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Articles 31 - 43 of 43
Full-Text Articles in Law
Dagher, American Needle, And The Evolving Antitrust Theory Of The Firm: What Will Become Of Section 1?, Christopher L. Sagers
Dagher, American Needle, And The Evolving Antitrust Theory Of The Firm: What Will Become Of Section 1?, Christopher L. Sagers
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
This summer, on the last regularly scheduled sitting of its October 2008 Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case that could have far-reaching consequences throughout the law of Sherman Act Section 1. In the case under review, American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, the Seventh Circuit, by unanimous panel decision, entered a striking ruling in the long-running debate over whether professional sports leagues can be “single entities” under Copperweld. The court not only said yes, but did so in what is possibly the most likely context in which the member teams could have competed with one another - the …
Competition Come Full Circle? Pending Legislation To Repeal The U.S. Railroad Exemption, Christopher L. Sagers
Competition Come Full Circle? Pending Legislation To Repeal The U.S. Railroad Exemption, Christopher L. Sagers
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
Repeal of the railroad antitrust exemptions has been advocated ever since deregulation of that industry, and bills have been introduced twice to do it. However, there is no particular reason yet to believe railroad exemption repeal will occur in this Congress. The pending bills have not progressed far and have failed before, and they are opposed by the industry. But even if they progress, and assuming there is not also some significant change to the overall railroad regulatory framework, it seems unlikely that antitrust litigation will be very successful or that it will much change the status quo in rail …
Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: Alchemy In The Age Of Empiricism?, Thomas L. Greaney
Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: Alchemy In The Age Of Empiricism?, Thomas L. Greaney
All Faculty Scholarship
One is hard-pressed to find in law an undertaking more fraught with uncertainty than the application of the efficiencies defense in merger analysis. Generalist fact finders (judges) and politically-attuned government officials (prosecutors and regulators) are charged with two Herculean tasks: (1) predicting the outcome of organic changes in business enterprises and (2) comparing the magnitude of those changes to the equally uncertain amount of harm to future competition that the transaction will cause. Given the enormous, perhaps intractable, uncertainty of this inquiry, it is therefore paradoxical that many of the strongest advocates for strengthening the role of efficiencies analysis in …
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
UF Law Faculty Publications
Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft's server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft's documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs' technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for up to five more …
New Antitrust Realism, Maurice Stucke
New Antitrust Realism, Maurice Stucke
Scholarly Works
In the midst of a failing economy, the incoming Obama administration will not likely adopt its predecessor's antitrust policies. So if change is afoot, what form should change take? This essay outlines the needed transformative change in today's competition policy. The essay proposes more empirical analysis by the U.S. competition authorities, outlines how behavioral economics can assist in this new antitrust realism, and concludes in explaining why such antitrust realism is needed.
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators. The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial chambers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly remedies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defendant's assets. At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity) grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final judgment or an order. The …
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Articles
Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …
Pangloss Responds, Daniel A. Crane
Pangloss Responds, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
I am afraid that William Shieber and I are speaking past each other. I agree wholeheartedly with his assertion that anyone who believes that political appointees do not exert a considerable influence over the antitrust agencies is naïve. However, Technocracy and Antitrust does not advance the Panglossian view that the antitrust agencies are apolitical, if by that we mean that robotic machines devoid of human perspective or ideological commitment churn out scientifically predetermined antitrust results.
Intellectual Liability, Daniel A. Crane
Intellectual Liability, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Intellectual property is increasingly a misnomer since the right to exclude is the defining characteristic of property and incentives to engage in inventive and creative activity are increasingly being granted in the form of liability rights (which allow the holder of the right to collect a royalty from users) rather than property rights (which allow the holder of the right to exclude others from using the invention or creation). Much of this recent reorientation in the direction of liability rules arises from a concern over holdout or monopoly power in intellectual property. The debate over whether liability rules or property …
Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane
Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Antitrust scholars are having fun again. Not so long ago, they were the poor, redheaded stepchildren of the legal academy, either pining for the older days of rigorous antitrust enforcement or trying to kill off what was left of the enterprise. Other law professors felt sorry for them, ignored them, or both. But now antitrust is making a comeback of sorts. In one heady week in May of 2009, a front-page story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney-the Obama Administration's new Antitrust Division head at the Department of Justice-to jettison the entire report on …
Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane
Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Antitrust law is back in vogue. After years in the wilderness, antitrust enforcement has reemerged as a hot topic in Washington and in the legal academy. In one heady week inMay of 2009, a frontpage story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney —theObama administration’s new AntitrustDivision head—to jettison the entire report onmonopolization offenses released by the Bush JusticeDepartment just eightmonths earlier. In a speech before the Center for American Progress, Varney announced that the Justice Department is “committed to aggressively pursuing enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” As if to prove that …
Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, D. Daniel Sokol
Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
When government regulates, it may either intentionally or unintentionally generate restraints that reduce competition ("public restraints"). Public restraints allow a business to cloak its action in government authority and to immunize it from antitrust regulation. Private businesses may misuse the government's grant of antitrust immunity to facilitate behavior that benefits businesses at consumers' expense. One way is by obtaining government grants of immunity from antitrust scrutiny. A recent series of Supreme Court decisions has made this situation worse by limiting the reach of antitrust law in favor of sector regulation. This is true even though the Supreme Court refers to …
Remedies, Antitrust Law, And Microsoft: Comment On Shapiro, Keith N. Hylton
Remedies, Antitrust Law, And Microsoft: Comment On Shapiro, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
The subject of remedies is a relatively under-theorized area of antitrust law, and Professor Shapiro has done the antitrust community a great favor by offering some innovative and useful theoretical insights on the design of antitrust remedies. He applies his theoretical insights to the Microsoft III case to reach the conclusion that the remedies adopted were inadequate to restore competition in the market for software platforms. In this review, I will offer additional theoretical insights on remedies and explain my reasons for rejecting his conclusions on Microsoft III.