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Full-Text Articles in Law

Looking Back With A Legend: Ira Millstein Reflects On The Impact Of Milton Friedman's Views On Corporate Governance, Eric L. Talley, Ira M. Millstein, Leo E. Strine Jr. Jan 2021

Looking Back With A Legend: Ira Millstein Reflects On The Impact Of Milton Friedman's Views On Corporate Governance, Eric L. Talley, Ira M. Millstein, Leo E. Strine Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

In this discussion, corporate governance legend and frequent The Business Lawyer contributor Ira M. Millstein reflects on the impact of Milton Friedman and his adherents on our corporate governance system and economy generally, as well as the path forward to an economy that functions better for the many. Millstein takes an historical perspective in conversation with former Chief Justice and Chancellor of Delaware, Leo E. Strine, Jr., moderated by Professor Eric Talley of Columbia Law School. Millstein situates the evolution of our corporate governance system, including the effect of Friedman and the Chicago school on it, within the political dynamics …


Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward A Framework Of Function(S) And Form(S), Robert B. Ahdieh Jun 2018

Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward A Framework Of Function(S) And Form(S), Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

The analysis herein arises from the collision course between the sweeping reforms mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and a single sentence of the U.S. Code, adopted nearly fifteen years earlier and largely forgotten ever since. Few were likely thinking of Section 106 of the National Securities Market Improvement Act when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted on July 21, 2010. As applied by the D.C. Circuit less than a year later in Business Roundtable v. SEC, however, that provision’s peculiar requirement of cost-benefit analysis could prove the new legislation’s undoing.

To help navigate …


Safe At Any Speed: Robert Ahdieh’S Take On Cost-Benefit Analysis In Financial Markets, Jack M. Beermann Nov 2014

Safe At Any Speed: Robert Ahdieh’S Take On Cost-Benefit Analysis In Financial Markets, Jack M. Beermann

Shorter Faculty Works

When I saw the title of Robert Ahdieh’s recent article, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), I thought, “oh no, not another article about CBA.” Knowing Professor Adhieh’s work, I took a flyer and read it anyway, and boy was I happy with my decision. This is a great article which should be of interest to anyone involved in administrative law, securities regulation and policy analysis more generally. Cost-benefit analysis has become an important regulatory tool, and Professor Adhieh’s article makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the special analysis required under Section 106 …


Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward A Framework Of Function(S) And Form(S), Robert B. Ahdieh Dec 2013

Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward A Framework Of Function(S) And Form(S), Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

The analysis herein arises from the collision course between the sweeping reforms mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and a single sentence of the U.S. Code, adopted nearly fifteen years earlier and largely forgotten ever since. Few were likely thinking of Section 106 of the National Securities Market Improvement Act when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted on July 21, 2010. As applied by the D.C. Circuit less than a year later in Business Roundtable v. SEC, however, that provision’s peculiar requirement of cost-benefit analysis could prove the new legislation’s undoing.

To help navigate …


Business Roundtable V. Securities And Exchange Commission: The Sec's First Big Shot At Proxy Access In The Shadow Of Dodd-Frank, Raymond E. Areshenko Apr 2013

Business Roundtable V. Securities And Exchange Commission: The Sec's First Big Shot At Proxy Access In The Shadow Of Dodd-Frank, Raymond E. Areshenko

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.


The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2012

The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are legal entities designed to foster certain kinds of collective economic activity. The decisionmaking power within a corporation ultimately rests with a board of directors elected by shareholders. Shareholders, however, do not use anything like a conventional ballot in these elections; instead, they fill out a “proxy ballot,” delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent board’s chosen nominees, very often the board members themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot — …


The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2012

The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Corporations are legal entities designed to foster certain kinds of collective economic activity. The decisionmaking power within a corporation ultimately rests with a board of directors elected by shareholders. Shareholders, however, do not use anything like a conventional ballot in these elections; instead, they fill out a “proxy ballot,” delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent board’s chosen nominees, very often the board members themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot — …


Executive Compensation: The Law And Incentives, Stas Getmanenko Oct 2010

Executive Compensation: The Law And Incentives, Stas Getmanenko

Stas Getmanenko

Excessive executive compensation frequently breeds resentment, undermines consumer faith in the financial system, and overly stigmatizes otherwise common business failures. Frequently, the opponents of lavish pay packages compare executive compensation to the compensation of rank-and-file workers. Such criticism reflects perfectly appropriate societal concerns over pay equity and distribution of wealth within a society. An entirely separate source of friction is the shareholders’ right to benefit from the corporation’s wealth. Shareholders’ dividend is directly reduced by the company’s expenses, one of which executive compensation. For most of today’s public companies the executive compensation expense is often negligible when considered in light …