Law Commons^™

Altered States: Review Of John T. Noonan, Jr., 'Narrowing The Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides With The States', John Eastman

John C. Eastman

Conversative Ninth Circuit Judge John Noonan's book, 'Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States', lambasts the Supreme Court's federalism decisions, a hallmark of the Rehnquist Court's revival of the limits on national power originally envisioned by those who drafted and ratified the Constitution. This review takes Judge Noonan to task for misconstruing the original meaning of the Constitution's Commerce Clause, for example, but agrees with his assessment that the Court's 11th Amendment jurisprudence is a doctrinal mess.

Re-Evaluating The Privileges Or Immunities Clause, John C. Eastman

John C. Eastman

In its 1999 case, Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court re-invigorated a long-dead clause of the Constitution, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment. Oddly, though, the opinion was written by Justice Stevens, one of the staunchest devotees of a living Constitution rather than originalism. As odd: Justice Thomas, the most consistent originalist on the Court, was in dissent. In his view, any reinvigoration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause should displace, rather than augment, the untethered jurisprudence that expansively interpreted other clauses of the 14th Amendment to cover the neutered Privileges or Immunities Clause, and it should …

Dealing With Old Father William, Or Moving From Constitutional Text To Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review Of The Copyright Term Extension Act, Malla Pollack

Malla Pollack

The author suggests a textual approach to the choice of review standards for statutes enacted purusant to the so-called Intellectual Property Clause, which is more properly named the Progress Clause. Turning to text of the Constitution s relatively unproblematic because the Progress Clause contains unusually detailed constitutional text. Furthermore, what little the Court has stated about the fundamental goals of the Clause matches the author's reading of its text. Any approach based on the drafting or ratification discussions stumbles on the thinness of the record, as well as the record's possible unreliability. The text supports a standard of review higher …

What Is Congress Supposed To Promote? Defining ‘Progress” In Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 Of The U.S. Constitution, Or Introducing The Progress Clause, Malla Pollack

Malla Pollack

Empirical reserach into ratification-era uses of the word "progress" in the United States demonstrates that this word, as used in Article One, Section Eight, Clause Eight, means "spread," i.e. diffusion, distribution. To the extent that Congress chooses not to act under this clause, the default position is that each person in the United States has a property right not to be excluded from publicly accessible knowledge and technology. Congress has only a very limited power to create private quasi-property, i.e., rights to exclude the rest of the commoners. Congress may only create temporary individual rights for "authors" or "inventors" to …

The Multiple Unconstitutionality Of Business Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Choice, And Constitutional History, Malla Pollack

Malla Pollack

Business method patents are of sufficiently doubtful constitutionality that the Supreme Court should either render them void or, at the least, require a clear Congressional fact finding that they are likely to promote the "Progress of . . . [the] Useful Arts." Four separate arguments support this conclusion. First, common sense shows that patents on business methods do not promote progress. Second, Congress has not considered whether business method patents are likely to promote progress. Third, "useful arts," as that phrase is used in the Constitution, does not include mere commerce. Lastly, the historical background of the Intellectual Property Clause …

Is There A Little (Or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing In Indian Law?, Frank Pommersheim

Frank Pommersheim

No abstract provided.

Re-Entering The Arena: Restoring A Judicial Role For Enforcing Limits On Federal Mandates, John Eastman

John C. Eastman

The mini-revolution in 1994 that gave Republicans control of Congress for the first time in forty years, and which led to the enactment of the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) as part of the Contract with America, was designed in part to revive some foundational constitutional principles, including federalism, enumerated powers, and the non-delegation of lawmaking authority. This Article considers how successful the UMRA has been in furthering these principles and how shortcomings of the UMRA that have become evident over the past seven years might be corrected to further these principles still further. Part II of the …

Lessons From The Past: Is There Anything New In Constitutional Law?, John C. Eastman

John C. Eastman

Review of David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801-1829 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2001). Modern-day constitutional lawyers learn their trade largely from reading and discussing judicial opinions, but there is in our nation's history a rich tradition of constitutional debate in the other branches of the government. In this volume - the second in his look at constitutional debates in Congress, Professor David Currie does a masterful job not only describing the most significant constitutional debates of the Jeffersonian-era Congresses, but also demonstrating how relevant those debates are for current constitutional disputes, whether it be the impeachment …

The Senate Is Supposed To Advise And Consent, Not Obstruct And Delay, John C. Eastman, Timothy Sandefur

John C. Eastman

This article explores the original understanding of the Constitution's division of power between the President and the Senate with respect to judicial appointments. The President is given the sole power to nominate, and the primary role in appointment, while the Senate was understood as having a much more limited role, serving as a check on the President to prevent appointments for political favor, family connection, etc. What the founders did not envision was a co-equal role for the Senate--that would have undermined the kind of accountability that comes from assigning the principal role to a single individual: the President. And …

James Madison And The Constitution's “Convention For Proposing Amendments", Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article traces the progress of James Madison's thought on the Constitution's "convention for proposing amendments as a way for states to assert themselves against the federal government. Madison saw the convention as an important part of the Constitution, and a constitutional alternative to nullification.

Justice Stephen Field: Frontier Justice Or Justice At The Natural Rights Frontier?, John Eastman

John C. Eastman

Produced for a conference by the Claremont Institute commemmorating the 150th Anniversary of California statehood, this article explores the jurisprudential philosophy of one of California's great jurists, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field. From his decisions dealing with property rights, government regulation, and Chinese exclusion statutes, Justice Field consistently demonstrated a deep understanding of the natural law principles that provide the foundation of legitimacy for republican government.

Restoring The General To The General Welfare Clause, John Eastman

John C. Eastman

This article examines the original understanding of the Constitution's Spending Clause (giving Congress the power to tax for the common defense and general welfare) and the competing interpretations of it offered by Alexander Hamilton, on the one hand, and James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, on the other. Madison contended that the Clause's reference to the general welfare was just short-hand for the powers granted elsewhere in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, while Hamilton viewed the clause as a stand-alone grant of power. Even Hamilton, though, believed that the power had limits - spending had to be for the …

The Constitutional Implications Of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, Kim Forde-Mazrui

Kim Forde-Mazrui

This paper explores the constitutional implications of race-neutral affirmative action, i.e., governmental efforts to pursue affirmative action goals, such as remedying discrimination and promoting diversity, through non-racial means. For example, to increase minority enrollment, some public universities give weight in the admission process to economic background. This paper suggests that such "race-neutral" policies may be just as unconstitutional as racial preferences if they are motivated by arguably discriminatory (against whites) purposes. I then present two doctrinal defenses of race-neutral affirmative action. First, assuming that strict scrutiny would apply to such policies, I argue that remedying discrimination, even so-called "societal discrimination," …

Education And The Constitution: Shaping Each Other And The Next Century, Elizabeth Reilly

Elizabeth Reilly

Thinking about the interaction between the Constitution and education reveals that they are deeply interconnected, at profound levels of interdependence and complexity. Those connections are often strikingly visible, but are sometimes quite subtle.

A fundamental interdependence was formed with the decision to formulate our governmental structure as a democratic republic. The Constitution created the necessity for adequate public education to prepare the citizenry to exercise the role of self-government. An educated voting public underpins a successful democratic structure, as was explicitly recognized in Brown v. Board of Education, in which the Court acknowledged:

the importance of education to our democratic …

Urinating On The Pennsylvania Constitution? Drug Testing Of High School Athletes And Article I, Section 8 Of The Pennsylvania Constitution, Amanda Smith

Amanda Sholtis

The Right To Know?: Delimiting Database Protection At The Juncture Of The Commerce Clause, The Intellectual Property Clause, And The First Amendment, Malla Pollack

Malla Pollack

The people of the United States have a constitutional right to know; the government has a duty not to block access to information. The First Amendment and the Intellectual Property Clause cabin the Commerce Clause. Congress cannot create a quasi-property right to exclude others from information without clearly demonstrating market failure. Sui generis protection of data bases does not meet this threashold requirement.

Scared To Death: Capital Punishment As Authoritarian Terror Management, Donald P. Judges

Donald P. Judges

American capital punishment poorly serves its stated goal of deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation. It is outrageously expensive, morally troubling, and widely repudiated. Why and how, then, does it flourish here? Drawing on a social psychological theory known as “terror management,” I argue there that it is best understood as a largely non-conscious, symbolic defense against the incipient terror provoked by awareness of death. According to terror management theory, when reminded of their own mortality, people deploy a mostly non-conscious defensive process that reduces anxiety by enhancing self-esteem through identification with and protection of cultural worldview. This defense manifests in hyperpunitiveness, …

Constituição, Soberania E Ditadura Em Carl Schmitt, Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior

Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior

On the basis of a reconstruction of Schmitt's decisionism and of the analysis of its effects on key terms of his conception like democracy, sovereignty and dictatorship, Schmitt'sthought is examined regarding his theoretical and practical positions on the constitutional issues of Weimar's Germany and of National-socialism. Special attention is given to how for him the unity and the hierarchy of the political powers and of the lae demand a strong State and a centralized command instead of a pluralistic balance.

The Empty Circles Of Liberal Justification, Pierre Schlag

Pierre Schlag

No abstract provided.

Unconstitutional Incontestability?: The Intersection Of The Intellectual Property And Commerce Clauses Of The Constitution: Beyond A Critique Of Shakespeare Co. V. Silstar Corp., Malla Pollack

Malla Pollack

This article makes several assertions: (1) The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, even read with the Commerce Clause, prevents Congress from giving authors or inventors exclusive rights unbounded by premeasured time limitations; (2) Because such limits exist, even incontestable trademarks must be subject to functionality challenges in order to prevent conflict with the Patent Clause; (3) The Intellectual Property Clause requires a similar challenge to prevent conflict with the Copyright Clause; (4) The states are also limited by either direct constitutional mandate or statutory preemption. Based on the first two assertions, this article argues that the Fourth Circuit's decision …

How To Limit Gerrymandering, Michael E Lewyn

Michael E Lewyn

An extensive discussion of constitutional issues related to partisan gerrymandering.

The Textualist (Reviewing George Anastaplo, The Constitution Of 1787: A Commentary (1989)), Robert C. Power

Robert C Power

No abstract provided.

Obscenity And The Right To Be Let Alone: The Balancing Of Constitutional Rights, Stephen W. Gard

Stephen W. Gard

While on the one hand a conceptual framework for obscenity cases is essential, it is equally true that the Supreme Court has in the past accepted theories proposed by commentators without making significant progress in extricating itself from the quagmire. In light of this situation, the purpose of this Note is not to urge the Court to accept any new theory for dealing with obscenity, but, rather, to suggest a conceptual framework present in the results of its prior decisions and to urge its explicit acceptance by the Court. No attempt will be made to be faithful to all the …

Treaty And Constitution. A Comparative Analysis Of An Uneasy Relationship, Theodor Jr Schilling

Theodor JR Schilling

Constitutions may be reversed by revolution. Treaty-constitutions may also be terminated by mutual consent of the contracting parties. A secession and a unilateral denunciation are, as a rule, not permissible under international law but will be recognized if effective. The only possibility to prevent a secession is to take away the social substratum of a secession i.e. to merge the peoples of the state from which the secession would take place. Such a merger allows the people, as constituent power, to adopt the treaty-constitution as its own. Such an adoption may be made in the forms of the creation of …