Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Law and Economics (2)
- Constitutional Law (1)
- Economic Policy (1)
- Economic Theory (1)
- Economics (1)
-
- First Amendment (1)
- Industrial Organization (1)
- Law and Politics (1)
- Law and Society (1)
- Legal History (1)
- Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation (1)
- Policy History, Theory, and Methods (1)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (1)
- Science and Technology Law (1)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (1)
- State and Local Government Law (1)
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Law
Teamwork Or Collusion? Changing Antitrust Law To Permit Corporate Action On Climate Change, Dailey C. Koga
Teamwork Or Collusion? Changing Antitrust Law To Permit Corporate Action On Climate Change, Dailey C. Koga
Washington Law Review
In an era of apprehension about climate change and the future of our planet, private companies are increasingly recognizing their role in increasing sustainability and lowering carbon emissions. To address this growing concern, some industry leaders are taking unilateral action to implement sustainable practices, but other companies have made agreements to fight emissions together. However, the Sherman Antitrust Act forbids agreements in restraint of trade. Further, antitrust law traditionally has refused to recognize ethical or moral justifications as legitimate reasons to permit anticompetitive agreements. As society’s concern for the planet grows and elected leaders move slower than needed to address …
Mere Common Ownership And The Antitrust Laws, Thomas A. Lambert
Mere Common Ownership And The Antitrust Laws, Thomas A. Lambert
Faculty Publications
"Common ownership," also called "horizontal shareholding," refers to a stock investor's ownership of minority stakes in multiple competing firms. Recent empirical studies have purported to show that institutional investors' common ownership reduces competition among commonly owned competitors. "Mere common ownership" is horizontal shareholding that is not accompanied by any sort of illicit agreement, such as a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, or the holding of a control-conferring stake. This Article considers the legality of mere common ownership under the U.S. antitrust laws. Prominent antitrust scholars and the leading treatise have concluded that mere common ownership that has the incidental effect of lessening market …
Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act (“the Act”) reflects this allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are “in restraint of... commerce among the several States.” This Article contends that the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints. This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute’s apparent meaning, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the …
Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle is accepted in some form by the entire Supreme Court and the majority of other writers. However, it means different things to different people. For example, some members of the Supreme Court can simultaneously acknowledge the antitrust consumer welfare principle even as they approve practices that result in immediate, obvious, and substantial consumer harm. At the same time, however, a properly defined consumer welfare principle is essential if antitrust is to achieve its statutory purpose, which is to pursue practices that injure competition. The wish to make antitrust a more general social justice statute is understandable: …
Sherman's Missing "Supplement": Prosecutorial Capacity, Agency Incentives, And The False Dawn Of Antitrust Federalism, Daniel E. Rauch
Sherman's Missing "Supplement": Prosecutorial Capacity, Agency Incentives, And The False Dawn Of Antitrust Federalism, Daniel E. Rauch
Cleveland State Law Review
When the Sherman Act passed in 1890, it was widely expected that it would operate primarily as a "supplement" to vigorous state-level antitrust enforcement of state antitrust statutes. This did not happen. Instead, confounding the predictions of Congress, the academy, and the trusts themselves, state antitrust enforcement overwhelmingly failed to take root in the years between 1890 and the First World War. To date, many scholars have noted this legal-historical anomaly. None, however, have rigorously or correctly explained what caused it. This Article does.
Using historical and empirical research, this Article establishes that the best explanation for the early failure …
No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao
No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao
William & Mary Law Review
The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …
Do Founders Control Startup Firms That Go Public?, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Do Founders Control Startup Firms That Go Public?, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
American competition policy has four big problems: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. These companies each reign over a sector of the digital marketplace, controlling both the consumer experience and the possibility of competitive entry. This Essay argues that the conventional account of how antitrust law allowed this consolidation of market power - that it failed to evolve to address the market realities of the technology sector- is incomplete. Not only did courts fail to adapt antitrust law from its smoke-stack roots, but they gave big tech special dispensation under traditional antitrust doctrine. Swayed by prevailing utopic views about digital markets …
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the
firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the
first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation
originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the
Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision.
Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman
Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired
a monopoly. …
Antitrust & Corruption: Overruling Noerr, Tim Wu
Antitrust & Corruption: Overruling Noerr, Tim Wu
Faculty Scholarship
We live in a time when concerns about influence over the American political process by powerful private interests have reached an apogee, both on the left and the right. Among the laws originally intended to fight excessive private influence over republican institutions were the antitrust laws, whose sponsors were concerned not just with monopoly, but also its influence over legislatures and politicians. While no one would claim that the antitrust laws were meant to be comprehensive anti-corruption laws, there can be little question that they were passed with concerns about the political influence of powerful firms and industry cartels.
Since …
Direct Evidence Of A Sherman Act Agreement, William H. Page
Direct Evidence Of A Sherman Act Agreement, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
In cases that allege price fixing or other per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts usually begin their opinions by saying there is no direct evidence of agreement—evidence like a “recorded phone call” that is “explicit and requires no inferences to establish” that the necessary direct communications occurred. Only at that point do the courts turn to the sufficiency of the inferences of agreement from circumstantial evidence. Courts highlight the absence of direct evidence of agreement in this way because of its special role on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, when courts do not …