Law Commons^™

Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey

Senior Honors Theses

Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …

Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert Hovenkamp

William & Mary Law Review

Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “combine or conspire” to monopolize—all without explanation. Section 2 is the antitrust law’s only provision that reaches entirely unilateral conduct, although it has often been used to reach collaborative conduct as well. In general, § 2 requires greater amounts of individually held market power than do the other antitrust statutes, but it is less categorical about conduct. With one exception, however, the statute reads so broadly that criticisms of the nature that it is outdated cannot be based on faithful readings of the text.

The one …

Impediments To Renewed And Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement, Edward D. Cavanagh

William & Mary Business Law Review

Antitrust Division head Jonathan Kanter recently proclaimed that “the era of lax enforcement is over, and the new era of vigorous and effective antitrust law enforcement has begun.” Federal enforcers have indeed been active; the DOJ has sued Google in two separate actions, and the FTC has brought an action against Facebook.

While bringing these cases is an important first step to achieving a more robust antitrust enforcement regime, a significant obstacle to an antitrust renaissance remains—overcoming the strong gravitational pull of Chicago School theory that has dominated antitrust thought for the past half-century. Chicago School principles have not kept …

The Factor/Element Distinction In Antitrust Litigation, Christopher R. Leslie

William & Mary Law Review

Most price-fixing litigation turns on whether the plaintiffs can present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants did, in fact, conspire to raise prices. This generally entails the proffering of plus factors, a type of evidence that suggests parallel conduct by the defendants was the product of collusion, not independent decisions. As their name suggests, plus factors are just that—factors. Proving a collection of factors may be necessary for a plaintiff’s case, but no individual factor is ever required. If it were, it wouldn’t be a factor; it would be an element.

Several federal …

The Constitutional Moment That Wasn't: 1912-1914 And The Meaning Of The Sherman Act, Alan J. Meese

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Hair On Fire: Why Companies Are Less Likely To Feel The Burn Under The Doj’S Newest Change To Antitrust Enforcement, Caroline M. Whitener

Pepperdine Law Review

In July 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division announced that in an effort to help companies avoid “‘hair on fire’ experiences,” Division prosecutors are now, despite previous hesitancy, encouraged to offer prosecution alternatives in the form of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) to corporate antitrust violators. Alternative prosecution agreements, such as DPAs and NPAs, are contracts between the government and corporate wrongdoers that allow companies to delay or entirely avoid prosecution, provided the company adheres to the contract terms. Additionally, as a part of the policy change, DOJ antitrust prosecutors must evaluate a corporation’s preexisting …

Atomistic Antitrust, Robin C. Feldman, Mark A. Lemley

William & Mary Law Review

Antitrust is atomistic: deliberately focused on trees, not forests. It pays attention to the consequences of individual acts alleged to be anticompetitive.

That focus is misplaced. Companies and markets don't focus on one particular act to the exclusion of all else. Business strategy emphasizes holistic, integrated planning. And market outcomes aren't determined by a single act, but by the result of multiple acts by multiple parties in the overall context of the structure and characteristics of the market.

The atomistic nature of modern antitrust law causes it to miss two important classes of potential competitive harms. First, the focus on …

Old Macdonald Had A Trust: How Market Consolidation In The Agricultural Industry, Spurred On By A Lack Of Antitrust Law Enforcement, Is Destroying Small Agricultural Producers, Cody Mccracken

William & Mary Business Law Review

The U.S. agricultural industry is controlled by a handful of large corporations. Unprecedented levels of market consolidation has created a power disparity, where controlling corporations alone shape markets, often to the disadvantage of small agricultural producers. A primary, and often overlooked, cause of this consolidationdriven bargaining disadvantage, and its resulting harm, can be found in the lacking enforcement of the nation’s antitrust laws. Faulty metrics and lax legal interpretations employed by regulatory agencies have permitted large corporations to grab control of nearly every sector of the industry. From the seeds farmers plant to the markets they sell their goods into; …

New Copyright Stories: Clearing The Way For Fair Wages And Equitable Working Conditions In American Theater And Other Creative Industries, Jessica Silbey

Faculty Scholarship

We need some new intellectual property stories. By stories, I don’t mean entertaining fictions. I mean instead accounts or explanations that make sense of the world as it is lived by everyday people. Most of our relevant intellectual property laws were forged in the mid-twentieth century and have failed to keep pace with the transformations in creative and innovative practices of the twentyfirst. Being out-of-sync or failing to recognize broader existing stakeholders means laws are poorly aligned with on-the-ground realities and are out-of-touch with values and interests of the people laws serve. The Article at the center of this Symposium …

A Machete For The Patent Thicket: Using Noerr-Pennington Doctrine’S Sham Exception To Challenge Abusive Patent Tactics By Pharmaceutical Companies, Lisa Orucevic

Vanderbilt Law Review

Outrageous drug prices have dominated news coverage of the American healthcare system for years. Yet despite widespread condemnation of skyrocketing drug prices, nothing seems to change. Pharmaceutical companies can raise drug prices with impunity because they hold patents on their drugs, which give them monopolies. These monopolies are only supposed to last twenty years, and then competing lower-cost drugs like generics can enter the market, driving down the costs of pharmaceuticals for all. But pharmaceutical companies have created “patent thickets,” dense webs of overlapping patents surrounding one drug, which have artificially extended the companies’ monopolies for years or even decades …

Treble, Treble Toil And Trouble: The New Per Se Rule As A Protection Against The Curse Of The "Supreme Evil", Seth Konopasek

William & Mary Business Law Review

The Supreme Court has called collusion between firms the “supreme evil” of antitrust. Despite public and private enforcement efforts, collusive firms and the cartels they form cost American consumers billions of dollars a year and undermine the virtues of our free market economy. The Chicago School theory of antitrust enforcement, which has dominated antitrust scholarship, vehemently disapproves of private antitrust actions that enable plaintiffs to recover treble damages. Recent scholarship, however, has rejected the Chicago School’s concerns of overdeterrence and embraced the treble damages remedy. This Note follows the recent scholarship and proposes the New Per Se Rule, which would …

Interstate Burdens And Antitrust Federalism: A Reexamination Of Parker Immunity, John Sack

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

The Supreme Court has largely immunized state action from Federal antitrust enforcement. However, this carte blanche immunity, while founded on federalism grounds, runs counter to a number of constitutional principles, and too easily allows states to impose costs on other states while reaping all the benefits of anti-competitive policies. While the Supreme Court has only scantily discussed revisiting this immunity, academics and the Federal Trade Commission have largely criticized the doctrine. The Sherman Act, described as taking on a constitutional standing, should seek to form a more perfect economic union, and our understanding of State Action Immunity should strive towards …

Antitrust Antitextualism, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Judges and scholars frequently describe antitrust as a common-law system predicated on open-textured statutes, but that description fails to capture a historically persistent phenomenon:judicial disregard of the plain meaning of the statutory texts and manifest purposes of Congress. This pattern of judicial nullification is not evenly distributed: when the courts have deviated from the plain meaning or congressional purpose, they have uniformly done so to limit the reach of antitrust liability or curtail the labor exemption to the benefit of industrial interests. This phenomenon cannot be explained solely or even primarily as a tug-of-war between a progressive Congress and conservative …

Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces: A Competition And Safety Framework For Analyzing Utility Pole Association Rules, Roles, And Risks, Catherine J.K. Sandoval

Catholic University Law Review

As climate change augurs longer wildfire seasons, safe, reliable, and competitive energy and communications markets depend on sound infrastructure and well-calibrated regulation. The humble wooden utility pole, first deployed in America in 1844 to extend telegraph service, forms the twenty-first century’s technological scaffold. Utility poles are increasingly contested places where competition, safety, and reliability meet. Yet, regulators and academics have largely overlooked the risks posed by century-old private utility pole associations in California, composed of private and public utility pole owners and some entities who attach facilities to utility poles. No academic articles have examined the rules, roles, and risks …

Labor Organization In Ride-Sharing—Unionization Or Cartelization?, Mark Anderson, Max Huffman

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

The sharing economy brings together the constituent parts of a business enterprise into a structure that, on its surface, resembles a business firm, but in crucial ways is nothing like the traditional firm. This includes the ownership of the primary capital assets used in the business, as well as one of the most fundamental features of a firm—the relationship with its labor force. Sharing economy workers are formally contractors, running small businesses as sole entrepreneurs, with the effect that they are excluded from many of the protections made available to workers across the economy. The result is a seeming disparity …

Can The Federal Trade Commission Use Rulemaking To Change Antitrust Law?, Richard J. Pierce Jr

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Lina Khan, the new Chair of the FTC, proposes to use notice and comment rulemaking to make major changes in antitrust law by declaring many practices to be “unfair methods of competition” within the meaning of that term in section five of the FTC Act. She has the strong backing of President Biden and her Democrat colleagues. That raises two questions. Does the FTC have the power to use the notice and comment process to implement Section five? If it has that power, can it use the rulemaking process to make the major changes in antitrust law that Chair Khan …

Do Legal Origins Predict Legal Substance?, Anu Bradford, Yun-Chien Chang, Adam S. Chilton, Nuno Garoupa

Faculty Scholarship

There is a large body of research in economics and law suggesting that the legal origin of a country – that is, whether its legal regime is based on English common law or French, German, or Nordic civil law – profoundly impacts a range of outcomes. However, the exact relationship between legal origin and legal substance has been disputed in the literature and not fully explored with nuanced legal coding. We revisit this debate while leveraging novel cross-country data sets that provide detailed coding of two areas of laws: property and antitrust. We find that having shared legal origins strongly …

Antitrust Changeup: How A Single Antitrust Reform Could Be A Home Run For Minor League Baseball Players, Jeremy Ulm

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to protect competition in the marketplace. Federal antitrust law has developed to prevent businesses from exerting unfair power on their employees and customers. Specifically, the Sherman Act prevents competitors from reaching unreasonable agreements amongst themselves and from monopolizing markets. However, not all industries have these protections.

Historically, federal antitrust law has not governed the “Business of Baseball.” The Supreme Court had the opportunity to apply antitrust law to baseball in Federal Baseball Club, Incorporated v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs; however, the Court held that the Business of Baseball was not …

Behavioral Lessons For Antitrust Enforcement, Avishalom Tor

Faculty Lectures and Presentations

These are lecture slides to accompany a virtual lecture.

Avishalom Tor, professor and director of the Research Program on Law and Market Behavior at Notre Dame Law School, delivered this lecture to lawyers and economists of the Department of Justice’s antitrust division in Washington D.C. and throughout the country in the summer of 2020.

The lecture provides a systematic review of the lessons empirical behavioral findings offer to antitrust law, enforcement, and policy. Professor Tor introduces key findings of behavioral antitrust and explores their implications for doctrine and enforcement across the field, in areas ranging from horizontal restraints, through …

Artificial Stupidity, Clark D. Asay

William & Mary Law Review

Artificial intelligence is everywhere. And yet, the experts tell us, it is not yet actually anywhere. This is because we are yet to achieve artificial general intelligence, or artificially intelligent systems that are capable of thinking for themselves and adapting to their circumstances. Instead, all the AI hype—and it is constant—concerns narrower, weaker forms of artificial intelligence, which are confined to performing specific, narrow tasks. The promise of true artificial general intelligence thus remains elusive. Artificial stupidity reigns supreme.

What is the best set of policies to achieve more general, stronger forms of artificial intelligence? Surprisingly, scholars have paid little …

No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao

William & Mary Law Review

The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …

The Defend Trade Secrets Act And Foreign Theft: The Application Of The Act To Extraterritorial Misappropriation, John Dustin Hawkins

Journal of Intellectual Property Law

This Note explores the evolution of federal trade secret law in the United States, particularly the enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. Part II discusses the legislative history of the Act, as well as key provisions and definitions of the Act, which are critical when considering the DTSA's extraterritorial application. Additionally, this Note considers the tests used by courts to determine extraterritorial application in other areas of U.S. law. Part III explains why a uniformly-applied balancing test would best serve the courts in determining the extraterritorial application of the DTSA to reach foreign conduct.

Movements, Moments, And The Eroding Antitrust Consensus, Michael Wolfe

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

Timothy Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (Columbia Global Reports, 2018). $14.99.

Timothy Wu’s book, The Curse of Bigness, offers a brief history on and critical perspective of antitrust law’s development over the last century, calling for a return to a Brandeisian approach to the law. In this review-essay, I use Wu’s text as a starting point to explore antitrust law’s current political moment. Tracing the dynamics at play in this debate and Wu’s role in it, I note areas underexplored in Wu’s text regarding the interplay of antitrust law with other forms of …

The Curse Of Bigness: New Deal Supplement, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

This is a supplement to the book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. It covers the years between 1920 - 1945, with a focus on the New Deal, and represents material left out of the original book.

It is meant to be read together with the larger volume, but can also be read separately.

American Oligarchy: How The Enfeebling Of Antitrust Law Corrodes The Republic, Zachariah Foge

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

In this note, I will argue that the current antitrust framework is misguided and based on erroneous legal and economic theories originating from the Chicago School. I will argue that the neoclassical approach is not only wrong when examining the legislative intent of Congress but is also in contravention with the policy goals and foundational principles of antitrust law. Furthermore, I will argue that the Chicago School’s narrow, outcome-based view of antitrust is ill-equipped to deal with the demands of the twenty-first century and especially with the online marketplace. The tech giants are unprecedented in their scale, and the online …

Constraining Monitors, Veronica Root

Veronica Root

Monitors oversee remediation efforts at dozens, if not hundreds, of institutions that are guilty of misconduct. The remediation efforts that the monitors of today engage in are, in many instances, quite similar to activities that were once subject to formal court oversight. But as the importance and power of monitors has increased, the court’s oversight of monitors and the agreements that most often result in monitorships has, at best, been severely diminished and, at worst, vanished altogether.

The lack of regulation governing monitors is well documented; yet, the academic literature on monitorships to date has largely taken the state of …

Accommodating Capital And Policing Labor: Antitrust In The Two Gilded Ages, Sandeep Vaheesan

Maryland Law Review

In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress sought to prevent big businesses from maintaining and augmenting their power through collusion, mergers, and exclusionary and predatory practices and also aimed to preserve the ability of workers to act in concert. At times, the antitrust laws have benefited ordinary Americans. Antitrust achievements include the restructuring of the oil industry in 1911, the creation of competitive market structures in the mid-twentieth century, and the termination of AT&T’s telecommunications monopoly in 1984.

Yet, the history of antitrust in the United States is not one of uninterrupted successes. Over two forty-year periods, the executive branch and …

Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …

Analyzing Vertical Mergers To Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article analyzes three recent vertical mergers: a private antitrust case attacking the consummated merger of Jeld-Wen and Craftmaster Manufacturing Inc. (“CMI”) that was cleared by the DOJ in 2012 but subsequently litigated and won by the plaintiff, Steves & Sons in 2018; and two recent vertical merger matters investigated and cleared (with limited remedies) by 3-2 votes by the Federal Trade Commission in early 2019 -- Staples/Essendant and Fresenius/NxStage. There are some factual parallels among these three matters that make it interesting to analyze them together. First, the DOJ’s decision to clear Jeld-Wen/CMI merger appears to be a clear …

The Blue Devil's In The Details: How A Free Market Approach To Compensating College Athletes Would Work, David A. Grenardo

Pepperdine Law Review

Everyone involved in the business of major college athletics, except the athletes, receives compensation based on a free market system. The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) cap on athlete compensation violates antitrust law, and athletes should be allowed to earn their free market value as everyone else does in this country. This Article provides a detailed approach to compensating college athletes under a free market model, which includes a salary cap, the terms of a proposed standard player’s contract, a discussion of who can represent players, and payment simulations for football and basketball teams. A free market approach would not …