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Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande Oct 1999

The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

As the world’s nations rapidly move from systems in which central planning and monopoly are replaced by free markets,2 it becomes increasingly valuable to consider the histories of competition policy experienced in different nations, on a comparative basis.3 In this article, we focus on the history of antitrust in the United States, the first nation to develop and fully-articulate a competition policy, drawing out themes that may be useful to other countries as they contemplate the shape and direction of their own competition regimes. We show that the American competition policy has reflected an underlying stability and bi-partisanship, but that …


Cap-Sized: How The Promise Of The Price Cap Voyage To Competition Was Lost In A Sea Of Good Intentions, Gregory J. Vogt Mar 1999

Cap-Sized: How The Promise Of The Price Cap Voyage To Competition Was Lost In A Sea Of Good Intentions, Gregory J. Vogt

Federal Communications Law Journal

This Article explores the Federal Communication Commission’s efforts to regulate into being marketplace economic forces through price cap regulation. A comprehensive analysis of the history and policies behind price cap regulation of LECs offers guidance for the future. Ultimately, while progress towards local exchange competition has been made, certain important adjustments should be implemented to allow price caps to achieve their full potential. These changes, consistent with the original theory of price caps, will in turn help speed the transition to competition.


Notes On Trademark Monopolies, Wendy J. Gordon, Glynn S. Lunney Jr. Jan 1999

Notes On Trademark Monopolies, Wendy J. Gordon, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.

Scholarship Chronologically

Since 1742, when Lord Hardwicke seemingly equated trademark protection with monopoly in one of the first trademark cases, until the mid- 1950s, concerns that trademarks represented a form of illegitimate monopoly effectively constrained the growth of trademark protection. In the twentieth century, Edward Chamberlain became the leading proponent of the trademark as monopoly view with the publication of his work, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, in 1933. In his work, Chamberlain argued that a trademark enabled its owner to differentiate her products and then to exclude others from using the differentiating feature. By doing so, trademark protection can effectively …


Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards And Microsoft, Keith N. Hylton, Ronald A. Cass Jan 1999

Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards And Microsoft, Keith N. Hylton, Ronald A. Cass

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent symposium issue of the George Mason Law Review, Steven Salop and R. Craig Romaine use the Microsoft litigation as a focus for discussion of antitrust law. Salop and Romaine argue that each of the allegations against Microsoft could constitute evidence of a design by Microsoft to reduce competition and to preserve or extend monopoly power. They argue as well that the right legal standard to apply in monopolization cases is a "competitive effects" test that balances the benefits and harms of the monopolist's conduct. This article exposes problems with their approach, explains why it departs from current …


Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer Jan 1999

Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer

Michigan Law Review

Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may have unforeseen virtues. The combination of these oft-criticized characteristics might induce a limited amount of infringement that enhances social welfare without reducing (or without substantially reducing) the profitability of the patentee. Patent infringement is generally viewed as socially inefficient because infringement reduces the patentee's ex ante incentive to innovate. Limited amounts of infringement combined with increased patent duration, however, can substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supracompetitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incentives to innovate. Indeed, this Article derives a legal regime that preserves the incentive to innovate by …


Thoughts On The Sprint Acquisition., Michael Botein Jan 1999

Thoughts On The Sprint Acquisition., Michael Botein

Articles & Chapters

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