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Full-Text Articles in Law

Right On Time: A Reply To Professors Allen, Claeys, Epstein, Gordon, Holbrook, Mossoff, Rose, And Van Houweling, Dotan Oliar, James Y. Stern Jan 2020

Right On Time: A Reply To Professors Allen, Claeys, Epstein, Gordon, Holbrook, Mossoff, Rose, And Van Houweling, Dotan Oliar, James Y. Stern

Faculty Publications

A simple observation started us off in writing Right on Time. Studying and teaching intellectual property law, we noticed striking parallels between traditional first possession rules in property law and analagous rules governing the acquisition of patent, copyright, and trademark rights. We thought that established first possession principles could illuminate the workings of IP law. As we dug in, however, it became increasingly clear that our premise wasn’t quite right. While many penetrating commentators had said many penetrating things about first possession, the leading treatments tended to focus on significant individual aspects of the overall issue. What we could …


Response To Oliar And Stern: On Duration, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy, And Time, Wendy J. Gordon Jan 2020

Response To Oliar And Stern: On Duration, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy, And Time, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Courts often use possession to determine who should own unclaimed resources. Yet, as Oliar and Stern demonstrate, the concept of possession is little more than a metaphor, capable of being applied to a broad range of phenomena. The authors helpfully deploy “time” as a metric to sort through the rules determining what should count as possession, and they survey the likely costs and benefits attached to choosing earlier versus later events as triggers for acquiring title.

With those tools in hand, Oliar and Stern employ “time” and the analogy of physical possession to address problems in copyright, patent, and trademark …


Right On Time: First Possession In Property And Intellectual Property, Dotan Oliar, James Y. Stern Mar 2019

Right On Time: First Possession In Property And Intellectual Property, Dotan Oliar, James Y. Stern

Faculty Publications

How should we allocate property rights in unowned tangible and intangible resources? This Article develops a model of original acquisition that draws together common law doctrines of first possession with original acquisition doctrines in patent, copyright, and trademark law. The common denominator is time: in each context, doctrine involves a trade-off between assigning entitlements to resources earlier or later in the process of their development and use. Early awards risk granting exclusivity to parties who may not be capable of putting resources to their best use. Late awards prolong contests for ownership, which may generate waste or discourage acquisition efforts …


Rethinking Novelty In Patent Law, Sean B. Seymore Jan 2011

Rethinking Novelty In Patent Law, Sean B. Seymore

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The novelty requirement seeks to ensure that a patent will not issue if the public already possesses the invention. Although gauging possession is usually straightforward for simple inventions, it can be difficult for those in complex fields like biotechnology, chemistry, and pharmaceuticals. For example, if a drug company seeks to patent a promising molecule that was disclosed but never physically made in the prior art, the key possession question is whether a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) could have made it at the time of the prior disclosure. Put differently, could the PHOSITA rely on then-existing knowledge …


Accession And Original Ownership, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2009

Accession And Original Ownership, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Although first possession is generally assumed to be the dominant means of establishing original ownership of property, there is a second but less studied principle for initiating ownership, called accession, which awards new resources to the owner of existing property most prominently connected to the new resource. Accession applies across a wide variety of areas, from determining rights to baby animals and growing crops to determining ownership of derivative rights under intellectual property laws. Accession shares common features with first possession, in that both principles assign ownership uniquely in a way that imposes minimal information cost burdens on society. But …


An Inquiry Into The Merits Of Copyright - Notes On Property Parallels, Dukeminier/Krier Book, Among Other Things - 1985, Wendy J. Gordon Jan 1985

An Inquiry Into The Merits Of Copyright - Notes On Property Parallels, Dukeminier/Krier Book, Among Other Things - 1985, Wendy J. Gordon

Scholarship Chronologically

These are notes re thoughts sparked by reading Dukeminier & Krier, PROPERTY (little Brown 1981) and their TEACHERS MANUAL FOR PROPERTY (Little Brown 1981). What I may be doing is beginning a unified i/p. One part of that doctrine may be parallel ordinary Property, like so: HYPOTHESIS - The role played in ordinary property law by "possession" [,1] may be played in i/p law by "use. This can be very important.


The Patentability Of A Principle Of Nature, John B. Waite Jan 1917

The Patentability Of A Principle Of Nature, John B. Waite

Articles

The extent to which courts will go in conceding patentability to a natural law, or principle of nature, is evidenced in the case of Minerals Separation Co. v. Hyde, 37 Sup. Ct. -, decided by the Supreme Court, December 11, 1916. It has always been more or less an axiom of patent law that the discovery of a principle of nature does not entitle the discoverer to a patent for it. The case usually thought of first as authority therefor, is that of Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 5 Blatch. 116, 2 Fisher 320. The patentees in that case …


The Patentability Of A Mental Process, John B. Waite Jan 1917

The Patentability Of A Mental Process, John B. Waite

Articles

The fact of possession has been so correlated with the theory of property that it is difficult to dissociate ownership from the possibility of physical possession. One finds that the average lawyer, even though he may defind a right in rem as a right enforcible against any person, is extremely apt, unless after especial thought, to explain that it is enforcible against anyone because it pertains to a thing capable of physical possession and control, a thing that could be actually sequestered, from all other persons. Not at all infrequently the term property has been judicially stripped even of its …