers' interests are also safeguarded. …

Executive Certification Requirements In The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002: A Case For Criminalizing Executive Recklessness, Christopher Wyant

Seattle University Law Review

This Comment focuses on sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 302 requires Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), or their equivalents, to personally certify the accuracy of financial disclosure filings required by the SEC and to vouch for the reliability of the internal corporate controls that produce that information.'4 Section 906 contains an additional certification requirement and provides specific criminal penalties for willful or knowing violations of that requirement.'" An efficiency-based analysis of these two sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggests that including a recklessness standard of intent would be more likely to increase …

Public Relations, Howard J. Rubenstein, Jill Fisch, John Elsen, Stanley S. Arkin, Randall Smith, Carl Felsenfeld

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.