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Full-Text Articles in Law
Fedaccounts: Digital Dollars, Morgan Ricks, J. Crawford, L. Menand
Fedaccounts: Digital Dollars, Morgan Ricks, J. Crawford, L. Menand
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
We are entering a new monetary era. Central banks around the world- spurred by the development of privately controlled digital currencies as well as competition from other central banks-have been studying, building, and, in some cases, issuing central bank digital currency ("CBDC").
Although digital fiat currency is one of the hottest topics in macroeconomics and central banking today, the discussion has largely over- looked the most straightforward and appealing strategy for implementing a U.S. dollar-based CBDC: expanding access to bank accounts that the Federal Reserve already offers to a small, favored set of clients. These accounts consist of entries in …
The Failed Regulation Of U.S. Treasury Markets, Yesha Yadav
The Failed Regulation Of U.S. Treasury Markets, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In trading the preeminent risk-free security, the $21 trillion U.S. Treasury market supports the country's borrowing needs, financial stability, and investor appetite for a safe asset. Straddling the nexus between a securities market and a systemically essential institution, the Treasury market must function at all costs, even if other markets fail.
This Article shows that Treasury market structure is fragile, weakened by a regulatory model poorly suited to match its design. First, public oversight of Treasuries is fragmented, divided between five or more agencies. The rulebook for Treasuries is sparse, lacking basic guardrails common to other markets. Without effective rules …
Federal Corporate Law And The Business Of Banking, Morgan Ricks, Lev Menand
Federal Corporate Law And The Business Of Banking, Morgan Ricks, Lev Menand
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The only profit-seeking business enterprises chartered by a federal government agency are banks. Yet there is barely any scholarship justifying this exception to state primacy in U.S. corporate law.
This Article addresses that gap. It reinterprets the National Bank Act (NBA) the organic statute governing national banks, the heavyweights of the financial sec- tor-as a corporation law and recovers the reasons why Congress wrote this law: not to catalyze private wealth creation or to regulate an existing industry, but to solve an economic governance problem. National banks are federal instrumentalities charged with augmenting the money supply-- a delegated sovereign privilege. …