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Full-Text Articles in Law

Who Cares Whether A Monopoly Is Efficient? The Sherman Act Is Supposed To Ban Them All, Robert H. Lande Nov 2023

Who Cares Whether A Monopoly Is Efficient? The Sherman Act Is Supposed To Ban Them All, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Section 2 of the Sherman Act was designed to impose sanctions on all firms that monopolize or attempt to monopolize regardless whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conductor, and regardless whether the firm is efficient. This conclusion emerges from a textualist analysis of the language of Section 2. This article briefly analyzes contemporaneous dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases, and demonstrates that when the Sherman Act was passed the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term was not limited to monopolies acquired through anticompetitive conduct or monopolies that were inefficient. An attempt to monopolize also had …


Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey May 2023

Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey

Senior Honors Theses

Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …


Ballad Health: Understanding Appalachia’S Regional Healthcare Monopoly, Meredith A. Bailey May 2023

Ballad Health: Understanding Appalachia’S Regional Healthcare Monopoly, Meredith A. Bailey

Baker Scholar Projects

The Ballad Health merger of 2018, which combined the now 21 hospitals in the region under one organization, has impacted the healthcare landscape in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. Historically, Appalachia has had to persevere through primary physician shortages, a lack of specialty care, geographic obstacles to accessing healthcare, challenges related to substance abuse, and much more. Since the merger of Mountain States Health Alliance and Wellmont Health System, little research has been done to assess the perceived impact the aggregation of providers has had on the population it serves. This study utilizes an online survey to better understand the …


The Microsoft Litigation’S Lessons For United States V. Google, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page Feb 2023

The Microsoft Litigation’S Lessons For United States V. Google, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page

University of Miami Law Review

The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and three overlapping groups of states have filed federal antitrust cases alleging Google has monopolized internet search, search advertising, internet advertising technologies, and app distribution on Android phones. In this Article, we focus on the DOJ’s claims that Google has used contracts with tech firms that distribute Google’s search services in order to exclude rival search providers and thus to monopolize the markets for search and search advertising—the two sides of Google’s search platform. The primary mechanisms of exclusion, according to the DOJ, are the many contracts Google has used to secure its …


A Patent And A Prize, Keith N. Hylton Feb 2023

A Patent And A Prize, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines a simple and old question: should innovators receive a patent or a prize? The answer I provide is equally simple: they should receive both. The literature on patents versus prizes has proceeded mostly under the assumption that there should be a choice between a regime of patents and a regime of prizes in which patents fall into the public domain upon award of the prize. There are significant “public choice costs” under the prize plans. By this I mean there are risks of inappropriate transfers to patentees – that is, looting – and of confiscation of patentees, …


The Power Of Antitrust Personhood, Herbert Hovenkamp Jan 2023

The Power Of Antitrust Personhood, Herbert Hovenkamp

University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law

Antitrust law addresses conspiracy, or collaborative conduct, more harshly than it does unilateral conduct. One person acting alone can get away with far more than groups of firms acting by agreement. In most cases that distinction is justified. Creating substantial market power unilaterally is difficult and relatively uncommon, but it can be created in a moment’s time by an agreement among firms. But how do antitrust tribunals determine when conduct is unilateral rather than collaborative? Often the ansawer is obvious, but sometimes it is not. Two statutory provisions were intended to be the umpire of such decisions. A section of …


Kegiatan Monopoli Pada Bumn Kepelabuhanan: Studi Terhadap Pelaksanaan Perjanjian Tertutup (Tying Agreement) Oleh Pt Pelabuhan Indonesia Ii (Persero) Pada Area Konsesi Pelabuhan Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha, Kahfiarsyad Julyan Elevenday Dec 2022

Kegiatan Monopoli Pada Bumn Kepelabuhanan: Studi Terhadap Pelaksanaan Perjanjian Tertutup (Tying Agreement) Oleh Pt Pelabuhan Indonesia Ii (Persero) Pada Area Konsesi Pelabuhan Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha, Kahfiarsyad Julyan Elevenday

"Dharmasisya” Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI

This study aims to find out about how the monopoly activities including how the implementation of a tying agreement conducted by PT Pelabuhan Indonesia II (Persero) as a SOE in the perspective of Competition Law. This study is conducted by analyzing the consideration of judges as stated in the Supreme Court of Republic Indonesia Decision No. 302 K/Pdt. Sus-KPPU/2014 and North Jakarta District Court Decision No. 1/Pdt/KPPU/2015/PN Jkt.Utr. The results of this study indicate that the monopoly activities conducted by PT Pelabuhan Indonesia II (Persero) in its concession area are a monopoly by law as stated in Article 50 a …


On Monopolistic Practices In Bitcoin: A Coded Solution: A Coded Solution, Sanya Samtani, Varun Baliga Sep 2022

On Monopolistic Practices In Bitcoin: A Coded Solution: A Coded Solution, Sanya Samtani, Varun Baliga

Indian Journal of Law and Technology

The underlying values inherent in the creation of bitcoins are those of decentralization and accessibility. The horizontal power structure is an integral part of bitcoins’ architecture – this paper seeks to find a feasible alternative to status quo in order to preserve these characteristics. First, we look at the harms of monopolies and how the concentration of bitcoins is exceptionally harmful to its continued existence. Second, we expose the inadequacies of the existing regulatory frameworks, and discuss how status quo militates against the foundational ideology of bitcoin as a non-institutional cryptocurrency. Third, we undertake a comparative study of the existing …


The Melting Of Patent Law, Eben Moglen Sep 2022

The Melting Of Patent Law, Eben Moglen

Indian Journal of Law and Technology

In this special comment, the author posits that the patent system as it stands is archaic and oppressive, and has neither intellectual nor moral support. Having veered away from its original goals, by virtue of the change in the technological and functional basis of government, it instead serves as a justification for inequalities of wealth distribution. The author argues that substantial reform is required that would shift the balance in patent law from monopolistic greed to public interest, paving the way for access to knowledge.


President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jul 2022

President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In July, 2021, President Biden signed a far ranging Executive Order directed to promoting competition in the American economy. This paper analyzes issues covered by the Order that are most likely to affect the scope and enforcement of antitrust law. The only passage that the Executive Order quoted from a Supreme Court antitrust decision captures its antitrust ideology well – that the Sherman Act:

rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time …


The Progressives' Antitrust Toolbox, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2022

The Progressives' Antitrust Toolbox, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The period 1900 to 1930 was the Golden Age of antitrust theory, if not of enforcement. During that period courts and scholars developed nearly all of the tools that we use to this day to assess anticompetitive practices under the federal antitrust laws. In subsequent years antitrust policy veered to both the left and the right, but today seems to be returning to a position quite similar to the one that these Progressive adopted. Their principal contributions were (1) partial equilibrium analysis, which became the basis for concerns about economic concentration, the distinction between short- and long-run analysis, and later …


The Invention Of Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2022

The Invention Of Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The long Progressive Era, from 1900 to 1930, was the Golden Age of antitrust theory, if not of enforcement. During that period courts and Progressive scholars developed nearly all of the tools that we use to this day to assess anticompetitive practices under the federal antitrust laws. In a very real sense we can say that this group of people invented antitrust law. The principal contributions the Progressives made to antitrust policy were (1) partial equilibrium analysis, which became the basis for concerns about economic concentration, the distinction between short- and long-run analysis, and later provided the foundation for the …


Antitrust Error Costs, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2022

Antitrust Error Costs, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The idea that consideration of error costs should inform judgments about actions with uncertain consequences is well established. When we act on imperfect information, we consider not only the probability of an event, but also the expected costs of making an error. In 1984 Frank Easterbrook used this idea to rationalize an anti-enforcement bias in antitrust, reasoning that markets are likely to correct monopoly in a relatively short time while judicial errors are likely to persist. As a result, false positives (recognizing a problem when there is none) are more costly than false negatives. While the problem of error cost …


Tech Giant Exclusion, John B. Kirkwood Jan 2022

Tech Giant Exclusion, John B. Kirkwood

Faculty Articles

There is no topic in regulatory policy that is more pressing and more controversial than what to do about the tech giants – Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Apple. Critics claim that that these powerful platforms crush competitors, distort the political process, and elude antitrust law because it cares only about consumer prices. The only solution, they argue, is to break them up.

This diagnosis is mistaken. The tech giants have indeed engaged in anticompetitive conduct. They have excluded rivals selling products on their platforms by demoting them in search results, copying their products, or refusing to deal with them. While …


Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Nov 2021

Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Are large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is surprisingly complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms the less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, competition can be made to work in most of them. Further, antitrust enforcement, with its accommodation of firm variety, is generally superior to any form of statutory regulation that generalizes over large numbers.

Assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive …


Addressing The Divisions In Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Nov 2021

Addressing The Divisions In Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This is the text of an interview conducted in writing by Professor A. Douglas Melamed, Stanford Law School.


The Necessity In Antitrust Law, Gregory Day Oct 2021

The Necessity In Antitrust Law, Gregory Day

Washington and Lee Law Review

Antitrust rarely, if ever, gives primacy to a dispute’s subject matter. For instance, exclusionary conduct that raises the price of a lifesaving drug receives the same analysis as a restraint of baseball cards. Since antitrust’s purpose is to promote consumer welfare, the equal treatment of important and mundane goods might appear perplexing. After all, competition to produce affordable foods, medicines, and other necessities would seem to foster consumer welfare more than inane products do.

In fact, defendants generally win antitrust lawsuits even when monopolizing necessities because the primary method of antitrust review is notably deferential to defendants. To explain this …


Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Sep 2021

Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust litigation often requires courts to consider challenges to vertical “control.” How does a firm injure competition by limiting the behavior of vertically related firms? Competitive injury includes harm to consumers, labor, or other suppliers from reduced output and higher margins.

Historically antitrust considers this issue by attempting to identify a market that is vertically related to the defendant, and then consider what portion of it is “foreclosed” by the vertical practice. There are better mechanisms for identifying competitive harm, including a more individualized look at how the practice injures the best placed firms or bears directly on a firm’s …


Antitrust Harm And Causation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jul 2021

Antitrust Harm And Causation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

How should plaintiffs show harm from antitrust violations? The inquiry naturally breaks into two issues: first, what is the nature of the harm? and second, what does proof of causation require? The best criterion for assessing harm is likely or reasonably anticipated output effects. Antitrust’s goal should be output as high as is consistent with sustainable competition.

The standard for proof of causation then depends on two things: the identity of the enforcer and the remedy that the plaintiff is seeking. It does not necessarily depend on which antitrust statute the plaintiff is seeking to enforce. For public agencies, enforcement …


The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns Apr 2021

The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns

Indiana Law Journal

One of the few things former President Donald Trump and leading Democrats appear to agree on is the need to subject Big Technology (“Big Tech”) firms to antitrust scrutiny. But unsurprisingly they disagree about how to address the problem. Senator Elizabeth Warren and many other leading Democrats have called for breaking up large technology firms, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, in a revival of the trust-busting progressive era of the early twentieth century. In contrast, the Trump administration triggered more traditional antitrust monopoly review of potential anticompetitive activities of a number of leading technology firms, which is more likely …


The New Era Of Nfl Antitrust Law, The Sunday Ticket Package: Was The Ninth Circuit Ruling A Touchdown Or A Penalty?, Maya Rustom Mar 2021

The New Era Of Nfl Antitrust Law, The Sunday Ticket Package: Was The Ninth Circuit Ruling A Touchdown Or A Penalty?, Maya Rustom

Pepperdine Law Review

Americans love football, but every year thousands of fans are forced to pay exorbitant annual fees if they chose to have access to out-of-market games. In other words, if fans don’t live in the territory of their favorite team, they can either pay an excessive annual fee to watch their team play or miss out on the majority of games every season. This arrangement is a result of DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket Package, which is an exclusive distributorship agreement with the NFL that prevents fans from watching live out-of-market games unless they pay the annual subscription fee. This Comment addresses and …


Dodge V. Ford: What Happened And Why?, Mark J. Roe Jan 2021

Dodge V. Ford: What Happened And Why?, Mark J. Roe

Vanderbilt Law Review

Behind Henry Ford’s business decisions that led to the widely taught, famous-in-law-school Dodge v. Ford shareholder primacy decision were three industrial organization structures that put Ford in a difficult business position. First, Ford Motor had a highly profitable monopoly and needed much cash for the just-begun construction of the River Rouge factory, which was said to be the world’s largest when completed. Second, to stymie union organizers and to motivate his new assembly-line workers, Henry Ford raised worker pay greatly; Ford could not maintain his monopoly without sufficient worker buy-in. And, third, if Ford explicitly justified his acts as in …


The Political Face Of Antitrust, Spencer Weber Waller Jan 2021

The Political Face Of Antitrust, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Publications & Other Works

The last twenty years have brought antitrust back to the fore as a political issue of greater salience. Several booms and busts in the economy have highlighted the issue of corporate power in the economy and the political system. The growing influence and aggressiveness of the European Union and other jurisdictions' competition laws have highlighted the relative retreat in the United States. Political movements in the United States have brought issues of corporate power and its abuse back into the public limelight and with them a greater political salience for antitrust in the election cycle of 2020.


Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis Jan 2021

Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …


Climbing To 1011: Globalization, Digitization, Shareholder Capitalism And The Summits Of Contemporary Wealth, David A. Westbrook Jun 2020

Climbing To 1011: Globalization, Digitization, Shareholder Capitalism And The Summits Of Contemporary Wealth, David A. Westbrook

Journal Articles

While we may find many sorts of inequality in the United States and elsewhere, this essay is about the specific form of inequality exemplified by Jeff Bezos or Bill Gates, that is, the Himalayan summits of contemporary wealth, mostly in the United States. Such wealth results from the confluence of three historical developments.

First, the social processes referred to under the rubric of “globalization” have created vast markets. A dominant position in such markets leads not only to great wealth, but the elimination of peers. Since there are few such markets, relatively significant wealth is possessed by very few people. …


House Judiciary Inquiry Into Competition In Digital Markets: Statement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Apr 2020

House Judiciary Inquiry Into Competition In Digital Markets: Statement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This is a response to a query from the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, requesting my views about the adequacy of existing antitrust policy in digital markets.

The statutory text of the United States antitrust laws is very broad, condemning all anticompetitive restraints on trade, monopolization, and mergers and interbrand contractual exclusion whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.” Federal judicial interpretation is much narrower, however, for several reasons. One is the residue of a reaction against excessive antitrust enforcement in the 1970s and earlier. However, since that time antitrust …


Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande Apr 2020

Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee asked me to submit suggestions concerning the adequacy of existing antitrust laws, enforcement policies, and enforcement levels insofar as they impact the state of competition in the digital marketplace. My submission recommends the following nine reforms:

1. A textualist analysis of the Sherman Act shows that Section 2 actually is a no-fault monopolization statute. At a minimum Congress should enact a strong presumption that every firm with a 67% market share has violated Section 2. This would move the Sherman Act an important step in the right direction, the direction Congress intended in 1890. My …


The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr. Jan 2020

The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose

sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the

firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the

first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation

originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the

Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision.

Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous

dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman

Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired

a monopoly. …


Antitrust And Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure Of American Express, John B. Kirkwood Jan 2020

Antitrust And Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure Of American Express, John B. Kirkwood

Faculty Articles

Two-sided platforms serve two sets of customers and enable them to interact with each other. The five most valuable corporations in America – Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft – all operate two-sided platforms. But despite their growing power, the Supreme Court's American Express decision has made it harder to stop them from stifling competition. This Article systematically exposes the flaws in the Court's reasoning and identifies the principles that should govern future cases. The Court’s most fundamental error was to require plaintiffs in rule of reason cases to make an initial showing of consumer harm that weighs the effects …


Rethinking Major League Baseball’S Antitrust Exemption, Roger D. Blair, Wenche Wang Jan 2020

Rethinking Major League Baseball’S Antitrust Exemption, Roger D. Blair, Wenche Wang

UF Law Faculty Publications

For nearly a century, Major League Baseball (MLB) has enjoyed antitrust immunity. No other sports league or organization is similarly exempt. Shielded by precedent from antitrust prosecution, MLB clubs are free to exploit both monopolistic and monopsonistic power. In this paper, we call for a repeal of MLB’s antitrust exemption. In doing so, we examine some recent antitrust challenges to MLB conduct, the current interest of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in labor market issues, the welfare consequences of the exemption, and a policy recommendation for legislative action.