Law Commons^™

More Lessons From Japan: End Industrywide Collective Bargaining?, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

The number of books and articles discussing Japanese management techniques with an eye to transplanting them to the United States is staggering. Americans understandably are impressed by Japanese efficiency and like to think the adoption of some of their techniques will aid our own industries. Often these proposals seem fanciful and fail to recognize the many differences between the two countries, their economic systems and cultures.

The Law And Economics Of Organ Procurement, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents an economic analysis of the organ procurement system in the U.S. and examines proposals to alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. The paper's principal conclusions are: (1) Although non-market solutions deserve the highest priority, demand increases fueled by improvements in transplant technology will probably make some market-based solution necessary in the future. (2) Quality deterioration and coercion will not necessarily be worrisome problems under a market-based procurement system.

Water Marketing And The Law, Mark Squillace

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

13 pages.

Legal Devices For Enhancing Water Diversion Opportunities Within The Appropriation System, David C. Hallford

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

28 pages.

Economic And Social Impacts Of Agriculture-To-Urban Water Transfers: The Arkansas Valley Of Colorado, Charles W. Howe, Jeffrey K. Lazo

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

20 pages.

Contains 1 page of references.

Evaluating Judicial Capacity To Determine Public Welfare Values In Water Transfers, Charles T. Dumars

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

31 pages (includes illustrations).

Contains references.

Water Agencies And Water Transfers In California: A Case Study Of The Kern County Water Agency, Brian E. Gray

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

20 pages.

Contains references.

The Role Of Market Transfers In The Accommodation Of New Uses: A Case Study Of The Truckee-Carson Basin, A. Dan Tarlock

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

31 pages (includes 1 map).

Urban Water Conservation: The Last Water Hole Or Mostly A Mirage?, Gary C. Woodward

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

28 pages.

Contains references.

Update On Market Strategies For The Protection Of Western Instream Flows And Wetlands, Robert Wigington

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

49 pages.

Contains references.

Sources Of Water Iii: Interstate Transfers, Clyde O. Martz

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

35 pages.

Contains references.

Agenda: Moving The West's Water To New Uses: Winners And Losers, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado Law School professors Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Mark Squillace.

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers will be the theme for this year's water conference, June 6-8 at the Law School in Boulder. The conference will consider the changing demands for water in the West and the need to reallocate a portion of the existing uses of water to new uses.

The first day will provide the background by looking at the most likely sources of water to meet these demands, including agriculture, federal water projects, interstate transfers, and …

The Limits Of Social Policy, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information As A Positive Influence In Political Insitutions, Michael A. Fitts

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Second Generation Of Notes Indexed For Inflation, Michael S. Knoll

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law And Economics Meet The Real World, Michael I. Meyerson

All Faculty Scholarship

"Law and economics" has been hailed by its supporters as the only intellectually valid means for analyzing legal issues. Its critics have dismissed law and economics as amoral and biased against the poor. Ironically, each side in this frequently acrimonious debate has much to offer those in the opposing camp. This Article reflects a modest attempt to bridge the chasm.

One need not believe that money is everything in order to believe that the effect a given legal rule has on total societal wealth is relevant in decisionmaking. But this admission does not consign one to a legal world where …

The Corporate Entity In An Era Of Multinational Corporations, Phillip Blumberg

Faculty Articles and Papers

No abstract provided.

Insurance And The Limits Of Rational Discrimination, Martin J. Katz

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

As the state of the insurance industry indicates, policy makers and academics have reached little consensus about how to address the implications of rational discrimination. This Current Topic argues that rational discrimination should not be viewed simply as a question of profitability or financial interests, but must also be approached from a moral perspective. Part One examines the underlying cause of rational discrimination in one particular insurance market,' locating its ultimate source in the historical injustices perpetrated against Blacks. This section condemns rational discrimination for perpetuating and even exacerbating social inequalities. The analysis suggests that our society will not fully …

Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

One way to test the accuracy of Professor Scherer's research is to compare it to the best previous work in the area. Prior to his current article the best analysis of the state of economic thinking and knowledge during antitrust's formative period was presented twelve years ago by—Professor Scherer. This was a skeletal precurser to the well-documented version that he now presents, but his overall conclusions are identical. During the twelve years since his conclusions were presented in the Yale Law Journal no one has demonstrated that his research is in any way faulty or misleading, even though many have …

Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Aversion To Risk Aversion In The New Institutional Economics, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

One significant division that emerged during the conference involved the role of risk aversion in analyzing institutional arrangements. I, along with Oliver Williamson, took the position that the risk aversion assumption deflects attention from the more significant determinants and that more progress would be made if we could bind our hands and agree to invoke attitudes toward risk only as a last resort. Professor Richter has graciously given me this opportunity to elaborate upon this theme.

Regulating Regulators: The Legal Environment Of The State, David S. Cohen

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

In this paper I focus on the ability of tort law to reduce primary costs, or losses associated with the number and seriousness of accidents. In one sense I will be analysing the state as if it were a private firm in which losses suffered by private individuals and firms are externalities. Several years ago Mark Spitzer wrote a paper on this topic in which he posited several models of state activity and analysed the incentive effects of liability rules in each case. In my view Spitzer's general conclusion - the rule which may be synthesized from all of the …

Whither Economic Duress? Reflections On Two Recent Cases, Andrew B.L. Phang

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

From its rather tentative and extremely recent beginnings, I the law relating to economic duress has developed at a relatively rapid pace during the last decade or so. We have had a series of decisions from various courts and jurisdictions* which, collectively at least, affirm the existence of the doctrine in English law. The pronouncements at the highest levels, however, have not purported to be definitive, and, as we shall see, have certainly not aided in a clarification and systematization of the doctrine of economic duress. The two recent decisions, which are the subject of the present comment, have merely …

The First Great Law & Economics Movement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Beginning in the 1880s American economists turned their attention to the law in a way unprecedented in American thought. Some legal academics in turn incorporated economics into their thinking about the law. Whether their output or its impact were great enough to warrant calling their efforts a law and economics "movement" is worth debating. This essay argues that there was such a movement.

Four things account for the increasing interest in law and economics at the turn of the century: (1) the widespread application of evolutionary models to the development of both law and economic theory; (2) the influence of …

The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For Enterprise Liability, Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

This Article explores the insurance and deterrence implications of important and long overlooked facts. Consumers are insured through first-party mechanisms against most of the risks of product accidents. However, first-party insurers rarely and imperfectly adjust premiums according to an individual consumer's decisions concerning exactly what products she will purchase, how many of those products she will purchase, and how carefully she will consume them. Such consumer decisions we refer to as "consumption choices. " This failure by first-party insurers to adjust premiums according to consumption choices gives rise to a first-party insurance externality. Based on this insight, this Article offers …

Beyond Negotiability: A New Model For Transfer And Pledge Of Interests In Securities Controlled By Intermediaries, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

An Economic Analysis Of The Criminal Law As A Preference-Shaping Policy, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In this Article I provide an economic analysis of criminal law as a preference-shaping policy. I argue that in addition to creating disincentives for criminal activity, criminal punishment is intended to promote various social norms of individual behavior by shaping the preferences of criminals and the population at large. By taking into account this preference-shaping function, I explain many of the characteristics of criminal law that have heretofore escaped the logic of the economic model. It is also the preference-shaping function and the prerequisite ordering of preferences that distinguish criminal law from tort law. My analysis suggests that society will …

Corporate Control: Markets And Rules, Caroline Bradley

Articles

No abstract provided.

The Demand For Tax Return Preparation Services, Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Michael A. Udell, Louis L. Wilde

Faculty Scholarship

We analyze taxpayer choices of return preparation services. We distinguish between two types of nonpaid preparers, six types of paid third parties, and self-preparation. Among other things, we find significant differences in the factors which explain the demand for paid third parties who are and are not able to represent clients before the IRS. Among these factors are increases in IRS audit rates and the frequency of IRS penalties.

The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this article is to promote a particular research program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract formation. Although I will often simply speak of offer and acceptance in my discussion, I mean to refer to a broader set of issues than are commonly denoted by this doctrinal label. My program transcends the narrow issue of whether particular communications technically should be classified as offers and acceptances, and includes questions often analyzed under the rubrics of implication and interpretation. At its broadest, my argument addresses all legal rules that answer two types of …