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Full-Text Articles in Law
Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan
Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In this Article, I study a fascinating problem - what are the legal, political and economic implications of regulating executive bonuses? While the Administration's recent consideration of proposals to tax bonuses of AIG executives has sparked a great deal of media speculation and attention, there has been little legal scholarship discussing the various possible consequences of this and other methods of regulating executive compensation. Especially given the growing interest in executive compensation and the possible benefits and costs of regulation in this arena, I believe this paper will make a significant scholarly contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance …
Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal
Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal
Washington and Lee Law Review
Contingent capital has great potential to improve corporate governance in Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in executive compensation. The proposal adds an important element to the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered approach to executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds with early triggers could be preferable to other debt instruments because, in addition to lowering income inequality and increasing sustainability, the early trigger design can improve incentives for executives …
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Golden Gate University Law Review
Employing a model of game theory, this Article shows how current judge-made law in areas of the duty of loyalty does not adequately prevent corporate managers from violating their fiduciary duty. This Article presents a solution, advising shareholders to reform corporate governance through executive compensation contracts that would properly incentivize corporate managers to comport with their duty of loyalty. Part I examines the rise of contractarianism, the prominent legal academic view of a corporation that helps to guide judicial interpretation of corporate law pertaining to managers’ fiduciary duties. Part II examines agency costs, a subset of transaction costs, and the …
Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford
Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
No abstract provided.