Law Commons^™

The Kavanaugh Court And The Schechter-To-Chevron Spectrum: How The New Supreme Court Will Make The Administrative State More Democratically Accountable, Justin Walker

Indiana Law Journal

In a typical year, Congress passes roughly 800 pages of law—that’s about a seveninch

stack of paper. But in the same year, federal administrative agencies promulgate

80,000 pages of regulations—which makes an eleven-foot paper pillar. This move

toward electorally unaccountable administrators deciding federal policy began in

1935, accelerated in the 1940s, and has peaked in the recent decades. Rather than

elected representatives, unelected bureaucrats increasingly make the vast majority

of the nation’s laws—a trend facilitated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in three

areas: delegation, deference, and independence.

This trend is about to be reversed. In the coming years, Congress will …

The Life Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Imagine if Congress, the President, and the industries they hoped to regulate all decided that neither politically isolated bureaucrats nor a popularly sanctioned President should wield the power to administer Congress’ laws, to make legislative-type policy, to enforce that policy, and to adjudicate disputes under it. Imagine if there were another experiment, one that has persisted, but few have noticed.

Imagine no longer. Overlooked by most, there is a model for federal administration that does not rely on isolated administrators or Presidential control, but instead on elected bureaucrats. Today, the United States Department of Agriculture houses over 7,500 elected farmer-bureaucrats …

The Other Hobbs Act: An Old Leviathan In The Modern Administrative State, Jason N. Sigalos

Georgia Law Review

The Hobbs Administrative Orders Review Act is a
little-known statute, one that is often mistaken for a
federal criminal statute with a similar name.
The lesser-known Hobbs Act requires aggrieved parties
to challenge certain agency orders in a federal court of
appeals within sixty days of the order’s promulgation.
However, if no party does so, are later parties bound by
a potentially unlawful agency order in subsequent
enforcement actions? The U.S. Supreme Court recently
dodged this question in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton
& Harris Chiropractic, Inc. That case concerned a suit
between two private parties under the Telephone
Consumer …

Overlapping Legal Rules In Financial Regulation And The Administrative State, Matthew C. Turk

Georgia Law Review

Reforms which seek to overhaul the Dodd-Frank Act
have begun to gain support within the Trump
Administration and Congress. The leading proposals go
beyond technical matters and reflect a wholesale
critique: financial regulation has become too
burdensome, too complex, and grants too much
discretion to regulators. This Article argues that what is
really at stake in these debates is the distinct issue of
“regulatory overlap”—the joint use of multiple legal
rules to address a common market failure. It begins by
developing a general framework for analyzing
overlapping legal rules of all kinds. That framework is
then applied in case studies …

The Life Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Galperin

Articles

Imagine if Congress, the President, and the industries they hoped to regulate all decided that neither politically isolated bureaucrats nor a popularly sanctioned President should wield the power to administer Congress’ laws, to make legislative-type policy, to enforce that policy, and to adjudicate disputes under it. Imagine if there were another experiment, one that has persisted, but few have noticed.

Imagine no longer. Overlooked by most, there is a model for federal administration that does not rely on isolated administrators or Presidential control, but instead on elected bureaucrats. Today, the United States Department of Agriculture houses over 7,500 elected farmer-bureaucrats …