Law Commons^™

Fact, Value And Theory In Antitrust Adjudication, Herbert Hovenkamp

Duke Law Journal

No abstract provided.

What Are The Alternatives To Chicago?, Wesley J. Liebeler

Duke Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Foreword: Economists On The Bench, Jerome M. Culp

Law and Contemporary Problems

No abstract provided.

Antitrust, Law & Economics, And The Courts, Louis Kaplow

Law and Contemporary Problems

No abstract provided.

Antitrust, Law & Economics, And Politics, John J. Gibbons

Law and Contemporary Problems

No abstract provided.

Interest Groups, Antitrust, And State Regulation: Parker V. Brown In The Economic Theory Of Legislation, William H. Page

Duke Law Journal

The Parker doctrine requires that state regulatory arrangements seeking exemption from federal antitrust law be clearly articulated by the state "as sovereign." Professor Page argues that the clear-articulation requirement is justified because it reinforces representative political processes. He rejects Professor Wiley's capture preemption approach and the Supreme Court's analysis in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, arguing that both misconceive the nature of governmental relationships with interest groups. Professor Page concludes that the essentially collective nature of economic regulation supports adherence to the clear-articulation requirement as the measure of political legitimacy.

Conflicts Of Jurisdiction: Antitrust And Industrial Policy, Janusz A. Ordover

Law and Contemporary Problems

No abstract provided.

The Antitrust Implications Of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends In The Modern Era, Thane N. Rosenbaum

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law In The European Community And The United States: A Comparative Analysis, Gabriele Dara

Louisiana Law Review

No abstract provided.

Disaggregation Of Damages Requirement In Private Monopolization Actions, James R. Mccall

Notre Dame Law Review

No abstract provided.

Legal Factors In The Acquisition Of A United State Corporation: Litigation By Hostile Targets, Johan E. Droogmans

LLM Theses and Essays

Acquisitions of United States corporations have become increasingly complex takeover contests, where bidders and target corporations are forced into offensive and defensive litigation strategies to protect their respective interests. Targets often assert that the bidders have violated federal or state securities laws, federal antitrust laws, federal margin regulations, federal and state regulatory systems, and federal anti-racketeering laws. These lawsuits are primarily based on the principal federal regulation of takeovers in section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Williams Act. Target litigation is customary, but entails certain disadvantages; a lawsuit rarely stops an offer, is expensive, …

Competition At The Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards For Banks And Other Financial Institutions, Joseph P. Bauer, Earl W. Kintner

Journal Articles

Congressional and judicial attitudes towards the banking industry have reflected two, sometimes conflicting, goals-the maintenance of the solvency of financial institutions to protect the interests of depositors, other creditors and the economy at large; and the promotion of competition among these institutions and in the economy. The advancement of these goals has been reflected in the application of the antitrust laws to the industry.

For the most part, the Sherman and Clayton Acts apply with the same force and scope to financial institutions as to other industries. In some cases, however, the goal of institutional protection is favored, and the …