Law Commons^™

A New Approach To Plaintiff Incentive Fees In Class Action Lawsuits, Jason Jarvis

Northwestern University Law Review

Because modern litigation is time-intensive and expensive, a consumer has no monetary incentive to sue over a low-value claim—even when the defendant has clearly violated that consumer’s legal rights. But the defendant may have harmed many consumers in the same way, causing significant cumulative damage. By permitting the aggregation of numerous small claims, class action lawsuits provide a monetary incentive for lawyers and plaintiffs to pursue otherwise low-value suits. Often, an important part of this incentive is the “incentive fee,” an additional payment awarded to the named plaintiffs as compensation for the time they spend and risks they assume in …

Politics, Identity, And Class Certification On The U.S. Courts Of Appeals, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang

Michigan Law Review

This Article draws on novel data and presents the results of the first empirical analysis of how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals judges influence class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We find that the ideological composition of the panel (measured by the party of the appointing president) has a very strong association with certification outcomes, with all-Democratic panels having dramatically higher rates of procertification outcomes than all-Republican panels—nearly triple in about the past twenty years. We also find that the presence of one African American on a panel, and the presence of …

Working Hard Or Making Work? Plaintiffs' Attorneys Fees In Securities Fraud Class Actions, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, A. C. Pritchard

Articles

In this article, we study attorney fees awarded in the largest securities class actions: “mega- settlements.” Consistent with prior work, we find larger fee awards but lower percentages in these cases. We also find that courts are more likely to reject or modify fee requests made in connection with the largest settlements. We conjecture that this scrutiny provides an incentive for law firms to bill more hours, not to advance the case, but to help justify large fee awards—“make work.” The results of our empirical tests are consistent with plaintiffs’ attorneys investing more time in litigation against larger companies, with …

Addressing The Class Claim Conundrum With Online Dispute Resolution, Amy J. Schmitz

Faculty Publications

Consumers with similar claims in the United States (U.S.) often join forces to launch representative, or "class", actions. This allows them to obtain remedies with little cost and effort and serves a "private attorney general" function by bringing light to purchase problems that public enforcement offices may not have the resources to address. This is especially important for lower dollar claims that are too costly for each consumer to pursue individually.

Nonetheless, some have criticized class actions in the U.S. for forcing settlements and padding the pockets of lawyers, while leaving consumers with minimal pay outs. At the same time, …

The Story Of A Class: Uses Of Narrative In Public Interest Class Actions Before Certification, Anne E. Ralph

Washington Law Review

When litigants in public interest class actions tell their stories, the narratives can advance the law and influence public debate. But before class members’ stories can vindicate civil rights on the merits, plaintiffs must overcome the hurdle of class certification.

For decades, obtaining class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was not a significant challenge for plaintiffs seeking to litigate as a class. But recent restrictive procedural developments—including heightened standards for class certification—threaten the powerful stories that can be told through public interest class actions.

Missing in the critical analysis of class action jurisprudence is any discussion of …

Claim Preclusion And The Problem Of Fictional Consent, Lindsey Simon

Scholarly Works

The doctrine of claim preclusion promotes fairness and finality by preventing parties from raising claims that already were (or could have been) raised in a prior proceeding. This strict consequence can be imposed only when the litigant received minimal due process protections in the initial proceeding, including notice and direct or indirect participation.

Modern litigation has caused a new problem. In some cases, a party may be precluded from ever raising a claim on the grounds of “fictional consent” to a prior court’s decisionmaking authority. Litigation devices have expanded the potential reach of judgments through aggregation and broad jurisdictional grants, …

Civil Procedure And Economic Inequality, Maureen Carroll

Articles

How well do procedural doctrines attend to present-day economic inequality? This Essay examines that question through the lens of three doctrinal areas: the “irreparable harm” prong of the preliminary injunction standard, the requirement that discovery must be proportional to the needs of the case, and the due process rights of class members in actions for injunctive relief. It concludes that in each of those areas, courts and commentators could do more to take economic inequality into account.

Deregulation And Private Enforcement, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Many conservatives oppose much of the administrative state. But many also oppose much of our private enforcement regime. This raises the questions of whether conservatives believe the marketplace should be policed at all, and if so, who exactly should do that policing? In this Essay, based on my new book, The Conservative Case for Class Actions, I take a deep dive into conservative principles to try to answer these questions. I conclude that almost all conservatives believe the marketplace needs at least some legal constraints, and I argue that ex post, private enforcement is superior to the alternatives. Not only …

May Class Counsel Also Represent Lead Plaintiffs?, Bruce A. Green, Andrew Kent

Faculty Scholarship

For decades, courts and commentators have been aware that the potential for conflicting interests among the class representatives, class counsel, and absent class members is inherent in the class action device. Notwithstanding this realization and a substantial amount of scholarly and judicial commentary on class conflicts, one kind of conflict has not received due attention: the conflict that inevitably arises when class counsel also represents class members as individuals. We demonstrate that this conflict— so common to be almost invisible—arises from the very beginning of a putative class representation, and may create a fraught situation for a lawyer concurrently representing …

The Commonality Of Causation, Sergio J. Campos

Articles

This essay, a version of which was given as the inaugural Goldman Endowed Lecture at Ohio Northern University School ofLaw, discusses the treatment of causation in class actions, multidistrict litigation, and similar collective litigation. Causation is a ubiquitous element of civil claims, and typically it is treated as an individual element of a claim because it is dependent on the circumstances of each individual claimant. Even if the conduct at issue in litigation is "common, " or the same, for a group of claimants, whether that conduct caused harm to a specific claimant will depend on the unique circumstances of …

Politics, Identity, And Class Certification On The U.S. Courts Of Appeals, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article draws on novel data and presents the results of the first empirical analysis of how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals judges influence class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We find that the ideological composition of the panel (measured by the party of the appointing president) has a very strong association with certification outcomes, with all-Democratic panels having dramatically higher rates of procertification outcomes than all-Republican panels—nearly triple in about the past twenty years. We also find that the presence of one African American on a panel, and the presence of …

When Congress Requires Nationwide Injunctions, David Hausman

University of Colorado Law Review

A curious provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) precludes class actions challenging expedited removal, the system of fast-track deportations for individuals who have recently entered the country. The same provision authorizes nationwide relief in non-class actions, but it requires that plaintiffs in such non-class systemic challenges file their claims in the federal District Court for the District of Columbia and that they do so within sixty days of the challenged change to the system. This framework should matter to scholars of nationwide injunctions for two reasons. First, Congress took for granted in 1996 that federal district courts may …