Law Commons^™

Antidumping Laws As Barriers To Trade--The United States And The International Antidumping Code, John Barceló Iii

John J. Barceló III

No abstract provided.

Acpera And What Business Lawyers Need To Know Right Away In An Antitrust Investigation, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

Just about every practitioner advising businesses needs to be up-to-date on antitrust law. It is all too easy for a person involved in business to make casual comments or engage in what they think is legitimate activity only to find that they are the subject of a federal or state investigation for horizontal or vertical restraint of trade or price fixing, customer allocation, bid-rigging, or some other form of technically prohibited behavior. Blatant willful violations are, understandably, criminal but technical violations are a part of the trend of state and federal overcriminalization. Potential criminal prosecution for technical antitrust violations is …

Reexamining The Role Of Illinois Brick In Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, Jeffrey Harrison

Jeffrey L Harrison

This Article argues that it is time for either the Court or Congress to reexamine Illinois Brick for the purpose of reconciling it with more general principles of antitrust standing. The overall goals of such an endeavor would be to ensure consistent treatment of similarly situated potential plaintiffs and to rationalize private antitrust enforcement.

Monopolization, Innovation, And Consumer Welfare, John Lopatka, William Page

William H. Page

While most commentators and the enforcement agencies voice support for the consumer welfare standard, substantial disagreement exists over when economic theory justifies a presumption of consumer injury. Virtually all would subscribe to the theoretical prediction that an effective cartel will likely inflict consumer injury by reducing output and thus increasing prices. But the academic and judicial consensus disappears when the theory at issue predicts that a practice -- a merger or a predatory pricing campaign, for example -- will harm consumers in the future through some complex sequence of events.

In our view, the desire to protect innovation is legitimate, …

Cartelization Through Buyer Groups, Chris Doyle, Martijn Han

Martijn A. Han

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to commit credibly to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an ‘implied cartel’ depends on the retailers’ incentives to source their inputs secretly from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase …