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Articles 1 - 30 of 47
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why Do Banks Fail Together? Evidence From Executive Compensation, Deniz Anginer, Jinjing Liu, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun
Why Do Banks Fail Together? Evidence From Executive Compensation, Deniz Anginer, Jinjing Liu, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Recent bank failures have elicited extensive interest about the causes, focusing on incompetence of bank executives, policymakers, bank regulators and supervisors and even uninsured depositors. Yet, before we can prescribe solutions to bank failures, we need to identify the correct causes of the underlying problems. We argue that the problem is not so much with incompetence of executives, depositors, or regulators per se, but rather with managerial incentives.
We provide both a conceptual basis as well as empirical evidence to show that bank executives have incentives to increase systemic risks in order to maximize the benefits of bank bailouts. Consequently, …
The Evolution Of Private Equity And The Change In General Partner Compensation Terms In The 1980s, Stephen Fraidin, Meredith Foster
The Evolution Of Private Equity And The Change In General Partner Compensation Terms In The 1980s, Stephen Fraidin, Meredith Foster
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
While the business model of private equity has remained largely unchanged since the 1980s, private equity as an industry has undergone a dramatic transformation. In the early 1980s, private equity was both highly profitable and highly controversial. Today, on the other hand, it is an important asset class and its returns are modest. This paper will document both of these changes and identify the several factors that contributed simultaneously to private equity’s declining profitability and to its increasing public acceptance. This paper will also identify another change that private equity underwent in the 1980s, which has been largely ignored: the …
Clarifying The Original Clawback: Interpreting Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304 Through The Lens Of Dodd-Frank Section 954, J. Royce Fichtner, Patrick Heaston, Lou Ann Simpson
Clarifying The Original Clawback: Interpreting Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304 Through The Lens Of Dodd-Frank Section 954, J. Royce Fichtner, Patrick Heaston, Lou Ann Simpson
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In the early 2000s, major accounting scandals involving reporting violations and audit failures sent the United States financial markets into turmoil. Congress and President George W. Bush reacted to the controversy by passing the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, better known as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), in July of 2002. Section 304 created an explicit procedure, whereby the SEC could disgorge or clawback a CEO or CFO’s incentive-based compensation or stock gains when such profits were based on inflated financial statements later required to be restated to reflect the company’s true financial position. When the stock market …
Taxing Greed, Genevieve Tokić
Taxing Greed, Genevieve Tokić
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Appeals to greed in support of various tax proposals are often seen in response to populist moods in politics. Such appeals may be used to garner political support for a policy or proposal. However, there has been little academic consideration of the role of greed (or attitudes towards greed) in the law, and in tax law in particular. This Article seeks to fill that gap by taking a close look at the concept of greed. In doing so, the Article first surveys the history of greed and its meaning, and draws on political philosophy and economic literature to provide a …
Intrafirm Monitoring Of Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Intrafirm Monitoring Of Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article argues that employees should serve as intrafirm monitors of executive performance and pay. Employees and shareholders, labor and capital, can monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Diffuse, diversified, and short durational shareholders currently monitor performance and pay through the market mechanism of public disclosures and share price. Employees can add an effective layer of monitoring by leveraging private information. Employees possess the corporation's entire information content; the assessment derived from this content would be relevant to the board's assessment of executive performance and pay. Corporate employees are also a major constituent of the corporate system and …
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Indiana Law Journal
Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common understanding by proposing a different view based on an agency problem paradigm. Controlling shareholders, this Article suggests, may in fact overpay managers in order to maximize controllers’ consumption of private benefits, due to their close social and business ties with professional managers or for other reasons, such as being captured by professional managers. This tendency to overpay managers is …
"Green" Performance: The Future Of Performance-Based Executive Compensation?, Ben Schwefel
"Green" Performance: The Future Of Performance-Based Executive Compensation?, Ben Schwefel
San Diego Journal of Climate & Energy Law
Although sustainability performance appears to be a logical extension of the traditional performance-based compensation model, the effect and result of such performance remains unclear and untested across the market. The adoption of broad-based sustainability performance measures may be dangerous because, often times, these measures are tailored to the corporation and may decrease total shareholder return in the short run. Regardless of whether or not the corporation decides to introduce these measures, their effect on total shareholder return and other corporate interests requires an individualized analysis.
Part II of this Comment discusses the current state of executive compensation, including the use …
Ceo & Employee Pay Discrepancy: How The Government's Policies Have Encouraged The Gap, David R. Meals
Ceo & Employee Pay Discrepancy: How The Government's Policies Have Encouraged The Gap, David R. Meals
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
This paper examines the role of the U.S. Government in the CEO versus worker pay gap, both in contributing to its creation and the ability to reverse it. To better understand this issue, this paper includes a survey of current U.S. and foreign CEO compensation practices, a survey of theories proposed to explain the divergence between U.S. and foreign CEO compensation, a review of the social and business impact of excessive CEO compensation, and identifies socioeconomic theories regarding the excessive CEO pay trend. This is followed by a review of the history of attempted solutions along with newly enacted and …
Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan
Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In this Article, I study a fascinating problem - what are the legal, political and economic implications of regulating executive bonuses? While the Administration's recent consideration of proposals to tax bonuses of AIG executives has sparked a great deal of media speculation and attention, there has been little legal scholarship discussing the various possible consequences of this and other methods of regulating executive compensation. Especially given the growing interest in executive compensation and the possible benefits and costs of regulation in this arena, I believe this paper will make a significant scholarly contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance …
Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal
Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal
Washington and Lee Law Review
Contingent capital has great potential to improve corporate governance in Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in executive compensation. The proposal adds an important element to the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered approach to executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds with early triggers could be preferable to other debt instruments because, in addition to lowering income inequality and increasing sustainability, the early trigger design can improve incentives for executives …
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Golden Gate University Law Review
Employing a model of game theory, this Article shows how current judge-made law in areas of the duty of loyalty does not adequately prevent corporate managers from violating their fiduciary duty. This Article presents a solution, advising shareholders to reform corporate governance through executive compensation contracts that would properly incentivize corporate managers to comport with their duty of loyalty. Part I examines the rise of contractarianism, the prominent legal academic view of a corporation that helps to guide judicial interpretation of corporate law pertaining to managers’ fiduciary duties. Part II examines agency costs, a subset of transaction costs, and the …
Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford
Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
No abstract provided.
Symposium On Executive Compensation Keynote Address, Kenneth R. Feinberg
Symposium On Executive Compensation Keynote Address, Kenneth R. Feinberg
Vanderbilt Law Review
I want to thank Richard Nagareda for inviting me to Vanderbilt; he's an old friend. I am very honored to return to Vanderbilt. I taught a course at Vanderbilt, and I loved teaching here. I loved going to the Country Music Hall of Fame and learning more about Patsy Cline and Johnny Cash. Really, it was great. I've already received an invitation from Dean Jim Bradford to come back to the business school and the law school and to participate in an interdisciplinary look at executive compensation. I hope to return. But when I saw that the Vanderbilt Law Review …
Executive Compensation Consultants And Ceo Pay, Martin J. Conyon
Executive Compensation Consultants And Ceo Pay, Martin J. Conyon
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article surveys recent empirical studies on the relation between compensation consultants and CEO pay. The economic rationale for using executive compensation consultants is that they supply valuable data, information, and professional expertise to client firms. However, critics argue that the consultant's independence might be compromised because of conflicts of interest arising from the cross selling of business services or because of the consultant's desire to obtain repeat business. The emergent empirical evidence suggests that pay consultants are important in explaining executive compensation, although the findings are sometimes mixed and the precise effects of consultants on pay are yet to …
Economics, Politics, And The International Principles For Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis Of Executive Pay At European Banks, Guido Ferrarini, Maria C. Ungureanu
Economics, Politics, And The International Principles For Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis Of Executive Pay At European Banks, Guido Ferrarini, Maria C. Ungureanu
Vanderbilt Law Review
In this Article, we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay at banks and suggest that there is no strong support for regulating bankers' compensation structures. We also argue that detailed regulation of incentives would subtract essential decisionmaking powers from boards of directors and make compensation structures too rigid.
In Part II we note that political support for regulating bankers' pay has been strong and …
Evolving Executive Equity Compensation And The Limits Of Optimal Contracting, David I. Walker
Evolving Executive Equity Compensation And The Limits Of Optimal Contracting, David I. Walker
Vanderbilt Law Review
Executive equity compensation in the United States is evolving. At the turn of the millennium, stock options dominated the equity pay landscape, accounting for over half of the aggregate ex ante value of senior executive pay at large public companies, while restricted stock and similar compensation accounted for only about ten percent. Beginning in 2006, stock grants have displaced options as the single largest component of senior executive compensation at these firms. Accompanying this shift has been increased variation among companies in their relative emphasis on stock and options in equity pay packages. Both phenomena provide an opportunity for a …
Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation & The Obama Plan, Michael B. Dorff
Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation & The Obama Plan, Michael B. Dorff
Indiana Law Journal
Public outrage at the enormous bonuses TARP recipients paid to senior executives recently prompted the Obama administration to impose sweeping new curbs on executive compensation. Shortly thereafter, Senator Dodd added restrictions on executive bonuses to the stimulus bill President Obama subsequently signed. These are understandable political reactions, but will they achieve the twin goals of reducing executive compensation in recipients of federal assistance while spurring better corporate performance? To examine this question, I analyze excessive compensation as the product of "confident uncertainty, "the tendency of even the most sophisticated actors to place unwarranted confidence in their ability to predict the …
Taking Stock—Salary And Options Too: The Looting Of Corporate America, Kenneth R. Davis
Taking Stock—Salary And Options Too: The Looting Of Corporate America, Kenneth R. Davis
Maryland Law Review
No abstract provided.
Say On Pay's Bundling Problems, Andrew C. W. Lund
Say On Pay's Bundling Problems, Andrew C. W. Lund
Kentucky Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: How The Doctrine Can Provide A Viable Solution In Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, Steven Clayton Caywood
Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: How The Doctrine Can Provide A Viable Solution In Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, Steven Clayton Caywood
Michigan Law Review
In the midst of the global recession of the late 2000s, there was an outcry against corporate executives and what the public deemed to be their excessive compensation. Although this anger is still featured in today's headlines, it is nothing new. In fact, excessive executive compensation complaints arose when the very concept of a corporation was still new. Most of the complaints that the public has leveled have had little effect on boards of directors' decisions. Occasionally, however the outcry is so great that the public compels a company's leadership to take action. This happened early in 2009 when American …
"Who Killed Katie Couric?" And Other Tales From The World Of Executive Compensation Reform, Kenneth M. Rosen
"Who Killed Katie Couric?" And Other Tales From The World Of Executive Compensation Reform, Kenneth M. Rosen
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
Executive Compensation: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules Do Not Result In Complete Disclosure, Sean M. Donahue
Executive Compensation: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules Do Not Result In Complete Disclosure, Sean M. Donahue
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Executive Fraud And Canada's Regulation Of Executive Compensation, Bo James Howell
Executive Fraud And Canada's Regulation Of Executive Compensation, Bo James Howell
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Economic Impact Of Backdating Of Executive Stock Options, M. P. Narayanan, Cindi A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun
The Economic Impact Of Backdating Of Executive Stock Options, M. P. Narayanan, Cindi A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun
Michigan Law Review
This Article discusses the economic impact of legal, tax, disclosure, and incentive issues arising from the revelation of dating games with regard to executive option grant dates. It provides an estimate of the value loss incurred by shareholders of firms implicated in backdating and compares it to the potential gain that executives might have obtained through backdating. Using a sample of firms that have already been implicated in backdating, we find that the revelation of backdating results in an average loss to shareholders of about 7%. This translates to about $400 million per firm. By contrast, we estimate that the …
Mickey, Can You Spare A Dime? Disneywar, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, And Business Law Pedagogy, Kenneth M. Rosen
Mickey, Can You Spare A Dime? Disneywar, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, And Business Law Pedagogy, Kenneth M. Rosen
Michigan Law Review
American business executives are under fire. Recent, notorious difficulties at companies such as the Enron Corporation brought attention to these individuals. Notwithstanding the conclusion of the trials of some of those top executives, skepticism remains about the inner workings of U.S. corporations and the quality of corporate governance. Drawing special scrutiny from some quarters is the compensation granted to corporate officers and directors. For instance, the timing of certain stock option grants, a key component of some compensation packages, raised ire because of those options' supposed backdating and fortuitous proximity to increases in share prices. Further, some questioned more generally …
The Incoherence Of American Corporate Governance And The Need For Federal Standards, Timothy De Lizza
The Incoherence Of American Corporate Governance And The Need For Federal Standards, Timothy De Lizza
Fordham Urban Law Journal
This Comment suggests that the U.S. Congress should expand the SEC’s mandate so that it has clear authority to implement corporate governance standards. Part I provides an overview of problems regarding how much executive pay is given, how pay is set, and how it is disclosed. It then highlights regulatory responses to those problems, including how they provide contradictory incentives and result in unpredictability and over-regulation. Part II considers the current scope of the SEC’s mandate, including courts’ and commentators’ difficulty in defining its boundaries. Part II concludes that this difficulty sometimes makes the SEC’s regulatory actions either ineffective or …
Disney Examined: A Case Study In Corporate Governance And Ceo Succession, Lawrence Lederman
Disney Examined: A Case Study In Corporate Governance And Ceo Succession, Lawrence Lederman
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer
Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer
Michigan Law Review
Consider the unusual legal structures of the following four deals: When Google went public in 2004, it used an Internet auction to sell its stock to shareholders. When Ben & Jerry's went public in 1984, it sold its stock only to Vermont residents. Steve Jobs's contract with Apple entitles him to an annual cash salary of exactly one dollar. Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker, considered reincorporating in Bermuda to reduce its tax liability. Under public pressure, it changed its mind and remains legally incorporated in Connecticut. What do these deals have in common? In each case, the legal infrastructure of …
Conflicting Loyalties Facing In-House Counsel: Ethical Care And Feeding Of The Ravenous Multi-Headed Client The Fifth Annual Symposium On Legal Malpractice And Professional Responsibility., William E. Matthews, Robert M. Hoffman, Daniel C. Scott
Conflicting Loyalties Facing In-House Counsel: Ethical Care And Feeding Of The Ravenous Multi-Headed Client The Fifth Annual Symposium On Legal Malpractice And Professional Responsibility., William E. Matthews, Robert M. Hoffman, Daniel C. Scott
St. Mary's Law Journal
Because of corporate scandals that shook the business world, legislative, corporate, and public fingers immediately pointed at corporate attorneys for allowing such egregious conduct to occur. In 1983, the American Bar Association (ABA) passed Model Rule 1.13, which promoted the entity theory. Under the entity theory, the organization is the in-house counsel’s only client; and the in-house counsel’s primary duty is to act in the best interest of the organization. Whether the issue is deciding to make an executive compensation disclosure in a proxy statement, taking on a dual role within the organization, acting in compliance with heightened professional responsibility …
Excessive Compensation In Publicly Held Corporations: Is The Doctrine Of Waste Still Applicable, John W. Murrey Iii
Excessive Compensation In Publicly Held Corporations: Is The Doctrine Of Waste Still Applicable, John W. Murrey Iii
West Virginia Law Review
No abstract provided.