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Articles 1 - 30 of 32
Full-Text Articles in Law
'It Wasn't Supposed To Be Easy': What The Founders Originally Intended For The Senate's 'Advice And Consent' Role For Supreme Court Confirmation Processes, Michael W. Wilt
Channels: Where Disciplines Meet
The Founders exerted significant energy and passion in formulating the Appointments Clause, which greatly impacts the role of the Senate and the President in appointing Supreme Court Justices. The Founders, through their understanding of human nature, devised the power to be both a check by the U.S. Senate on the President's nomination, and a concurrent power through joint appointment authority. The Founders initially adopted the Senate election mode via state legislatures as a means of insulation from majoritarian passions of the people too. This paper seeks to understand the Founders envisioning for the Senate's 'Advice and Consent' role as it …
Symposium On Pofma: Parliamentary Debates About Pofma – Hansard Beyond Statutory Interpretation?, Benjamin Joshua Ong
Symposium On Pofma: Parliamentary Debates About Pofma – Hansard Beyond Statutory Interpretation?, Benjamin Joshua Ong
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The issue of a legislative response to falsehoods first drew public attention when the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods held its public hearings. This public attention was renewed when the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (“POFMA”), in Bill form, was unveiled. Questions arose among both the public and MPs about whether POFMA would grant the Government power to stifle academic research, journalism, or the expression of opinion, as well as whether it would be difficult for an individual to seek recourse against an allegedly wrongly made Direction.This post focuses not with the substance of these issues (important …
"When The President Does It": Why Congress Should Take The Lead In Investigations Of Executive Wrongdoing, Andrew B. Pardue
"When The President Does It": Why Congress Should Take The Lead In Investigations Of Executive Wrongdoing, Andrew B. Pardue
William & Mary Law Review
Asked by British journalist David Frost whether the President of the United States has the ability to authorize illegal acts when he believes such action is justified, Richard Nixon infamously replied: “Well, when the President does it, that means it is not illegal.” A majority of Americans disagreed with the former President’s assessment. But the question remains: If the President is theoretically capable of breaking the law while in office, what is the best way to determine whether a crime has actually been committed? This question has forced lawmakers to attempt to reconcile various investigatory mechanisms—all differing in their independence …
Dimensions Of Delegation, Cary Coglianese
Dimensions Of Delegation, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
How can the nondelegation doctrine still exist when the Supreme Court over decades has approved so many pieces of legislation that contain unintelligible principles? The answer to this puzzle emerges from recognition that the intelligibility of any principle dictating the basis for lawmaking is but one characteristic defining that authority. The Court has acknowledged five other characteristics that, taken together with the principle articulating the basis for executive decision-making, constitute the full dimensionality of any grant of lawmaking authority and hold the key to a more coherent rendering of the Court’s application of the nondelegation doctrine. When understood in dimensional …
League Of Conservation Voters V. Trump, Adam W. Johnson Mr.
League Of Conservation Voters V. Trump, Adam W. Johnson Mr.
Public Land & Resources Law Review
A consortium of environmental groups brought suit challenging an executive order opening millions of acres of continental shelf lands to oil and gas leasing. The Court held that the President’s actions exceeded his statutory authority and intruded on Congress’s power under the Property Clause, violating the separation of powers doctrine.
Trade And The Separation Of Powers, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman
Trade And The Separation Of Powers, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman
Ganesh Sitaraman
There are two paradigms through which to view trade law and policy within the American constitutional system. One paradigm sees trade law and policy as quintessentially about domestic economic policy. Institutionally, under the domestic economics paradigm, trade law falls within the province of Congress, which has legion Article I authorities over commercial matters. The second paradigm sees trade law as fundamentally about America’s relationship with foreign countries. Institutionally, under the foreign affairs paradigm, trade law is the province of the President, who speaks for the United States in foreign affairs. While both paradigms have operated throughout American history, the domestic …
Pepperdine University School Of Law Legal Summaries, Analise Nuxoll
Pepperdine University School Of Law Legal Summaries, Analise Nuxoll
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
No abstract provided.
Chevron Deference In The States: Lessons From Three States, Carrie Townsend Ingram
Chevron Deference In The States: Lessons From Three States, Carrie Townsend Ingram
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
The appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court of the United States has left many wondering if a change to the Chevron doctrine is impending. Justice Gorsuch’s colleague on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, shares similar views on Chevron. This article will compare the federal rule to three different states: Indiana, Delaware, and Arizona. Each state has taken a different path in determining that the judiciary should not give deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes that it is charged with enforcing. Delaware has affirmatively declared that the Chevron doctrine is not applicable in its state. A …
Litigating War: The Justiciability Of Executive War Power, Chris Smith
Litigating War: The Justiciability Of Executive War Power, Chris Smith
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar
Courts frequently dismiss claims against the Executive’s use of the war power as being non-justiciable political questions. This lack of a judicial check has created a situation in which meaningful checks and balances on the war power are found only in the Executive Branch itself. But the Constitution places the bulk of war powers in the hands of Congress. Executive usurpation of Congress’s constitutional prerogative to initiate hostilities has significantly weakened the separation of powers. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress sought to reassert its constitutional authority over war-making decisions by passing the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution …
Executive Rulemaking And Democratic Legitimacy: "Reform" In The United States And The United Kingdom's Route To Brexit, Susan Rose-Ackerman
Executive Rulemaking And Democratic Legitimacy: "Reform" In The United States And The United Kingdom's Route To Brexit, Susan Rose-Ackerman
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Established public law principles are under strain from the prospect of Brexit in the United Kingdom and the Trump Administration in the United States. In the United Kingdom the Parliament is playing an increasingly important role in overseeing the Government, and the judiciary is beginning to support democratic accountability in executive policymaking. In the United States, possible statutory changes and the power of the president to reshape the public administration are of concern. Although in the United States the most draconian measures will likely die with the return of the House to Democratic Party control, they may remain on the …
Administrative Adjudication And Adjudicators, Jack M. Beermann
Administrative Adjudication And Adjudicators, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
The appointment, removal, supervision and allocation of cases to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) and other non-Article III adjudicators in the United States federal government continues to create vexing legal issues for courts and commentators. This article is an effort to address all of these issues together, to facilitate a holistic understanding of the place of non-Article III adjudicators in the federal government. The appointment question revolves around whether non-Article III adjudicators are Officers of the United States, which most are. There are two issues surrounding the removal of non-Article III adjudicators. First, for reasons sounding in due process concerns, adjudicators …
Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come To Generate Environmental Law Without Congress, Donald J. Kochan
Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come To Generate Environmental Law Without Congress, Donald J. Kochan
Texas A&M Law Review
The administrative state has emerged as a pervasive machine that has become the dominate generator of legal rules—despite the fact that the U.S. Constitution commits the legislative power to Congress alone. When examining legislation authorizing administrative agencies to promulgate rules, we are often left asking whether Congress “dele- gates” away its lawmaking authority by giving agencies too much power and discretion to decide what rules should be promulgated and to determine how rich to make their content. If the agencies get broad authority, it is not too hard to understand why they would fulsomely embrace the grant to its fullest. …
War Is More Than A Political Question: Reestablishing Original Constitutional Norms, John C. Dehn
War Is More Than A Political Question: Reestablishing Original Constitutional Norms, John C. Dehn
Faculty Publications & Other Works
Since World War II, it has become increasingly common practice for presidents to use non-defensive military force abroad without obtaining congressional pre-approval, thereby leaving Congress with no meaningful role in the decision. This modern practice is clearly at odds with the Constitution’s text and original meaning. A wealth of scholarly commentary concludes that the Constitution grants Congress alone the power to authorize non-defensive military force. Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, ample commentary also concludes that a president has inherent constitutional power only to defend the nation from an actual or impending attack.
This Essay rejects the notion that …
Democratic Conditions, Barry Sullivan
Democratic Conditions, Barry Sullivan
Faculty Publications & Other Works
According to many social scientists, democratic institutions are subject to much discontent and distrust today. Citizens sense the existence of a substantial disconnect between the rhetoric of representative democracy and its reality—what citizens believe their proper role to be and what the realities of our government and society allow them to be. More to the point, citizens of all stripes believe that those who “represent” them live lives quite different from their own, and that those representatives are not seriously interested in the perspectives, ideas, or well-being of most people. The nature and extent of this discontent raises serious questions …
Separation Of Powers In Comparative Perspective: How Much Protection For The Rule Of Law?, Peter L. Strauss
Separation Of Powers In Comparative Perspective: How Much Protection For The Rule Of Law?, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter discusses the separation of powers. The point about traditions, or shared social norms, is a central one for this chapter. At a time of growing pessimism about the fate of democracy worldwide, adherence to norms of political behaviour may have an importance transcending formal provisions for the allocation of governmental power. As such, this chapter first presents a brief account of ‘separation of powers’ under American presidentialism; then the contrasting system of Westminster parliamentarianism; third, the increasingly prevalent mixed regimes, often semi-presidential, that can be described as ‘constrained parliamentarism’; and, finally, international institutions. As the chapter shows, in …
Due Process For Article Iii—Rethinking Murray's Lessee, Kent H. Barnett
Due Process For Article Iii—Rethinking Murray's Lessee, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
The Founders sought to protect federal judges’ impartiality primarily because those judges would review the political branches’ actions. To that end, Article III judges retain their offices during “good behaviour,” and Congress cannot reduce their compensation while they are in office. But Article III has taken a curious turn. Article III generally does not prohibit Article I courts or agencies from deciding “public rights” cases, i.e., when the government is a party and seeking to vindicate its own actions and interpretations under federal law against a private party. In contrast, Article III courts generally must resolve cases that concern “private …
The Trump Administration And The Rule Of Law, Peter L. Strauss
The Trump Administration And The Rule Of Law, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
Written for a French audience in 2017, this article sought to frame the explosive issues about the Trump presidency in relation to the American trend to strong views of the unitary executive, that in the author's view ignore the striking contrast between to propositions in Article II Section 2 of the Constitution, its only words defining presidential power. Made "Commander in chief" of the military, he is next given the power only to require the opinion in writing from the heads of the executive bodies Congress was expected to create how they intended to carry out the duties Congress had …
Trade And The Separation Of Powers, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman
Trade And The Separation Of Powers, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman
Faculty Scholarship
There are two paradigms through which to view trade law and policy within the American constitutional system. One paradigm sees trade law and policy as quintessentially about domestic economic policy. Institutionally, under the domestic economics paradigm, trade law falls within the province of Congress, which has legion Article I powers over commercial matters. The second paradigm sees trade law as fundamentally about America’s relationship with foreign countries. Institutionally, under the foreign affairs paradigm, trade law is the province of the President, who speaks for the United States in foreign affairs. While both paradigms have operated throughout American history, the domestic …
Blank Checks: An Analysis Of Emergency Actions Warranting Unilateral Executive Action, Megan E. Ball
Blank Checks: An Analysis Of Emergency Actions Warranting Unilateral Executive Action, Megan E. Ball
Notre Dame Law Review
This Note discusses the separation of powers issues raised in the D.C. Circuit by then-Judge, now Justice Kavanaugh in Mexichem Fluor’s suit. Specifically, this Note analyzes the federal government’s approach to climate change, overreach of the EPA to act beyond its statutorily granted authority, and the EPA’s reliance upon President Obama’s executive directives as the justification for its overreach. Part I of this Note provides a broad introduction of the CAA and the importance of the policy motivations for the later addition of Title VI to the Act. Part II discusses in more depth the decision in Mexichem Fluor v. …
The Due Process And Other Constitutional Rights Of Foreign Nations, Ingrid Wuerth
The Due Process And Other Constitutional Rights Of Foreign Nations, Ingrid Wuerth
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The rights of foreign states under the U.S. Constitution are becoming more important as the actions of foreign states and foreign state-owned enterprises expand in scope and the legislative protections to which they are entitled contract. Conventional wisdom and lower court cases hold that foreign states are outside our constitutional order and that they are protected neither by separation of powers nor by due process. As a matter of policy, however, it makes little sense to afford litigation-related constitutional protections to foreign corporations and individuals but to deny categorically such protections to foreign states.
Careful analysis shows that the conventional …
The Statutory Separation Of Powers, Sharon B. Jacobs
The Statutory Separation Of Powers, Sharon B. Jacobs
Publications
Separation of powers forms the backbone of our constitutional democracy. But it also operates as an underappreciated structural principle in subconstitutional domains. This Article argues that Congress constructs statutory schemes of separation, checks, and balances through its delegations to administrative agencies. Like its constitutional counterpart, the “statutory separation of powers” seeks to prevent the dominance of factions and ensure policy stability. But separating and balancing statutory authority is a delicate business: the optimal balance is difficult to calibrate ex ante, the balance is unstable, and there are risks that executive agencies in particular might seek expansion of their authority vis-à-vis …
Mcculloch V. Marbury, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Heath Khan
Mcculloch V. Marbury, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Heath Khan
All Faculty Scholarship
This article builds on recent scholarship about the origins and creation of “our Marbury”—the contemporary understanding of the case and its significance—to argue that Marbury is in fact wholly unsuited for the role it plays in Supreme Court rhetoric and academic instruction. While Marbury is generally understood to support aggressive judicial review, or actual invalidation of a government act, it offers no guidance at all for how judicial review should be employed in particular cases—in particular, whether review should be aggressive or deferential. The actual opinion in Marbury makes no effort to justify its lack of deference to the …
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters
All Faculty Scholarship
Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agencies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-comment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doctrine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial deference—has helped …
James Wilson As The Architect Of The American Presidency, Christopher S. Yoo
James Wilson As The Architect Of The American Presidency, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
For decades, James Wilson has been something of a “forgotten founder.” The area where commentators generally recognize Wilson’s influence at the Convention is with respect to Article II, which establishes the executive and defines its powers. Most scholars characterize him as a resolute advocate of an independent, energetic, and unitary presidency, and a particularly successful one at that. In this regard, some scholars have generally characterized Wilson’s thinking as overly rigid. Yet a close examination of the Convention reveals Wilson to be more flexible than sometimes characterized. With respect to many aspects of the presidency, including the appointment power, the …
Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty-Five Years In The Trenches And In The Tower, Stephen B. Burbank
Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty-Five Years In The Trenches And In The Tower, Stephen B. Burbank
All Faculty Scholarship
Trusting in the integrity of our institutions when they are not under stress, we focus attention on them both when they are under stress or when we need them to protect us against other institutions. In the case of the federal judiciary, the two conditions often coincide. In this essay, I use personal experience to provide practical context for some of the important lessons about judicial independence to be learned from the periods of stress for the federal judiciary I have observed as a lawyer and concerned citizen, and to provide theoretical context for lessons I have deemed significant as …
Trade And The Separation Of Powers, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman
Trade And The Separation Of Powers, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
There are two paradigms through which to view trade law and policy within the American constitutional system. One paradigm sees trade law and policy as quintessentially about domestic economic policy. Institutionally, under the domestic economics paradigm, trade law falls within the province of Congress, which has legion Article I authorities over commercial matters. The second paradigm sees trade law as fundamentally about America’s relationship with foreign countries. Institutionally, under the foreign affairs paradigm, trade law is the province of the President, who speaks for the United States in foreign affairs. While both paradigms have operated throughout American history, the domestic …
Neither Fish Nor Fowl: The Separation Of Powers And The Office Of Administrative Hearings, Ann E. Cohen, Elise Larson
Neither Fish Nor Fowl: The Separation Of Powers And The Office Of Administrative Hearings, Ann E. Cohen, Elise Larson
Mitchell Hamline Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Semi-Autonomous Administrative State, Cary Coglianese
The Semi-Autonomous Administrative State, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
Conflicting views about presidential control of the administrative state have too long been characterized in terms of a debate over agency independence. But the term “independent” when used to describe administrative agencies carries with it the baggage of an unhelpful and unrealistic dichotomy: administrative agencies that are (or should be) subservient to presidential control versus those that are (or should be) entirely free from such influence. No agency fits into either category. This essay proposes reorienting the debate over presidential control around agency “autonomy,” which better conveys that the key issue is a matter of degree. Contrary to some proponents …
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters
Faculty Scholarship
Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agencies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-comment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doctrine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial deference—has helped …
Supreme Court As Superweapon: A Response To Epps & Sitaraman, Stephen E. Sachs
Supreme Court As Superweapon: A Response To Epps & Sitaraman, Stephen E. Sachs
Faculty Scholarship
Is the Supreme Court's legitimacy in crisis? Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman argue that it is. In their Feature, How to Save the Supreme Court, they suggest legally radical reforms to restore a politically moderate Court. Unfortunately, their proposals might destroy the Court's legitimacy in order to save it. And their case that there is any crisis may fail to persuade a reader with different legal or political priors. If the Supreme Court needs saving, it will be saving from itself, and from too broad a conception of its own legal omnipotence. A Court that seems unbound by legal principle …