Law Commons^™

Regulation Of Speculation In The Financial Market: Focusing On Derivative Instruments, Christopher Chao-Hung Chen

Christopher Chao-hung Chen

This article argues that market speculation is a conduct to acquire benefits by undertaking risk. Derivative instruments are powerful tools for market participants to conduct market speculation, which may help hedging, market making and completing investment market. However, pure and excessive speculation might cause net loss of market efficiency and create external costs. Some speculative transactions may imply asymmetric information. Market speculation might also lead to market abuse and even systemic risk. These reasons provide the basis to regulate market speculation by derivatives trading. This paper argues that Taiwan law might build on current regulatory model centring on the type …

Iosco's Response To The Financial Crisis, Roberta S. Karmel

Roberta S. Karmel

ABSTRACT FOR IOSCO’S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS BY ROBERTA S. KARMEL, Centennial Professor, Brooklyn Law School Like other international financial bodies, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has responded to the financial crisis of 2008. IOSCO thus revised its Objectives and Principles and added eight new Principles, including two that specifically focused on systemic risk. IOSCO’s ongoing efforts to support these new Principles are parallel to efforts by other financial regulators to deal with systemic risk. Yet, IOSCO’s efforts focus on somewhat different issues in the capital markets than the issues of interest to bank regulators. This Article …

Beyond Macro-Prudential Regulation: Three Ways Of Thinking About Financial Crisis, Regulation And Reform, Tamara Lothian

Tamara Lothian

This paper considers the debate about the "macro-prudential regulation" of finance in the context of a broader view of the relation of finance to the real economy. Five ideas are central to the argument. The first idea is that the two dominant families of ideas about finance and its regulation share a failure of institutional imagination. Neoclassical economists blame localized market and regulatory failures for the troubles of finance. Keynesians invoke the way in which the money economy may amplify cycles of despondency and euphoria. Neither current of thought recognizes that the institutions of finance in particular, and of the …

Consumer Protection Out Of The Shadows Of Shadow Banking: The Role Of The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, David J. Reiss

David J Reiss

Consumer protection remains the stepchild of financial regulation. Notwithstanding the fact that the economic doldrums we find ourselves in originated in the under-regulated subprime mortgage sector, relatively few academic commentators focus on the role that consumer protection can play in reducing such risks as well as in restoring the balance between consumer and producer in the financial markets. This essay suggests that consumer protection regulation has an important role to play in the regulatory structure of the shadow banking sector.

This essay does four things. First, it describes the role of shadow banking in the residential mortgage market—the shadow mortgage …

Chuaigh Ár Lá – Debt Of A Gaelsman: Ireland’S Sovereign Debt Crisis, National And International Responses, James Croke

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

How did a small island nation on the periphery of Europe go from the pauper of the European Union, to a paragon of a market economy, and back to fiscal ruin within the space of twenty years? Ireland was the poorest nation in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1988. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s it undertook structural reforms to fundamentally reshape its economy, the result was a booming economy throughout the mid-to-late 1990’s and early 2000’s, primarily fueled by exports and foreign direct investment. Rather than continue on a sustained, but slower, growth path in the 2000’s, …

Fragmentation Nodes: A Study In Financial Innovation, Complexity, And Systemic Risk, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

This Article resents a case study in how complexity arising from the evolution and proliferation of a financial innovation can increase systemic risk. The subject of the case study is the securitization of home loans, an innovation which played a critical and still not fully understood role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The Article introduces the term "fragmentation node" for these transaction structures, and it shows how specific sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes limited transparency and flexibility in ways that undermined the stability of the financial system. In addition to shedding new light on the processes through which …

Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation In Financial Firms: The Case For Convertible Equity-Based Pay, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Unlike the failure of a nonfinancial firm, the failure of a systemically important financial firm will reduce the value of a diversified shareholder portfolio because of economy-wide reductions in expected returns and a consequent increase in systematic risk. Thus, diversified shareholders of a financial firm generally internalize systemic risk, whereas managerial shareholders and blockholders do not. This means that the governance model drawn from nonfinancial firms will not fit financial firms. Regulations that limit risk-taking by financial firms can thus provide a benefit, rather than necessarily impose a cost, for the typical diversified public shareholder. Managerial shareholding also gives rise …

Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers And The Case For A Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher Muller

Faculty Scholarship

Inherent tensions in the financial sector mean that episodes of extreme stress are inevitable, if unpredictable. This is true even when financial regulatory and supervisory regimes are effective in many respects. The government's capacity to intervene may determine whether distress is confined to the financial sector or breaks out into the real economy Although adequate resolution authority to address a failing financial firm is a necessary objective of the current regulatory reforms, a firm-by-firm approach cannot address a major systemic failure. Major blows to the financial system, such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009, may require capital support of the …