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Full-Text Articles in Law
Racing Towards The Top?: The Impact Of Cross-Listing And Stock Market Competition On International Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.
Racing Towards The Top?: The Impact Of Cross-Listing And Stock Market Competition On International Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Cross-listing by foreign issuers onto U.S. exchanges accelerated during the 1990s, bringing international market centers into competition for listings and draining liquidity from some regional markets. Although cross-listing has traditionally been explained as an attempt to break down market segmentation and to increase investor recognition of the cross-listing firm, the globalization of financial markets and instantaneous electronic communications render these explanations increasingly dated. A superior explanation is "bonding": Issuers migrate to U.S. exchanges because by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the United States's higher disclosure standards and greater threat of enforcement (both by public and private enforcers), they partially compensate for …
Law And Regulatory Competition: Can They Co-Exist?, John C. Coffee Jr.
Law And Regulatory Competition: Can They Co-Exist?, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
It is possible to read Stephen Choi's article with admiration and enjoyment – until a critical point is reached at its very end. In an analysis that is balanced, nuanced, and thorough, Professor Choi initially reviews the recent debate over the role of law in fostering the development of financial markets. As others have also concluded, he finds a correlation between quality of law and financial development. At a few points, he may accept too easily the claim that the common law is superior to the civil law in fostering economic growth, without adequately considering the problem of multicollinearity that …
From Monopolists To Markets?: A Political Economy Of Issuer Choice In International Securities Regulation, Frederick Tung
From Monopolists To Markets?: A Political Economy Of Issuer Choice In International Securities Regulation, Frederick Tung
Faculty Scholarship
It is ironic that during a time of corporate scandal and regulatory soul searching, one of the most spirited debates among corporate and securities law scholars has focused on reform proposals for international securities regulation that essentially call for corporate self-regulation. Scholars have called for international regulatory competition in securities law, arguing that each issuer of securities should be able to pick its own securities regulatory regime. While these "issuer choice" proponents argue for a diversity of and competition among securities laws of the various nations, their proposals also ironically depend on uniformity - or at least international consensus - …