Law Commons^™

Crawford V. Washington, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

On June 9, by granting certiorari in Crawford v. Washington, 02-9410, the Supreme Court signaled its intention to enter once again into the realm of the Confrontation Clause, in which it has found itself deeply perplexed. This time there was a difference, however, because the grant indicated that the Court might be willing to rethink its jurisprudence in this area. Crawford, like Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), presents a classic case of what might be called station-house testimony. Michael Crawford was accused of stabbing another man. His wife, Sylvia, was …

Squeezing Daubert Out Of The Picture, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this essay, I will offer some thoughts on how we might reframe the issues governing the admissibility of expert evidence. My principal focus is not on any particular type of expert evidence but on broader questions: the extent to which we ought to rely on rulings of admissibility, the standards that should govern admissibility rulings, and the role of the trial and appellate courts in making those rulings. To some extent, I will concentrate on the context of criminal cases, but for the most part my conclusions apply in both civil and criminal litigation. Here are my conclusions: First, …

Minimizing The Jury Over-Valuation Concern (Visions Of Rationality In Evidence Law Symposium), Richard D. Friedman

Articles

A great deal of the rhetoric of evidence discourse concerns the supposed cognitive inadequacies of the jury. In various contexts we are told that although an item of evidence is probative, it must be excluded because the jury will give it too much weight. I believe this approach has played far too great a role in evidentiary law, and that it is an interesting project to see whether we can construct a satisfactory body of law without relying at all on the cognitive inadequacy argument. I think that, at least to a large extent, we can. In some settings, where …

Confessions, Search And Seizure, And The Rehnquist Court, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

About the time William Rehnquist ascended to the Chief Justiceship of the United States, two events occurred that increased the likelihood that Miranda would enjoy a long life.

In Moran v. Burbine, a six to three majority held that a confession preceded by an otherwise valid waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights should not be excluded either (1) because the police misled an inquiring attorney when they told her they were not going to question the suspect she called about or (2) because the police failed to inform the suspect of the attorney's efforts to reach him.

Although Burbine has …

Dial-In Testimony, Richard D. Friedman, Bridget Mary Mccormack

Articles

For several hundred years, one of the great glories of the common law system of criminal justice has been the requirement that prosecution witnesses give their testimony in the presence of the accused" face to face," in the time-honored phrase-under oath, subject to cross-examination, and, unless unfeasible, in open court. In the United States, this principle is enshrined in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." But now a new way is developing for witnesses for the prosecution …

"Whodunit" Versus "What Was Done": When To Admit Character Evidence In Criminal Cases, Sherry F. Colb

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, the law of evidence prohibits parties from offering proof of an individual's general character traits to suggest that, on a specific occasion, the individual behaved in a manner consistent with those traits. In a criminal trial in particular, the law prohibits a prosecutor's introduction of evidence about the defendant's character as proof of his guilt. In this Article, Professor Colb proposes that the exclusion of defendant character evidence is appropriate in one category of cases but inappropriate in another. In the first category, which Professor Colb calls "whodunit" cases, the parties agree …

A Suggestion On Suggestion, Richard D. Friedman, Stephen J. Ceci

Articles

Part I of the full article briefly describes the history and current slate of research into children's suggestibility. In this part, we argue that, although psychological researchers disagree considerably over the degree to which he suggestibility of young children may lead to false allegations of sexual abuse, there is an overwhelming consensus that children are suggestible to a degree that, we believe, must be regarded as significant. In presenting this argument, we respond to the contentions of revisionist scholars, particularly those recently expressed by Professor Lyon. We show that there is good reason to believe the use of highly suggestive …

Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Does Dickerson v. U.S., reaffirming Miranda and striking down §3501 (the federal statute purporting to "overrule" Miranda), demonstrate judicial arrogance? Or does the legislative history of §3501 demonstrate the arrogance of Congress? Shortly after Dickerson v. U.S. reaffirmed Miranda and invalidated §3501, a number of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "judicial arrogance" in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissibility of confessions. The test, pointed out the critics, had been adopted by extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on law enforcement. The Dickerson Court did not discuss the legislative history of §3501 at all. However, …

The Suggestibility Of Children: Scientific Research And Legal Implications, Stephen J. Ceci, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this Article, Professors Ceci and Friedman analyze psychological studies on children's suggestibility and find a broad consensus that young children are suggestible to a significant degree. Studies confirm that interviewers commonly use suggestive interviewing techniques that exacerbate this suggestibility, creating a significant risk in some forensic contexts-notably but not exclusively those of suspected child abuse-that children will make false assertions of fact. Professors Ceci and Friedman address the implications of this difficulty for the legal system and respond to Professor Lyon's criticism of this view recently articulated in the Cornell Law Review. Using Bayesian probability theory, Professors Ceci and …

Lilly V. Virginia Glimmers Of Hope For The Confrontation Clause?, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In 1662, in The Case of Thomas Tong and Others, which involved charges of treason against several defendants, the judges of the King's Bench conferred on a crucial set of points of procedure. As reported by one of the judges, Sir John Kelyng, the judges agreed unanimously that a pretrial confession made to the authorities was evidence against the Party himself who made the Confession, and indeed, if adequately proved could support a conviction of that party without additional witnesses to the treason itself. But -- again unanimously, and quite definitively -- the judges also agreed that the confession cannot …

Lilly V. Virginia: A Chance To Reconceptualize The Confrontation Right, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court once again has the opportunity to grapple with the meaning of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmel).t. The basic facts of Lilly are simple, for they present the ageold problem of accomplice confessions. Three men, Gary Barker and Ben and Mark Lilly, went on a crime spree, during which one of them shot to death a young man they had robbed and kidnaped. Ben Lilly was charged with being the triggerman, and Barker testified to that effect at Ben's trial. Mark did not testify. But Mark had made a statement to the …

Confessions, Search And Seizure And The Rehnquist Court, Yale Kamisar

Articles

About the time William Rehnquist ascended to the Chief Justiceship of the United States, two events occurred that increased the likelihood that Miranda would enjoy a long life. In Moran v. Burbine,' a 6-3 majority held that a confession preceded by an otherwise valid waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights should not be excluded either (a) because the police misled an inquiring attorney when they told her they were not going to question the suspect she called about or (b) because the police failed to inform the suspect of the attorney's efforts to reach him.

The Three Threats To Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) was the centerpiece of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure. Moreover, as Professor Stephen Schulhofer of the University of Chicago Law School has recently noted, a numbir of the Miranda safeguards "have now become entrenched in the interrogation procedures of many countries around the world." But Miranda is in serious trouble at home.

Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro

Articles

The following article is an edited version of the amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1998, in the case of Benjamin Lee Lilly v. Commonwealth of Virginia (No. 98-5881). "This case raises important questions about the meaning of the confrontation clause, which has been a vital ingredient of the fair trial right for hundreds of years," Professor Richard Friedman and his co-authors say. "In particular, this case presents the Court with an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the confrontation clause and the law of hearsay." On June 10 the …

Confrontation And The Definition Of Chutzpa, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

You may know the standard illustration of chutzpa - the man who kills both his parents and then begs the sentencing court to have mercy on an orphan. In this article, I discuss a case of chutzpa that is nearly as outlandish - the criminal defendant who, having rendered his victim unavailable to testify, contends that evidence of the victim's statement should not be admitted against him because to do so would violate his right to confront her. I contend that in a case like this the defendant should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right. On the same …

Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Tome v United States, for the fifth time in eight years, the Supreme Court decided a case presenting the problem of how a child's allegations of sexual abuse should be presented in court. Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to testify at trial, or at least unable to testify effectively under standard procedures. These cases therefore raise intriguing and difficult questions related to the rule against hearsay and to an accused's right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. One would hardly guess that, however, from the rather arid debate …

Confrontation And The Utility Of Rules, Richard D. Friedman, Ronald J. Allen, Alex Stein, Roger C. Park, Margaret A. Berger, Nancy J. King, John Jackson, Eleanor Swift, Craig R. Callen, Eileen A. Scallen

Articles

There is a good reason why evidence scholars continue to be fascinated and perplexed, and some courts continue at least to be perplexed, by the types of evidence that tend to be lumped together misleadingly under the headings nonassertive conduct or implied assertions. Evidence of this sort highlights a paradox of the prevailing law of hearsay. I believe that this paradox cannot be resolved without fundamentally transforming the structure of that law. Thus, while I agree - within the current framework - with many of the insights so ably stated in this Symposium, I think evidence scholars must devote their …

The Warren Court And Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Many commentators have observed that when we speak of "the Warren Court," we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1962 (when Arthur Goldberg replaced Felix Frankfurter) to 1969 (when Earl Warren retired). But when we speak of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1961 (when the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio was decided) to 1966 or 1967. In its final years, the Warren Court was not the same Court that had handed down Mapp or Miranda v. Arizona.

Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality And Situation, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Part I of this Comment, I present a short version of my argument against the admissibility of character impeachment evidence of criminal defendants, showing how the key elements ofthis argument are present in Professor Uviller's own Article. In Part II, I suggest that, notwithstanding Professor Uviller's comments to the contrary, an asymmetrical result-never admitting character evidence to impeach criminal defendants but admitting such evidence in some circumstances to impeach other witnesses- is perfectly reasonable. Finally, in Part III, I contend that Professor Uviller's interesting judicial surveys support the solution I have proposed for the problem of character impeachment evidence.

The Death And Transfiguration Of Frye, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The rule of Frye v. United States was seventy years old, and had long dominated American law on the question of how well established a scientific principle must be for it to provide the basis for expert testimony. Even after the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, several of the federal circuits, as well as various states, purported to adhere to Frye's "general acceptance" standard. But now, unanimously, briefly, and with no apparent angst, the United States Supreme Court has held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. that the Frye rule is incompatible with the Federal Rules.

Introduction Of Scientific Evidence In Criminal Cases, H. Patrick Furman

Publications

No abstract provided.

Toward A Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis Of Hearsay, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this Article, I offer a fundamentally different and nondoctrinaire way of approaching hearsay questions. In brief, I take the view that the resolution of a hearsay dispute, when the declarant is not on the stand, is essentially a matter of deciding who should bear the burden of producing the declarant, or more precisely, how courts should allocate that burden. Adopting a simple procedural improvement, concerning the examination of the declarant if she is produced as a witness, allows the court to allocate the burden optimally. If live testimony by the declarant would be more probative than prejudicial, then most …

Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian (!?) Analysis And A Proposed Overhaul, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Typically, arguments for restricting character impeachment evidence are based in part on the premise that prior crimes, at least violent crimes, generally indicate little about a person's veracity. The argument advanced here against character impeachment of criminal defendants does not rely on that premise; in fact, it accepts the premise that prior antisocial behavior, even not involving dishonesty, often does indicate a good deal about a person's general truthtelling inclination. A careful analysis of the situation of the accused on the witness stand-rather than an easy assumption about irrelevance-leads to this Article's broad conclusion that character impeachment evidence of criminal …

Improving The Procedure For Resolving Hearsay Issues, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this article, I propose two changes in the way hearsay issues are usually resolved. First, in some circumstances courts should divide the burdens of producing the declarant-for example, by imposing the physical burden on the proponent and the financial burden on the opponent. Second, no matter how the declarant is produced as a witness, she should ordinarily testify as part of the proponent's case, subject to cross-examination by the opponent. If the declarant does become a witness, the admissibility of her out-of-court statement should not be resolved until her current testimony about the underlying events is received.

Remembering The 'Old World' Of Criminal Procedure: A Reply To Professor Grano, Yale Kamisar

Articles

When I graduated from high school in 1961, the "old world" of criminal procedure still existed, albeit in its waning days; when I graduated from law school in 1968, circa the time most of today's first-year law students were arriving on the scene, the "new world" had fully dislodged the old. Indeed, the force of the new world's revolutionary impetus already had crested. Some of the change that the criminal procedure revolution effected was for the better, but much of it, at least as some of us see it, was decidedly for the worse. My students, however, cannot make the …

'Comparative Reprehensibility' And The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Yale Kamisar

Articles

It is not . . . easy to see what the shock-the-conscience test adds, or should be allowed to add, to the deterrent function of exclusionary rules. Where no deterrence of unconstitutional police behavior is possible, a decision to exclude probative evidence with the result that a criminal goes free to prey upon the public should shock the judicial conscience even more than admitting the evidence. So spoke Judge Robert H. Bork, concurring in a ruling that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to foreign searches conducted exclusively by foreign officials. A short time thereafter, when an interviewer …

Introduction: Trends And Developments With Respect To That Amendment 'Central To Enjoyment Of Other Guarantees Of The Bill Of Rights', Yale Kamisar

Articles

Seventy years ago, in the famous Weeks case,' the Supreme Court evoked a storm of controversy by promulgating the federal exclusionary rule. When, a half-century later, in the landmark Mapp case,2 the Court extended the Weeks rule to state criminal proceedings, at least one experienced observer assumed that the controversy "today finds its end." 3 But as we all know now, Mapp only intensified the controversy. Indeed, in recent years spirited debates over proposals to modify the exclusionary rule or to scrap it entirely have filled the air - and the law reviews.'

Gates, 'Probable Cause', 'Good Faith', And Beyond, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Illinois v. Gates1 was the most eagerly awaited constitutional-criminal procedure case of the 1982 Term. I think it fair to say, however, that it was awaited a good deal more eagerly by law enforcement officials and the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement than by defense lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union. As it turned out, of course, the Gates Court, to the disappointment of many, did not reach the question whether the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases should be modified so as not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment when …

The Silent Revolution, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest On A 'Principled Basis' Rather Than An 'Empirical Proposition'?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

[U]ntil the [exclusionary rule] rests on a principled basis rather than an empirical proposition, [the rule] will remain in a state of unstable equilibrium. Mapp v. Ohio, which overruled the then twelve-year-old Wolf case and imposed the fourth amendment exclusionary rule (the Weeks doctrine) on the states as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process, seemed to mark the end of an era. Concurring in Mapp, Justice Douglas recalled that Wolf had evoked "a storm of constitutional controversy which only today finds its end."' But in the two decades since Justice Douglas made this observation, the storm of controversy has …