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Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2014

Selected Works

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Antitrust

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Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Acpera And What Business Lawyers Need To Know Right Away In An Antitrust Investigation, Robert Sanger Nov 2014

Acpera And What Business Lawyers Need To Know Right Away In An Antitrust Investigation, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

Just about every practitioner advising businesses needs to be up-to-date on antitrust law. It is all too easy for a person involved in business to make casual comments or engage in what they think is legitimate activity only to find that they are the subject of a federal or state investigation for horizontal or vertical restraint of trade or price fixing, customer allocation, bid-rigging, or some other form of technically prohibited behavior. Blatant willful violations are, understandably, criminal but technical violations are a part of the trend of state and federal overcriminalization. Potential criminal prosecution for technical antitrust violations is …


Reexamining The Role Of Illinois Brick In Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, Jeffrey Harrison Nov 2014

Reexamining The Role Of Illinois Brick In Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, Jeffrey Harrison

Jeffrey L Harrison

This Article argues that it is time for either the Court or Congress to reexamine Illinois Brick for the purpose of reconciling it with more general principles of antitrust standing. The overall goals of such an endeavor would be to ensure consistent treatment of similarly situated potential plaintiffs and to rationalize private antitrust enforcement.


Monopolization, Innovation, And Consumer Welfare, John Lopatka, William Page Nov 2014

Monopolization, Innovation, And Consumer Welfare, John Lopatka, William Page

William H. Page

While most commentators and the enforcement agencies voice support for the consumer welfare standard, substantial disagreement exists over when economic theory justifies a presumption of consumer injury. Virtually all would subscribe to the theoretical prediction that an effective cartel will likely inflict consumer injury by reducing output and thus increasing prices. But the academic and judicial consensus disappears when the theory at issue predicts that a practice -- a merger or a predatory pricing campaign, for example -- will harm consumers in the future through some complex sequence of events.

In our view, the desire to protect innovation is legitimate, …