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Articles 31 - 43 of 43
Full-Text Articles in Law
Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol
Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate governance-the governance of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). There are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance across legal origins. In …
Patents, Property, And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Patents, Property, And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The decision to regulate involves the identification of markets where simple assignment of property rights is not sufficient to ensure satisfactory competitive results, usually because some type of market failure obtains. By contrast, if property rights are well defined when they are initially created and can subsequently be traded to some reasonably competitive equilibrium, then regulation is thought not to be necessary. In such cases the antitrust laws have a significant role to play in ensuring that the market can be as competitive as free trading allows. One problem with the patent system is that once a patent is granted …
Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: Alchemy In The Age Of Empiricism?, Thomas L. Greaney
Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: Alchemy In The Age Of Empiricism?, Thomas L. Greaney
All Faculty Scholarship
One is hard-pressed to find in law an undertaking more fraught with uncertainty than the application of the efficiencies defense in merger analysis. Generalist fact finders (judges) and politically-attuned government officials (prosecutors and regulators) are charged with two Herculean tasks: (1) predicting the outcome of organic changes in business enterprises and (2) comparing the magnitude of those changes to the equally uncertain amount of harm to future competition that the transaction will cause. Given the enormous, perhaps intractable, uncertainty of this inquiry, it is therefore paradoxical that many of the strongest advocates for strengthening the role of efficiencies analysis in …
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
UF Law Faculty Publications
Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft's server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft's documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs' technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for up to five more …
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators. The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial chambers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly remedies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defendant's assets. At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity) grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final judgment or an order. The …
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Articles
Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …
Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane
Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Antitrust scholars are having fun again. Not so long ago, they were the poor, redheaded stepchildren of the legal academy, either pining for the older days of rigorous antitrust enforcement or trying to kill off what was left of the enterprise. Other law professors felt sorry for them, ignored them, or both. But now antitrust is making a comeback of sorts. In one heady week in May of 2009, a front-page story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney-the Obama Administration's new Antitrust Division head at the Department of Justice-to jettison the entire report on …
Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, D. Daniel Sokol
Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
When government regulates, it may either intentionally or unintentionally generate restraints that reduce competition ("public restraints"). Public restraints allow a business to cloak its action in government authority and to immunize it from antitrust regulation. Private businesses may misuse the government's grant of antitrust immunity to facilitate behavior that benefits businesses at consumers' expense. One way is by obtaining government grants of immunity from antitrust scrutiny. A recent series of Supreme Court decisions has made this situation worse by limiting the reach of antitrust law in favor of sector regulation. This is true even though the Supreme Court refers to …
Substance, Procedure, And Institutions In The International Harmonization Of Competition Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Substance, Procedure, And Institutions In The International Harmonization Of Competition Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Many people who pay attention to the rapid development of antitrust regimes across the globe hold two tenets in common. First, most of the relevant stakeholders would benefit if competition policy could be harmonized interjurisdictionally.' Second, and alas, this beneficial harmonization is unlikely to happen on a significant scale in the foreseeable future.2 To many, antitrust harmonization is thus a noble but utopian aspiration. I generally share both the former sentiment and the latter lament but both are far too general to be of much use without further specification. Uniformity of competition policy is valuable to be sure, but not …
Pangloss Responds, Daniel A. Crane
Pangloss Responds, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
I am afraid that William Shieber and I are speaking past each other. I agree wholeheartedly with his assertion that anyone who believes that political appointees do not exert a considerable influence over the antitrust agencies is naïve. However, Technocracy and Antitrust does not advance the Panglossian view that the antitrust agencies are apolitical, if by that we mean that robotic machines devoid of human perspective or ideological commitment churn out scientifically predetermined antitrust results.
Cartels As Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications For The Analysis Of Dominant-Firm Conduct, William E. Kovacic
Cartels As Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications For The Analysis Of Dominant-Firm Conduct, William E. Kovacic
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Cartels often act like single dominant firms. Because there are a number of difficulties in determining market effects of single dominant firms, this article proposes that enforcement policy recognize the connection between cartels and firms engaged in monopolization. The resulting insight would be useful to determine whether or not cartel conduct should be viewed with suspicion when engaged in or by a dominant firm in a similar industry. Many cartels do not focus solely on suppressing interfirm rivalry; rather, many operate as two-stage mechanisms: the first stage consists of reaching a consensus on a plan to restrict output and curb …
New Antitrust Realism, Maurice Stucke
New Antitrust Realism, Maurice Stucke
Scholarly Works
In the midst of a failing economy, the incoming Obama administration will not likely adopt its predecessor's antitrust policies. So if change is afoot, what form should change take? This essay outlines the needed transformative change in today's competition policy. The essay proposes more empirical analysis by the U.S. competition authorities, outlines how behavioral economics can assist in this new antitrust realism, and concludes in explaining why such antitrust realism is needed.
Should The Government Prosecute Monopolies?, Maurice Stucke
Should The Government Prosecute Monopolies?, Maurice Stucke
Scholarly Works
In the past few years, courts and the Department of Justice have cited approvingly the Court's dicta in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. This article analyzes why the economic thinking in Trinko is wrong, and how the Court ignores its precedent involving the Sherman Act's concerns of monopolies' political, social and ethical implications. It responds to the Court's claim that cartel behavior is easier to identify and remedy than monopolistic behavior and proposes an improvement to the Court's current rule of reason standard to reduce the risk of false positives, while enabling the antitrust …